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ABSTRACT
A key characteristic that has led to the early adoption of public cloud computing is the utility
pricing model that governs the cost of compute resources consumed. Similar to public utilities
like gas and electricity, cloud consumers only pay for the resources they consume and only for
the time they are utilized. As a result and pursuant to a Cloud Service Provider’s (CSP) Terms
of Agreement, cloud consumers are responsible for all computational costs incurred within and
in support of their rented computing environments whether these resources were consumed in
good faith or not. While initial threat modeling and security research on the public cloud
model has primarily focused on the confidentiality and integrity of data transferred, processed,
and stored in the cloud, little attention has been paid to the external threat sources that have
the capability to aﬀect the financial viability of cloud-hosted services.
Bounded by a utility pricing model, Internet-facing web resources hosted in the cloud are
vulnerable to Fraudulent Resource Consumption (FRC) attacks. Unlike an application-layer
DDoS attack that consumes resources with the goal of disrupting short-term availability, a
FRC attack is a considerably more subtle attack that instead targets the utility model over
an extended time period. By fraudulently consuming web resources in suﬃcient volume (i.e.
data transferred out of the cloud), an attacker is able to inflict significant fraudulent charges
to the victim. This work introduces and thoroughly describes the FRC attack and discusses
why current application-layer DDoS mitigation schemes are not applicable to a more subtle
attack. The work goes on to propose three detection metrics that together form the criteria
for detecting a FRC attack from that of normal web activity and an attribution methodology
capable of accurately identifying FRC attack clients. Experimental results based on plausible
and challenging attack scenarios show that an attacker, without knowledge of the training web
log, has a diﬃcult time mimicking the self-similar and consistent request semantics of normal
web activity necessary to carryout a successful FRC attack.
1CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
Chapter contains modified content from the following submitted journal paper:
Idziorek, J., Tannian, M. and Jacobson, D. Insecurity of Cloud Utility Models. IEEE IT
Professional, c￿ IEEE 2012.
1.1 Dissertation Organization
The chapters provided in this dissertation provide a logical progression of work starting
with the broad analysis of the security aspects of the cloud computing model followed by a
systematic dissection of the specific problem this dissertation seeks to address. Each of the
respective chapters were written as individual papers. Because of this, the reader will find
minor overlap in the introductory content between chapters and such overlap was not removed
to enable each chapter to stand on their own as individual works. Together the combination
of these chapters provide a comprehensive analysis of the Fraudulent Resource Consumption
(FRC) attack on public cloud computing utility models.
Chapter 1 provides a high-level overview and introduction to the research problem addressed
in this dissertation. Chapter 2 presents a broad security analysis of the public cloud computing
model using the Parkerian Hexad as a system of analysis. From this survey of literature and
cloud related security concerns, a specific attack on the cloud computing model referred to as
the FRC attack is introduced in Chapter 3 and initial detection and attribution methodologies
are considered. To better understand how an attacker would carry-out a FRC attack, Chap-
ter 4 provides a simulation model and algorithm for generating web traﬃc in order to mimic
2a normal client base and thus providing a worst-case attack scenario. Chapter 5 presents a
FRC detection methodology capable of diﬀerentiating increases in aggregate traﬃc produced
by legitimate clients from that of a FRC attack. Following suit, Chapter 6 provides an attribu-
tion methodology that distinguishes legitimate clients from FRC attack clients. To provide a
complete analysis of the FRC attack, Chapter 7 discusses potential prevention and mitigation
solutions. Lastly, Chapter 8 summarizes this work and identifies the contributions this work
makes to the respective fields of study.
1.2 Introduction - Insecurity of Cloud Utility Models
Computing services that were traditionally hosted on organizations private servers and
networks are being outsourced to third-party Cloud Service Providers (CSPs). Initial threat
modeling on CSPs has concentrated on both the confidentiality (keeping data secret) and
integrity (making sure the data has not changed) of data hosted in the public cloud. While
these threats present real concerns, missing from threat models is the consideration of external
threat sources that can aﬀect the availability of Internet-facing cloud services. Availability in
this context is not solely restricted to system downtime as a result of a Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attack, but also the long-term financial viability of being able to host services
in the cloud.
A key feature that has led to the early adoption of public cloud computing is the utility
pricing model that governs the cost of computing resources consumed [77]. Similar to public
utilities like gas and electricity, cloud consumers only pay for the resources they consume (i.e.,
storage, bandwidth, and computer hours) and only for the time they are utilized. As a result
and as obligated by a CSP’s Terms of Agreement, cloud consumers are responsible for all
computational costs incurred in their leased compute environments whether these resources
were consumed in good faith or not.
Common use cases for corporations that have adopted public cloud computing include web-
site and web-application hosting and e-commerce. Like any Internet-facing presence, these
cloud-based services are equally vulnerable to Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks.
Moreover, given the addition of pay-as-you-go-pricing, cloud-hosted web services are also vul-
3nerable to attacks that seek to exploit the utility pricing model. While DDoS attacks are well
known and the associated risks are well researched, this article will explore a comparatively
more subtle attack on web-based services hosted in the cloud. The threat-source considered is
an attacker (e.g. botnet) that seeks to perform a Fraudulent Resource Consumption (FRC) at-
tack by consuming the metered bandwidth of web-based services that in-turn incurs a financial
burden on the cloud consumer.
Internet
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Figure 1.1: FRC Network Attack Diagram
The attack scenario depicted in Figure 1.1 illustrates the exploitation of the cloud utility
model vulnerability. Here a botnet consisting of potentially thousands of bot clients is con-
suming web resources hosted in the cloud by mimicking legitimate client behavior. To the
cloud-based web application, the intention of incoming requests is unknown, not considered
and thus each request is serviced with a reply that incurs a fractional cost that is assessed to
the cloud consumer. Due to the fact that this vulnerability up until now has not been dis-
cussed, determining the overall impact of the threat to the cloud community is diﬃcult at this
time. Instead, the focus of this work is to describe and bring awareness to the utility model
vulnerability, analyze the risk of a FRC attack for a specific cloud consumer and propose FRC
prevention, detection, attribution, and mitigation solutions. The overall goal of this work is to
get ahead of this vulnerability before it is inevitably exploited.
41.3 Cloud Utility Pricing Model
The utility model is attractive to a cloud consumer because of the low cost of entry and
avoidance of major capital expenses. While convenient, the utility model is not without its risks
as the financial liability for resources consumed is unlimited. CSPs such as Amazon EC2 [2] and
Rackspace [94] charge $0.12/GB (up to 40 TB) and $0.18/GB respectively for outbound data
transfers. As illustrated in Figure 1.1 and based on these pricing metrics, each reply serviced
by a cloud application (i.e. the attack target) is assessed a cost to the cloud consumer (i.e. the
victim). Requests in suﬃcient volume can be costly. Malicious use is even more burdensome
since the additional run-up in expenses has no associated business value. As it stands today,
CSPs do not monitor cloud consumers applications and thus it is up to the cloud consumer to
prevent, monitor and respond to such fraudulent behavior [60].
1.4 FRC Attack Description
As evidenced by recent trends in DDoS attacks, attackers are employing the services of
botnets with populations of upwards of tens of thousands of compromised hosts and are using
these botnets as an attack tool to wreak havoc on the Internet [58, 87]. In order to increase
eﬀectiveness and circumvent current detection mechanisms, attackers are moving away from
obvious network-layer attacks such as SYN floods and targeting application-layer resources
by means of HTTP flooding attacks. This discussion and the description of the FRC attack
anticipates a natural evolution of these attacks on metered resources hosted in the public cloud.
In order to describe the FRC attack more precisely, one could consider a time-series visu-
alization of a web server log as seen in Figure 1.2. Reading from bottom to top, the y-axis
depicts requests per second and the time-series covers a two-week time period (x-axis). As is
common, the modeled web server capacity is suﬃciently over-provisioned and this represents a
conservative estimate given the capacity of CSP web servers. Superimposed on top of normal
web activity are serviced requests from a FRC attack.
As shown in the callout in Figure 1.2, initial attack intensity above normal activity is a
region labeled Nuisance Activity because the resultant costs are insignificant for the cloud
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Figure 1.2: FRC Attack Region
consumer. However, as malicious activity intensifies beyond the Nuisance Activity region, the
malicious costs to the cloud consumer start to become a matter of concern; this transition
point is labeled J1. Malicious activity that exceeds J1 enters into the FRC Attack Region.
Within this region bounded by J1 and J2, a FRC attack does not significantly degrade the
Quality of Service (QoS) of the web server. With a utility model assigning costs for all data
transferred out of the CSP environment, this region is of interest to an attacker who wishes
to inflict economic pain. If the attack intensity increases above J2, the request volume will
reach a point when the web server QoS starts to significantly degrade. It is at this point
that current application-layer DDoS detection and mitigation schemes are eﬀective [58]. An
objective of FRC attack mitigation research is to improve detection sensitivity that will push
J2 closer to J1, thus narrowing the FRC Attack Region by detecting attacks that are legitimate
transactions, but diﬀer in the requestors intent.
Figure 1.3 depicts a FRC attack as a slow-and-low assault or death by a thousand requests.
Unlike short-lived DDoS attacks, the duration of a FRC attack could last weeks or months if
not detected. Because resources maliciously consumed are additive to that of normal traﬃc,
the aggregate of legitimate and malicious resource use is reflected in a cloud consumers monthly
bill.
Availability in the context of this discussion is not a binary measure in which the system
is nearly incapacitated at the time of the attack. The technical infrastructure of a website
hosted in a CSP environment will have no trouble functioning while a FRC attack is underway.
Instead, availability is a long-term consideration defined as the cloud consumer’s ability to
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withstand the financial consequences of a FRC attack over a prolonged period of time.
Although cloud computing makes for a compelling use case of the utility model, the concept
of utility computing is not unique to the cloud model and has been exploited in the past. How-
ever, as it stands today, the utility model contains an unaddressed vulnerability for the cloud
model and requires the attention of cloud consumers, security practitioners and researchers.
1.5 FRC Risk
Adopting the public cloud model brings with it new and old security risks. A key objective
of this article is to bring attention to the risk the utility pricing model introduces by discussing
the likelihood and impact of a FRC attack.
The likelihood of a cloud consumer falling victim to a FRC attack is largely dependent
upon the skill level, capacity and motivation of the attacker as well as the exploitability of
the utility pricing model. This pricing vulnerability is literally hiding in plain sight as CSPs
openly publish their pricing metrics. From a technical standpoint, all that is necessary for an
attacker to exploit this vulnerability is to make standard requests for web content that the
cloud consumer makes publically available. Although the worst-case threat-source is that of
7a large botnet, conceivably any Internet-connected device could perform a FRC attack with a
PERL script making HTTP GET requests or through the use of the infamous Low Orbit Ion
Cannon - an open-source tool that has fueled recent DDoS attacks [88].
As evidenced by the growing number, capacity, and sophistication of both botnets and
DDoS attacks respectively, the worst-case threat-sources undoubtedly possess the skill level
and resources to mount a sustained and impactful FRC attack. Thus, the only real factor
preventing a FRC attack is the motivation of the attacker. Like those that orchestrate DDoS
attacks, the motive of a FRC attacker could range from ego and hacktivisim to monetary
gain, extortion, revenge, creating a competitive advantage, and/or economic espionage [113].
If recent history is any guide, those that control botnets would likely perform a FRC attack to
promote a political agenda or in support of an ideological viewpoint.
For the victim, the direct monetary impact of a FRC attack is a function of the average
request intensity and the duration of the attack. To enumerate one end of the extreme, a week-
long DDoS attack launched from a 250,000 node botnet in 2011 peaked at 45Gbps [26]. If such
an attack were sustained on a cloud instance at $0.12/GB the resultant costs would have been
$0.68/s, $40/min, $2430/h, $58,320/day and $408,240/week. On the other end of the FRC
Attack Region, considered the website modeled in Figure 1.2. At an average normal request
rate of three requests per second, for a 250,000-node botnet to double the data usage costs
of this website would equate to each bot client being responsible for generating two requests
per day. Clearly, given the capacity of modern-day networks and computers, the bot clients
in this example could significantly increase their daily request quota and multiply the attack
cost by orders of magnitude. However, as will be discussed, once a bot clients usage footprint
eclipses the expected behavior of legitimate clients, the risk of being identified as malicious
greatly increases.
1.6 Defending Against a FRC Attack
Defending against a FRC attack is a significant challenge to the cloud consumer due to the
atypical and unassuming nature of the attack. As is the case with most attack risk, the cloud
consumer has four primary objectives: prevention, detection, attribution, and mitigation. Each
8of these aspects will be considered in this dissertation in the context of the FRC attack.
1.6.1 Prevention
A common way to prevent the exploitation of a vulnerability is to download and apply a
patch for it. However, in the context of this discussion, the bug is not a software defect but a
common business model deployed by CSPs. Until this vulnerability is actually exploited, the
cloud business model is not likely to change, so in lieu of a patch for this vulnerability there
are several, albeit limited, prevention options (Chapter 7). While the use of authentication
on a target website would significantly reduce the amount of exploitable resources, for this
discussion, this website feature is not considered as it is assumed the cloud consumer desires
to host public content. Similarly, graphical puzzles (i.e. CAPTCHAS) could be used as a
preemptive solution to diﬀerentiate humans and zombie computers. However, the use of such a
test could be detrimental to the overall goals of a public-facing website as these types of tests
will result in a certain percentage of legitimate clients being unable or unwilling to solve such
puzzles. Another option would be for the cloud consumer to work with application and content
developers to minimize the resource footprint of common or average requests. Limiting the
impact of client requests increases the costs for the FRC attacker and the risk of detection.
Unfortunately, without a utility model patch these controls will not thwart a motivated attacker.
So with limited prevention capability the next line of defense is detection.
1.6.2 Detection
The objective of FRC detection is to be able to determine if malicious traﬃc consumption
is occurring (Chapter 5). Due to the subtle nature of a FRC attack, previous application-layer
DDoS solutions that focus on high request intensities will not be suitable for FRC detec-
tion [120]. Instead, initial FRC detection approaches focus on behavioral metrics derived from
web logs that seek to capture the aggregate web page request choices of a websites client base.
Three measures, the Spearman, Overlap, and Zipf metrics have been identified to characterize
the accuracy, completeness, and relative proportionality of ranked requests respectively be-
tween two adjacent windows of observed logs (e.g. two 3-day windows). Together these three
9metrics provide consistent measures with which to describe normal behavior and to perform
anomaly detection. Although, for the sake of brevity, empirical results are not presented in
this discussion, the conclusion stemming from this work is that an attacker, without knowledge
of the training data set (i.e. historical web log), has a diﬃcult time requesting an impactful
volume of web documents while adhering to the structure of normal traﬃc. Thus the proposed
methodology is eﬀective for detecting even minor increases in fraudulent web activity, well
before the resultant costs are harmful.
The most practical detection approaches are classic. Review the bills over time and de-
termine if they are within an expected range. If not, one possible explanation is fraudulent
resource consumption. Log analyzers may help identify outlier application usage that can then
trigger an investigation of suspicious clients. A savvy FRC attacker will unfortunately be
missed by casual inspection.
1.6.3 Attribution
Attribution in this context is the ability to accurately diﬀerentiate legitimate clients from
that of FRC attack clients (Chapter 6). Like the previously discussed DDoS detection solutions,
current attribution solutions are geared towards detecting malicious clients that consume a
significant volume of requests in a very short time. Past works have focused on scrutinizing
the increased inter-request (i.e. time between successive web document requests) or inter-
session (i.e. time between web browsing sessions) arrival request rates of malicious clients in
comparison to that of a profile for normal users [97]. Again, it is contrary to the objectives of
a FRC attack for a single attack client to behave in a similar fashion as one participating in a
DDoS attack.
The challenge in this research area will be to minimize the number of falsely identified
legitimate clients while decreasing the impact of fraudulent clients. The methodology presented
in Chapter 6 indicates that normal client behavior can be characterized by client actions such
as: request volume per client, web documents requested, and web session parameters (e.g.,
requests per session and number of sessions). If attack clients, not privy to normal usage
activity, exceed a set threshold on these characteristics, they are flagged as malicious. A design
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goal of this attribution methodology is to be transparent to the clients and operates under the
condition that all clients are innocent until their usage footprint proves otherwise. Limiting
the impact of individual clients reduces the overall risk of a FRC attack. It is important to
note that this methodology is not rate-based, but instead sensitive to the accumulated requests
invoked by an attacker. Therefore, based on the choices made by an attacker, a malicious client
could be deemed anomalous after invoking a minimal number of requests.
1.6.4 Mitigation
Reactive solutions rely on accurate detection and attribution (Chapter 7). One must con-
sider the potential for legitimate clients being errantly classified as malicious. As a result,
approaches like blacklisting first-time oﬀenders may prove to be heavy-handed. Less absolute
mitigation strategies include imposing a back-oﬀ timeout to anomalous clients in which re-
quests from an IP address are not all serviced. Similarly, suspicious clients could also be served
a graphical puzzle to prove that the client is indeed a human. These reactive approaches are
available today and each has its own trade-oﬀs, but with limited detection and attribution
solutions available, the deployment and maintenance of such solutions will be challenging.
1.7 Summary
As they are structured today, cloud utility models are vulnerable to exploitation. By
allowing any client with access to the Internet to consume resources that are in turn metered
and billed exposes the cloud consumer to a risk that is only mitigated by time, detection and
accountability. Until recently, this vulnerability has been neglected and there have been no
previously known defense strategies. Awareness and understanding are a key means of defense,
and this dissertation strives to achieve those goals. Unless utility models are restructured to
remove the vulnerability of a FRC attack, research in detection and attribution is necessary to
ensure the long-term sustainability of cloud consumers and remove one more impediment that
could dissuade organizations from adopting public cloud computing.
To the best of the author’s knowledge, there have been no known public acknowledgements
of a FRC attack occurring on the public cloud. However, the absence of such knowledge does
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not confirm that the utility model vulnerability has not or will not be exploited. As an analog,
back in the early 90’s, Internet-facing firewalls were new and thought to be suﬃcient to secure a
connected enterprise. However, reality was that attacks were occurring and intrusion detection
systems soon pointed out these threats. Perhaps the utility model has been exploited and, as an
IT community, we are presently ill equipped to detect its presence or identify its culprits. The
only factor preventing a FRC attack is the motivation of the attacker. Through a systematic
analysis of the utility model vulnerability, this dissertation seeks to contribute to this research
eﬀort.
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CHAPTER 2. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC CLOUD
COMPUTING
Chapter contains modified content from the following published journal paper:
Idziorek, J. and Tannian, M. Security Analysis of Public Cloud Computing. International
Journal of Communication Networks and Distributed Systems, Vol. 9, Nos. 1/2, 2012, pp.
4-20, c￿ 2012 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd. (Invited Paper)
2.1 Abstract
Cloud computing is in its infancy and continues to evolve. As this evolution proceeds,
there are a number of privacy and security concerns emerging from the cloud computing model
that need to be addressed before broad acceptance occurs. This chapter is an initial literature
survey of cloud computing security, which promises to be a challenging research area. Although
cloud computing security research inherits previous research from its elemental technologies,
this chapter will limit its focus on surveying cloud computing targeted research. By performing
a systematic analysis of the security aspects of the cloud model, this work seeks to succinctly
clarify why security continues to be a significant impediment for cloud adoption.
2.2 Introduction
Cloud computing is in its infancy and continues to evolve. Early adopters of cloud com-
puting have recognized the cost savings, convenience, and agility this emerging compute model
aﬀords. However, as this evolution proceeds, there are a number of security and privacy con-
13
cerns emerging from the cloud computing model that need to be addressed before extensive
adoption occurs [42]. While much of the initial hype has created an ambiguous characterization
of what exactly does and does not constitute cloud computing, this paper will concentrate on
the cloud model as described by NIST [77]. The technologies comprising much of this descrip-
tion of cloud computing have been around for some time now (e.g., virtualization, broadband,
high- density storage, multi-core processors), however it has not been until recent years that
these technologies have all matured to the point where this novel synthesis of these founda-
tional components could be realized. As the cloud computing model matures, so will the body
of research that addresses the security concerns. The objective of this chapter is to present a
checkpoint of the current state of cloud computing security research by providing a system-
atic analysis and survey of relevant literature. Although much research has been conducted
on the individual components that together support the orchestration of the cloud model, the
emphasis of this work will be to concentrate on cloud-specific security research. The aim is
to succinctly clarify why security continues to be a highly significant impedance to full-scale
adoption.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2.3 provides the background for cloud computing
model. Section 2.4 provides a corresponding threat model. A description of the system of
analysis and the subsequent analysis are presented in Sections 2.5 and 2.6 respectively. Finally,
the chapter concludes with a discussion in Section 2.7.
2.3 Background
One useful way to understand cloud computing and related security issues is to consider
the major components starting with the nature of the cloud host followed by physical resources
tenants have in common and finally the connectivity. This work focuses explicitly on public
cloud computing where open access is marketed. Three actors will be referenced throughout
the chapter. The cloud service provider (CSP) is a company who provides pay-as-you-go
services using an infrastructure that is consistent with NISTs definition of cloud computing [77].
The tenant is the CSPs customer who has an application being serviced by the CSP and is
responsible for paying for cloud services. The user is the client of the tenant who derives value
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from using the cloud-hosted applications.
Figure 2.1: Cloud Layer Technology Stack
The cloud host can be viewed as a layered technology stack residing on the physical server
hardware. Each of the layers, as shown in Figure 2.1, provides abstraction of resources and
functionality to the layers above itself. The completeness and depth of control a tenant has
within the stack have been associated with service oﬀerings called software-as-a-service (SaaS),
platform-as-a-service (PaaS) and infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS).
In order for cloud computing to be a feasible information technology (IT) oﬀering, CSPs
have orchestrated a collection of technologies and investments in a manner that exhibit the
properties of economies of scale. In order to achieve these economies, resources are shared
among tenants (Figure 2.2). The communications infrastructure between users and tenant
applications is common. Multi-tenancy is optimized in order to increase returns on capital
investments. The result is that tenants share physical platforms consisting of CPUs, memory,
networking and storage. Isolation between tenants is provided through built-in logical controls.
Virtualization is one such logical control able to encapsulate tenant operating environments.
Large centralized storage arrays are managed with common storage constructs like relational
databases for the purposes of holding tenant data.
Connectivity as shown in Figure 2.3 is the last major perspective to consider. The global
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Figure 2.2: Shared Cloud Resources
Internet puts a world-wide market in technical reach of the CSP and users access tenant appli-
cations through the Internet. The tenants operational staﬀ manages operations on the Internet.
CSP staﬀ can remote in as well. Resilient low-cost service requires high connectivity within
the CSP data center in order to facilitate host migration and data replication. Resiliency
features and cost reduction are also supported across data centers through high bandwidth
intra-connectivity.
2.4 Threat Model
Assessing security and risk for an environment requires a working model of the threats
the system under evaluation could potentially experience. Threat modeling of public cloud
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Figure 2.3: Cloud Connectivity
computing in general will encompass a superset of threats to which a specific cloud-hosted
application implementation may not be exposed. Please refer to Figures 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6
throughout this discussion. The labelled points represent interfaces through which a threat
may exploit access. These labelled points will be referred to as <X.Y-Z> where X.Y is the
figure label and Z is a unique designation typically assigned in top-down order within the figure.
When considering threat-sources there are four classes of actors one can consider. The
classes are oriented to the origination of their attack. The first class is the Internet originating
threat sources <2.5-1>, which includes a long list of usual suspects (e.g., script- kiddy, hactivist,
botnet, corporate or government sponsored intelligence operative). The second class and third
class of threat sources have the potential to exploit the advantage of proximity and trust.
Second is of the semi-privileged actors who operate on behalf of neighboring tenants of the
victim (e.g., contractors, employees) <2.5-2, 2.5-3, 2.5-4>. The third and most dangerous class
is the fully-privileged actor who operates on behalf of the CSP or the victim (i.e. trusted
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insiders) <6.2, 6.3, 6.4>. The last is non-malicious with a wide range of origination points
such as operational failure due to natural disturbances, human error or technology faults.
Figure 2.4: Cloud Layer Technology Stack - Threat Interfaces
When considering the conceptual architecture of public cloud computing it appears to
present threat-sources with newfound leverage. By moving applications from within private
enclaves to the Internet-accessible public cloud, the Internet class of threat-sources has new
opportunities to possibly threaten the interface points <2.4-1, 2.4-2, 2.4-3>. The strategic
objective of the attackers may vary, but the tactical objectives of exploiting exposed software
and configuration vulnerabilities <2.4-1, 2.4-2, 2.4-3> and exhausting or misusing accessible
resources can be anticipated. A CSP supplied firewall service may be able to reduce exposure
to the ports not relevant to the application, but application exposure is necessary otherwise it
is inaccessible to the tenants users.
Although operational failures are not unique to cloud computing, the overall complexity
of the architecture that spans from users to the internal cloud implementation has increased.
Complexity is the antithesis of operational availability. Greater sensitivity or fragility can be
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Figure 2.5: Shared Cloud Resources - Threat Interfaces
expected in operations of the public cloud model. Natural events, power outages, DNS root
server saturation or cache poisoning, user Internet Service Provider (ISP) connectivity issues,
and internal capacity planning mistakes or countless possible configuration errors or system
failures within the CSP environment <2.4-1 - 2.4-5, 2.5-1 - 2.5-4, 2.6-4, 2.6-5> threaten user
access to cloud-hosted services.
An international CSP raises the specter of geo-politics threatening information flow be-
tween facilities. The US Government has proposed an Internet kill switch to isolate US-based
information systems from foreign threats [47]. Personal privacy protections instituted in var-
ious countries and other regulations limit the physical location of sensitive data storage [41].
The regulatory restrictions and opaque nature of CSP operations threaten organizations with
non-compliance if the data storage fault tolerance and archive algorithms within the CSP allow
compliance sensitive data to leave the authorized geo-location <2.6-5>.
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Figure 2.6: Cloud Connectivity - Threat Interfaces
As the literature survey proceeds in Section 2.5, this threat model will help provide context
for cloud computing security research conducted to date.
2.5 System of Analysis
Published analysis of cloud computing security is relatively recent. Analysts seem to have
waited for definition, implementation and interest to reach a minimum level of maturity. In the
past couple of years, at least ten papers have investigated, contemplated and researched broad
areas of cloud computing security [22, 48, 49, 54, 55, 57, 61, 62, 63, 66, 90, 96, 99, 101, 106].
The pool of cloud computing specific research is relatively shallow. However, several of these
papers endeavored to provide a literature survey [22, 48, 54] using organizing principles like
attack surfaces [48] or a compact scheme of: traditional security, availability and third-party
data control [22].
This paper reviews the body of cloud computing security literature for completeness of
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coverage. A system of orthogonal security principles is used to create a comprehensive review
structure to classify existing security research and illuminate gaps in areas of focus. The security
field has embraced the tenants of confidentiality, integrity and availability as the qualities secure
information systems should attempt to assure. However, such a model is an incomplete set of
qualities to consider when securing information and information systems in or adjacent to the
public cloud. Donn Parker [89] suggested in 1998 three additional orthogonal elements. These
additional elements should prove to be useful for this survey.
The elements we consider are confidentiality, integrity, availability, utility, authenticity and
possession. Please refer to Table 2.1 for the definitions of these terms. Since the terms utility,
authenticity and possession are not commonly considered, a brief elaboration of these terms
will be provided.
Utility on its face appears to be closely related to Availability, but Parker’s use of this term
avoids any conceptual overlap. Consider the example of digital data on existing paper tape,
punch cards, or on 8”, 5 1/4” floppy discs. If these media have been preserved, the information
stored is available for retrieval. If one ordered a modern computer today, one would find it
diﬃcult to request any of these media reading devices and any legacy drivers present in the
operating system will have questionable reliability. In this case, there is a lack of device and
driver availability, but fundamentally the stored information remains available. Information
availability is necessary but not suﬃcient for it to be useful.
Authenticity and Integrity may also appear to overlap conceptually, but consider that with-
out credible attribution to information origin the information may not suﬀer from an unau-
thorized change but from fundamental semantic credibility. Authenticity and data provenance
have a lot in common. However, provenance incorporates the notion of the importance of
knowing and being able to document the origin and life history of a data object in terms of
where it has been. Authenticity is satisfied if there is confidence in the informations authorship
or origin as well as if the information conforms to reality or fact. For example, an Internet-
hosted software download with an associated unsigned cryptographic hash value has verifiable
integrity, however the author or publisher cannot be verified. A verifiable signed cryptographic
hash would support authenticity, but would be insuﬃcient to achieve data provenance.
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Table 2.1: Parker’s Six Security Elements.
Security Element Description
Confidentiality the attribute of information whereby it has not been
exposed intentionally or accidentally to unauthorized
entities
Integrity the attribute of information whereby it has not been
subject to unauthorized state change whether inten-
tional or accidental
Availability the attribute of information and supporting systems
whereby they are reliably accessible with minimal de-
lay
Utility the attribute of information usefulness for a purpose
Authenticity the attribute of information in which the information
is genuine, the assertion of authorship or origin is true,
and is overall worthy of trust because it conforms to
reality or fact
Possession the state of information of which an entity has power,
physical control or holding of a specific instance of this
information, and an opportunity to use the informa-
tion
Possession is the most fundamental control of an object. The possessor has the opportunity
to destroy, alter or utilize the object. Encrypted data held by someone who lacks the decryption
key or algorithm remains confidential, but by possessing the encrypted data an opportunity
arises to attempt to decrypt the data (e.g., during World War II the allied capture of German
submarine communications and Enigma machines). Having a UNIX system password file ini-
tially is not a loss of confidentiality. However, by possessing the password file, the only control
protecting the passwords is the salted hash. With brute-forcing software, hardware, time and
patience, the confidentiality of hashed passwords can be undone. Possession provides the holder
the means to violate the other security properties of the information as well. A tenant utilizing
a cloud-hosted application has shown a willingness to share or relinquish possession of data
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and related information processing.
2.6 Analysis
2.6.1 Confidentiality
Perhaps, the single most significant impediment to the adoption of the cloud computing
model results from the lack of confidence in the confidentiality of data processing and storage
in a CSPs environment [100]. These concerns are well-founded as CSPs have experienced
privacy gaﬀes in the past that have inadvertently exposed tenants data [107]. When data is
moved outside of a trusted domain, data confidentiality issues arise for all of the datas states:
data-in-transit, data-at-rest and data-under-processing.
While research on the topic of data storage on untrusted platforms is not unique to the
cloud model [76], the proposed use cases for the cloud model (i.e. digital health records)
warrant further examination of privacy and confidentiality controls. Initial solutions have been
proposed to provide third-party management of encryption keys [127] as well as decoupling
access control from the CSP [33].
Even if data is encrypted in transit and it is encrypted at rest, all data processed in the
cloud has surely has been decrypted. Recent work in fully homomorphic encryption may pro-
vide tenants a means to implement computational processes without exposing the data being
processed to the CSP [79]. Fully homomorphic encrypted data can undergo useful transforma-
tions without ever requiring decryption by the developed application or the CSP [43].
Interposing technologies used in virtualized environments provide granular views into the
activities being performed on the host [31]. Confidential data and any supporting cryptographic
key materials are potentially being monitored and logged in the clear as the tenant is utilizing
them within processes. Unless an organizations security policy is rewritten to extend authorized
entities to include the CSP or make use of specialized hardware and protocols [53], there is
no way currently to prevent an unauthorized CSP operator from reconstituting confidential
information. Entire sequences of computations can be replayed potentially exposing sensitive
activities along with data. A successful implementation of a fully homomorphic system, which
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although promising does not seem likely in the near future [79], would have a significant eﬀect
on the confidentiality of data stored and processed in a CSP environment.
Although the encapsulation of VMs in a cloud environment is considered to provide logical
separation between tenants, recent research has shown that the use of virtualization does not
preclude an adversary from engaging in side-channel attacks that threaten confidentiality of
a number of facets within a tenants environment [98]. Known as a cross-VM side-channel
attack, an attacker on the same physical machine as the victim has the potential to monitor
time-shared caches for the purpose of measuring the load of the machine. Based on such
knowledge, it has been shown on Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) that an attacker
is able to determine whether or not they are co-located on the same machine as the victim
(i.e. cloud cartography) as well as estimate the victims network traﬃc patterns. In the stated
examples, although the leakage of such information does not reveal the direct knowledge of data
stored or computed in such an environment, it does potentially provide a competitor with the
necessary information to inflict potentially damaging DoS attacks or perform inference analysis
on activities. Furthermore, sharing resources among fellow tenants opens the door to theft of
cryptographic keys via similar cache-based side-channel attacks, covert channels, and keystroke
monitoring attacks [98].
Lastly, authentication portals that are exposed to the public Internet raises the threat of
unauthorized access by a malicious actor. While brute-force and dictionary attacks and their
corresponding mitigation solutions are well-known, research on cloud authentication mecha-
nisms has shown that EC2 was vulnerable to XML signature-wrapping and advanced XSS
attacks [112]. If exploited, the attacker would be able to access to a cloud consumer’s control
panel and thus be able upload and download virtual machine image files and reset adminis-
trator passwords to cloud instances. Even though this specific vulnerability has been patched,
if history is any indicator, similar types of bugs are ever-present in a CSPs design and lay
dormant waiting to be discovered.
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2.6.2 Integrity
CSPs provide tenants with simplified computing environments, however the supporting in-
frastructure and controls are anything but simple. CSPs have not been impervious to Byzantine
faults where tenant data has been errantly altered [1]. In addition to the CSP infrastructure,
malicious insiders, external bad actors, and malware have the ability to aﬀect the integrity of
the cloud model. To mitigate such threats some have suggested that the compute environment
in the cloud is the ideal use case for the trusted computing platform [102, 108, 109], while
others have explored attestation mechanisms [104] enabling for both integrity verification of a
cloud tenants VM and the platform on which it executes. Similarly, others have proposed using
a formal language to automate the process integrity verification of both static and dynamic
virtualized cloud environments [9]. Although integrity concerns exist for all aspects of a CSPs
platform much of the early attention has concentrated on the integrity of the data stored in
the cloud and the integrity of the virtual compute environments (i.e. IaaS) [50].
Initial analysis of integrity vulnerabilities in cloud storage systems find that CSPs are
able to provide integrity safeguards for data as it is transferred in and out of the cloud but
lack the ability to provide such integrity verification between transferring phases as data is
stored on a physical medium [35]. The absence of such controls in current day cloud storage
oﬀerings brings forth issues of not only integrity but also repudiation between tenants and
CSPs. Related mitigation eﬀorts propose third-party controls that enable the verification of
integrity for dynamic data stored in the cloud [119] as well as security services that provide
intermediate integrity protections between applications and cloud storage providers [110].
In order to achieve eﬃciencies and to minimize cost, many CSPs rely heavily upon virtual-
ization technologies. CSPs utilize virtualization as an abstraction of computing resources that
enables several virtual machines (VMs) leased by multiple and distinct tenants to reside on one
physical server. The key to abstracting hardware resources is the use of the virtual machine
monitor (VMM) also referred to as a hypervisor (Figure 2.1). The VMM acts as a broker
between each VM and the underlying hardware platform comprising of CPU cycles, storage,
memory, and other computing resources. Reliance on virtualization by CSPs enables unique
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security advantages but also creates inevitable trade-oﬀs introducing new security vulnerabili-
ties [50, 93].
In a non-virtualized computing environment, host-based security mechanisms are accessible
by the user leaving these mechanisms vulnerable to attack, disablement, and misconfiguration.
Transferring security services from within the guest operating system and placing them in the
VMM mitigates these threats while oﬀering advanced capabilities to monitor the integrity of a
virtualized compute environment. The process of monitoring VM behavior is known as virtual
machine introspection (VMI) and security research in this field has increased significantly along
with the resurgence of virtualization [38]. A few of the security controls that can be migrated
are passive intrusion detection monitoring of VMs, malware detection and secure logging. Those
security services that take advantage of their introspective position are able to perform security
anomaly detection by either modifying processes or providing a decision framework for secure
code execution [80]. Whether CSPs oﬀer such services by default or as add-on security-as-a-
service features, the ability to monitor the integrity of the guest operating system at a layer
outside control of the tenant and across an entire virtualized enterprise provides the potential
for security functionality that individual tenants are not capable of providing for themselves.
With the pervasive use of VMMs in cloud environments, the integrity of the VMM has
become a key security focus. Just like traditional operating systems, VMMs are also software
implementations and thus leave the door open for similarly exploitable vulnerabilities. Threats
include but are not limited to interposition attacks [64] to either observe or alter VM data
flows or destroying the entire computer environment [44]. The tactical advantages of hosting
security mechanisms in the VMM may be lost if an attacker manages to obtain control of the
lowest layer in the cloud technology stack (Figure 2.1). Whoever controls the VMM has a clear
advantage to either ensure or disrupt the integrity of the cloud environment [38].
2.6.3 Availability
One of the cloud computing models most significant contribution is its potential to make
vast sophisticated resources available to tenants. However, a few high-profile incidents have
caused much disdain for the cloud model. The severity of such outages is exacerbated by the
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fact that availability is lost for all parties involved. Not only are users unable to gain access
to cloud-based resources via the Internet, but also tenants are unable to gain local access to
their resources, because they are also dependent on Internet connectivity. While initial focus
has centered on specific outages from known threat sources, research eﬀorts have started to
explore vulnerabilities that are either created or enhanced by the cloud model.
High-profile CSPs like Amazon, Google, and Microsoft have experienced undesirable down-
time in the past [84] due to power outages [16], weather [30], and technical problems [15].
However, the vulnerabilities that have accounted for these past losses of availability are not
unique to the cloud model and are equivalent for virtually all IT data centers. As inferred from
many CSPs service level agreements (SLAs), outages are to be expected. Amazons EC2 [2]
and Microsoft’s Azure [121] provide availability guarantees of 99.95% uptime. While a single
two-hour outage might grab news headlines, over the course of a month this loss of availability
is well within the stated CSPs SLAs. If a mission-critical service is unable to tolerate periodic
and inevitable periods of unavailability, it is likely that these services are not suitable for the
cloud.
Despite fault-tolerance resource planning and novel features such as horizontal scaling,
CSPs have not been resilient to DDoS attacks. In one specific instance, a tenants cloud-
based web server was denied service for more than 19 hours [78]. While DDoS attacks are
not unique to the cloud model and have been experienced by Internet-facing services for quite
some time, the increased reliance on Internet-facing services raises the risk for such attacks.
Further complicating the issue is that tenants must not only accept the risk of such attacks on
their resources but must also account for the collateral damage resulting from attacks targeting
collocated tenants.
In addition to traditional threat sources, the architecture and shared resources that are
inherent to the cloud model increase the threat-surface for those seeking to deprive availability.
As a cornerstone of the cloud computing business model, multi-tenant provisioning results in
multiple tenants information processing needs being serviced by common resources. Relating
to availability, resource consumption by each tenant draws from a common pool of CPU, RAM,
network infrastructure, and disk storage to name a few. In such an environment, the attack
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has more control over the compute environment (i.e. IaaS service platform giving the attacker
the most control and the SaaS service platform giving the attacker the least control), thus
enabling the attacker to disrupt availability of service for fellow tenants. Recent research has
focused on an attackers ability to map the cloud network topology [73] and also the attackers
ability to place a VM on the same physical host as their victim [98]. In the former example,
by mapping out the network topology, an attacker can perform flooding attacks on limited
network bandwidth between subnets and thus denying service to tenants on the same subnet.
In the latter example, by placing a VM adjacent to that of the victim, the attacker is able to
observe the victims network activity. This provides the attacker with the insight of when peak
loads occur and when to inflict a DDoS that will cause maximum damage.
Transferring information processing or data into the cloud that was traditionally hosted on
private networks increases operational availability exposure and introduces new vulnerabilities
attackers can exploit. In spite of this downside, the cloud model enables the acquisition of
enormous amounts of computing resources and each tenant must answer the question of whether
or not the cloud model can provide higher availability in comparison to in-house hosting.
Missing from initial threat modeling and research is the consideration of availability in
respect to the long-term financial viability of a cloud tenant to operate in the cloud. While
unexpected costs in the cloud can originate from mismanaged or unanticipated usage [115],
such costs can also be inflicted by an attacker seeking to exploit the utility pricing model that
governs the usage of resources in the public cloud. This gap in threat modeling and research
is the problem this dissertation seeks to address.
2.6.4 Utility
Utility of information should be considered on a wide range of information abstractions.
What is an application or virtual web server platform, but information that performs with
a purpose? In many cases these infrastructure and application platforms are as essential as
the data being processed in order to obtain utility from the data [117]. Although information
utility is not a commonly discussed term, lock-in is of great concern [13, 22, 117]. Lock-in is the
circumstance that data, application design or implementation security controls require signifi-
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cant transformation eﬀorts in order to operate these elements in a diﬀerent CSP environment
or back in-house. The concept of lock-in is not unique to cloud computing when one considers
diﬃculty related to moving on-premises applications to diﬀerent platforms (e.g., legacy appli-
cations). The lack of standard interfaces, APIs, security control architectures, databases, and
implementation parameters cause much of the lock-in [13, 22, 117]. Beyond the data processing
aspects, proprietary data formatting is also a concern [22].
Exit strategies may be a means to avoid lock-in [13, 96]. Whether the language is the
SLA [96] or another contractual document [13] the format of the data should be agreed upon
for when the tenant wishes to leave the CSP. It is unclear whether there will be value lost
in terms of metadata or structure when the data is exported to a neutral or widely accepted
format.
One strategy in avoiding lock-in would be for a tenant to self-manage as much of the cloud
services environment as possible. In other words, the more the CSP does for the tenant the
more the CSP unique methodologies, applications, programming platforms and interfaces bind
the tenant to the CSP [13]. This strategy defeats the value of cloud computing for some tenants,
because the necessary skills, labour and software licenses increase the upfront and ongoing costs
of entry for a tenants desired services.
Use of predicate and homomorphic encryption has been suggested to improve control and
confidentiality [22], but it may also be a means to improve utility. High assurance implementa-
tions of these technologies will require widely recognized standards of use (e.g., AES is a usage
standard for the Rijndael cipher) as well as vetted implementations. As a result, there is likely
to be greater portability of programs written to use these technologies as well as that data
format thus allowing for portability across CSPs or for internal processing. Key management
will be an important consideration, because any purpose requiring the data to be in clear-text
may be thwarted if the keys are lost or unavailable.
2.6.5 Authenticity
Authenticity is generally desirable for all information types. Authentic academic transcripts,
health records, tax filings, market prices for corporate shares or bonds, corporate financial
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records clearly demand authenticity since decisions are dependent on this information being
true to fact. There is a greater tolerance for doubt in authenticity for data like today’s weather
forecast or whether a staﬀ meeting has been rescheduled, but one would desire authenticity
if verifiability or accountability could be easily achieved. When control of data storage and
information processing is entrusted to a third-party how does one assure the authenticity of
the information and services in their control?
Authenticity is an emergent property whereby trust in an information object is a result
of demonstrable discipline that results from properties like: transparency of operations, gov-
ernance of information services, change control, separation of duties, auditing, authentication
and accountability. Outsourcing information processing and business services like managed
data centers, payroll or credit card processing is a fairly well-understood business practice.
What makes public cloud computing more challenging is: the purposeful use of multi-tenancy;
dynamic broad geographical dispersion of information storage and processing; a highly compet-
itive cloud services market; proprietary cloud architectures, management systems and service
oﬀerings technology; unrestricted customer base and global Internet user access. Verifiable
discipline in an environment as described can dissuade conservative customers from adopting
public cloud computing.
Analysts and researchers have made some progress in identifying and addressing these au-
thenticity challenges. Researchers [22] have raised the issues of lack of transparency in cloud op-
erations, frequent change in cloud services, the challenges of auditing a dispersed environment,
the heightened need for appropriate client authentication, the governance issues surrounding
the CSP practice of outsourcing services to a subcontractor and the lack of accountability for
potential loss of intellectual property. Some solutions have been suggested to address cloud
risks like: using tenant controlled middleware that ensures authentic data transactions for data
stored with an untrusted storage provider [110]; implementing trusted computing to address
the lack of transparency by providing high-assurance remote server attestation [22]; and [62]
reports that VMWare has released an API that provides hypervisor transparency.
Progress to address authenticity has been made; however, until authenticity becomes an
explicit objective of information security practitioners it will remain a second order issue.
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2.6.6 Possession
When analysts explore the root cause for the concerns over public cloud computing, pos-
session is the root of all control concerns. Loss of control not only jeopardizes the other five
elements of security, but is also a source of practical and legal challenges in its own right. It
would seem that the fundamental need for information protection and the desire for cheap
plentiful information processing are irreconcilable. For some tenants this may never change,
but research into this challenging problem may help others identify a means to safely adopt
public cloud computing.
As for practical problems, when a third-party possesses data how does one assure proper
deletion of information especially when some providers leverage their enormous collection of
tenant data for mining purposes [22]? These cross-purposes between the tenants needs and
providers revenue sources raise trust issues. Although not discussed by others, possession raises
residual data handling concerns after a tenant abandons an application. The risks may not be
borne by the tenant, but by the subjects of or the end-users who were using the abandoned
records. Although CSP departures from the market have been documented [22], the prospect
of mergers and acquisitions within the CSP population or by other firms looking to diversify
may raise the potential for a tenant to be in competition with its CSPs parent company. In
other words, a competitor may come into possession of a tenants data. Combine this prospect
with lock-in, the tenant is in a diﬃcult position.
As for legal problems, which will vary by jurisdiction, there are privacy and other regulatory
concerns. Concerns about regulatory compliance have been raised by [55] and [22], and these
authors associate the root issue to be possession. However, if authenticity is verifiable the
regulatory concerns regarding possession may be mitigated in cases where regulation does not
stipulate geo-location. Privacy can be viewed from two perspectives. One is the privacy of
the tenant and the other is privacy of the user. US legal standing of information held by a
third-party is murky. Currently, the US Fourth Amendment does not appear to apply to the
cloud thus there appears to be no need for judicial review for governmental access to data
stored in the cloud. Antiterrorism and criminal pursuits enabled by the US PATRIOT Act and
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the Stored Communications Act ease the burden of proof by the government and may limit the
cloud tenants awareness that their information has been obtained by the government [41]. Geo-
location of data is a regulatory constraint for individual-privacy laws as specified in European
Union Directive 95/46/EC and the associated national legislation for each of European Unions
member countries. The controller as designated in Directive 95/46/EC is the tenant who is
operating an application obtaining personal privacy information. Although the responsibility
for privacy protection is initially upon the tenant, it may be possible to share responsibility
with the CSP if the CSP is deemed to be influencing the means by which privacy information is
being processed. Per [22], CSPs are responding by allowing tenants to target the geo-location
of their data.
One suggestion to address cloud possession issues is to enable information to be self-
protecting [13], which essentially moves the security perimeter to be around the individual
data object. In addition, the use of predicate encryption and homomorphic encryption [22, 43]
may help alleviate disclosure-risk related to data remnants and trust issues related to CSP
ownership. Others have sought to provide solutions that would enable a cloud tenant to verify
the geo-location of data stored in the cloud [8].
Safe relinquishing or sharing of information possession is an open problem where potential
solutions have value far beyond cloud computing.
2.7 Discussion
Research papers on public cloud security have been reviewed using a framework of six
security elements. The practical reality is that tenants need to account for all six security
elements simultaneously. Each tenant must decide the significance and priority these elements
have with respect to their needs. For comprehensive security within the cloud, researchers and
practitioners need to work on addressing all security elements. Such complex evaluations and
decisions that follow will be costly.
Beyond the technical challenges of identifying research problems and solutions, the cloud
computing subject is plagued by realistic problems. Each CSP has implemented a cloud in
their own unique fashion, which stymies eﬀorts to generalize technical topics and solutions.
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The competitive nature of cloud computing discourages openness and access to the underlying
layers of abstraction. To complicate the issue further, cloud computing and related terms (e.g.,
SaaS) remain ill-defined thus challenging eﬀorts to define the target of evaluation with precision.
Moreover, the target of analysis (i.e. the individual cloud) is undergoing constant change. A
finding discovered today may be moot in a matter of days or weeks. This amorphous target
being presented by CSPs only promotes security through obscurity. Without standards with
respects to terms, functionality, protocols and interfaces, meaningful security research in cloud
computing that is comprehensive will be diﬃcult to conduct. Unless standards are embraced
and the gaps like those raised in the Analysis Section are addressed, security will be an ongoing
obstacle to public cloud computing despite its alluring advantages such as cost savings.
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CHAPTER 3. FRAUDULENT RESOURCE CONSUMPTION ATTACK
Chapter contains modified content from the following published conference paper:
Idziorek, J. and Tannian, M. ”Exploiting Cloud Utility Models for Profit and Ruin.” In Pro-
ceedings of the 2011 IEEE 4th International Conference on Cloud Computing (CLOUD ’11).
Washington, DC. 4-9 July 2011. pp. 33-40, c￿ IEEE 2011. (Acceptance Rate 36/196 =
18%)
3.1 Abstract
This chapter introduces and discusses an attack on the cloud computing model by which
an attacker subtly exploits a fundamental vulnerability of current utility compute models over
a sustained period of time. Internet-accessible cloud services expose resources that are me-
tered for billing purposes. These resources are subject to fraudulent resource consumption
that is intended to run-up the operating expenses for public cloud service customers. The
details and significance of this attack are discussed as well as initial detection and attribution
methodologies and there respective experimental results. This inaugural work investigates a
potentially significant vulnerability of the cloud computing model that could be exploited from
any Internet-connected device. Because the explored exploit is simply a matter of making well-
crafted web transactions that only diﬀer in intent but not in content of the attacking client,
such attacks are challenging to diﬀerentiate and thus this attack may be diﬃcult to detect and
mitigate.
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3.2 Introduction
Computing services that were traditionally hosted on organizations’ servers and networks
are being outsourced to third-party Cloud Service Providers (CSPs). Transferring sensitive
data and computing operations outside of a trusted environment raises obvious concerns of
confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, utility, and possession for all aspects of a
CSP’s service platform (Chapter 2). Initial focus, research, and threat modeling has concen-
trated on both the confidentiality and integrity of data stored and computed in the cloud.
Absent from these works is an analysis of the external threat sources that have the ability to
directly or indirectly aﬀect the availability of cloud-based services and exploit the integrity of
the billing model that governs this emerging computing model.
Despite uncertainty and unknown security vulnerabilities, early adopters of the cloud com-
puting model have utilized cloud-based resources for a number of services including search
engines, web hosting, content delivery, and application hosting [3]. Adopting cloud services
remains an unknown risk for many customers; however, initial customers have recognized the
benefits of reduced overhead of capital expenses and the attractiveness of the more novel cloud
infrastructure features such as horizontal scaling and the pay-as-you-use billing model. An
obvious threat that CSP customers face is the loss of availability. Although high-profile CSPs
like Amazon, Google, and Microsoft have experienced undesirable downtime in the past [84]
due to Distributed-Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks [78], lightening [30], and technical prob-
lems [12], these CSPs oﬀer service availability guarantees in the range of 99.9% to 99.95%
uptime [2, 45, 121]. The vulnerabilities that have accounted for past losses of availability are
not unique to the cloud model and have analogs in virtually any web-based service. With an
increased reliance on web-based services, including the outsourcing of applications that were
traditionally desktop-centric services, an organization raises the likelihood of DDoS attacks
aﬀecting those operations hosted in the cloud.
While semantic and flooding DDoS attacks are well known and the associated risks are well
researched [87], this work will explore a subtle attack more akin to an application-layer DDoS
attack. The threat-source considered in this paper is an attacker who seeks to fraudulently
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consume bandwidth of web-based cloud services that in turn incur a financial burden on the
cloud consumer. Utility computing is particularly vulnerable to an attack by which the attacker
seeks to exploit the utility pricing model in order to financially harm the victim.
The attack scenario depicted in Figure 3.1 illustrates a vulnerability of the cloud utility
model. A botnet consisting of potentially thousands of bot clients under skillful control of
the botmaster can consume cloud resources by mimicking legitimate client behavior. The
aggregation of these requests is the problem this work seeks to address.
Cloud
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(Attackers)
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Figure 3.1: Cloud Attack Network Model
In this chapter, two initial methodologies to mitigate Fraudulent Resource Consumption
(FRC) attacks on metered web resources are presented. The first is a detection methodology
that applies the properties of Zipf’s law to the analysis of aggregated user web consump-
tion patterns. The second approach is an entropy-based attribution methodology that detects
anomalous behaviors in request dynamics for individual attackers. The experimental results
demonstrate that both methodologies show promise of being eﬀective at detecting FRC attacks.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.3 provides the background for the
cloud computing model. A detailed description of the FRC attack is described in Section 3.4
and the detection and attribution methodologies as well as experimental results are presented
in Section 3.5. Related areas of work are analyzed in Section 3.6. Finally, future work and the
conclusion are presented in Section 3.7.
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3.3 Background
The attack described in this paper is not unique to the cloud model and could be carried out
in similarly hosted environments that makes use of utility pricing such as content distributed
networks. Despite the fact that this type of attack is not specific to cloud computing, the cloud
model does provide a well-documented and practical application of the utility computing model
to demonstrate such an attack. To better understand this attack and to provide context for
remainder of the chapter, this section provides a brief overview of public cloud computing and
the utility model.
3.3.1 Cloud Computing
When broken down, cloud computing is a specialized distributed computing model. Build-
ing upon the desirable characteristics of cluster, grid, utility, and service-oriented comput-
ing, cloud computing introduces a unique complement of features to create a new computing
paradigm [37]. The technologies comprising much of cloud computing have existed for a while
(e.g. virtualization, broadband, high-density storage, multi-core processors); however, it has
not been until recent years that these technologies have all matured to the point where a syn-
thesis of these elements could be realized. One of the novel characteristics of the cloud model
- as compared to past computing oﬀerings - is that consumers have the ability to self-provision
computing resources. This allows a cloud consumer to quickly establish an Internet-facing web
presence. Furthermore, CSPs oﬀer such services at attractive prices by way of a utility pricing
model as made possible by virtualization and economies-of-scale.
To keep the terminology straight throughout the rest of the chapter, the following roles are
defined:
• Cloud Service Provider (CSP) - The CSP (e.g. Amazon, Microsoft, or Rackspace) oﬀers
client-provisioned and metered computing resources that can be leased for flexible time
durations.
• Cloud Consumer - The cloud consumer is a person or organization that employs the
services of a CSP and is financially responsible for any and all resource consumption.
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• Client - The client is a legitimate user that requests services oﬀered by the cloud consumer.
• Attacker - The attacker is a malicious user that fraudulently consumes resources oﬀered
by the cloud consumer.
3.3.2 Utility Compute Pricing Model
The utility model, by which cloud services are oﬀered, enables the attractive payment model
of pay-as-you-use. Customers pay only for the resources they consume and only for the time
that they consume them. The flexibility that this model facilitates is advantageous to a cloud
consumer because of the low cost of entry and avoidance of major capital expenses. Table
3.1 represents a subset of the direct costing metrics established by Amazon’s Elastic Compute
Cloud (EC2) platform [4]. Although cloud computing makes for a compelling use case of the
utility model, the concept of utility computing has origins that date back to time-sharing on
mainframe computers.
Table 3.1: EC2 Pricing Metrics for a Large Linux Instance Residing in Northern Virginia (as
of January 2012)
Standard Compute Instance
Large Linux $0.34 per inst. hour
Data Transfered In
All Transfered In $0.10 per GB
Data Transfered Out
First 1 GB per Month $0.00 per GB
Up to 10 TB per Month $0.15 per GB
Next 40 TB per Month $0.11 per GB
Next 100 GB per Month $0.09 per GB
Over 150 GB per Month $0.08 per GB
As seen in Table 3.1, the cost of computing in the cloud is billed in units of Cost-Per-Hour
(CPH) consumed and derivatives of Cost-of-Data-Transferred (CDT) in and out of the CSP’s
environment. The total cost of computing in the cloud model can then be modeled as follows:
Total Cost = CPH(hours) + CDT (bytes) (3.1)
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Equation 3.1 represents the cost of cloud resources as a generic model that allows for the
analysis of cloud consumer costs independent of a particular CSP and their respective cost
metrics.
3.4 Fraudulent Resource Consumption (FRC) Attack
This section provides a conceptual foundation for the FRC attack. In order to provide a
comprehensive explanation, the target of the attack, the threat model, an attack description
and an exploration of the direct costs associated to this attack are provided.
3.4.1 Target
For the purposes of this work, the target of this attack is a website or web application
hosted in a third-party CSP environment. The CSP will generate revenue by providing hosting
services on a utility model basis. In this service environment, resources consumed by clients
result in a direct cost to the cloud consumer.
The characteristics of the websites considered in this paper are those that have been de-
signed to serve predominantly public web content that is accessible to Internet users. Although
the use of authentication on the site would significantly reduce the amount of content readily
available to the general anonymous public and thus potentially restrict the amount of ex-
ploitable resources, this website feature is not considered for it is assumed the cloud consumer
desires to host public content. It has also been assumed that the target website is hosted in
an environment in which the web server is properly configured, patched and is protected be-
hind a firewall that conforms to a well-considered information security policy and employs best
practice filtering techniques.
An additional characteristic is that the website does not make use of reverse-Turing tests [58]
to diﬀerentiate humans from zombie computers. The use of such tests is detrimental to the
overall goals of the cloud consumer, as these types of tests will result in a certain percentage
of legitimate users choosing not to solve the puzzles as well as preventing search bots from
indexing the website’s content. Therefore employment of such techniques to restrict access to
public-facing web content is regarded as excessive and not considered in this work.
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In an eﬀort to simplify the experimental design used to assess the chosen detection and
attribution techniques, the scope of HTTP protocol request methods is limited to HTTP GET
requests. All HTTP request methods consume resources on the server and supporting network,
but do vary by degree of consumption. These consumption distinctions would be necessary to
consider if a precise cost calculation is desired, but for the purpose of this initial work on the
FRC attack the focus is on the general relation between client actions and direct cost to the
cloud consumer.
3.4.2 Threat Model
The threat sources for the target described in Section 3.4.1 are the common threat sources
typically associated with Internet applications and services, such as a script-kiddy, hacktivist,
extortionist and a person performing information warfare for commercial or government pur-
poses [28]. The universal access that the target’s service provides enables remote access from
any Internet-connected threat source.
With a black market of hackers or botnets for hire [58], a threat-source is not required to be
capable of performing the attack themselves. Whoever performs the attack will require suﬃcient
compute resources and bandwidth to implement a sustained and significant resource utilization
attack, which is fairly given the current computer technology, capacity, and bandwidth.
In the past, Internet attacks were generally regarded as being less financially motivated
and driven by attackers need for self-fulfillment, political motivation, fun, or proof of skill [72].
Today, however, cyber criminals have been moving towards making a profit. The motivation of
the hired attacker in this threat model is purely financial and the attacker benefits directly from
either from a service fee or from an extortion fee paid by the victim. The original threat-source,
who hired the botnet master, achieves their objective by decreasing the economic health of the
victim.
In this threat model, the attacker will factor in time for attack completion, attack success
likelihood, and attack detection as key variables as resources are allocated and as an attack
methodology is chosen. By understanding the utility models published by CSPs, the attacker
can determine what transactions or actions will cost. Although optimal attack strategies are
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outside the scope of this paper, a wise attacker will construct an attack to consume significant
amounts of resources but will stay clear of extreme resource consumption to avoid detection.
The attacker will craft proper functional transactions in order to ideally exercise as many bill-
able resources per transaction as possible while remaining undetected. Unlike a SYN flooding
attacks that seeks to consume available socket resources by forming numerous incomplete TCP
connections, fully-established application-layer HTTP connections are much more eﬀective at
consuming large volumes of resources while remaining undetectable by current signature and
anomaly-based detection mechanisms.
The threat source attacks by generating web traﬃc consistent in comparison to legitimate
traﬃc. However, it is assumed that the threat source does not have the ability to access
historical records/logs from the victim’s servers nor the ability to insert a traﬃc-logging device
in front of the victim’s web-based services. Although collusion with an inside person would do
away with the previous assumptions, these fairly realistic restrictions prevent the attacker from
creating statistically indistinguishable traﬃc patterns in comparison with legitimate traﬃc seen
by the site. From the victim’s perspective, malicious and legitimate traﬃc are interwoven and
only diﬀers in intent not content.
3.4.3 Attack Description
As evidenced by recent trends in DDoS attacks, attackers are employing the services of
botnets consisting in size of upwards of tens of thousands of compromised hosts and are using
these botnets as an attack medium [58, 87]. To increase eﬀectiveness and circumvent current
detection mechanisms, attackers are moving away from network-layer attacks such as SYN
floods and attacking application-layer resources by means of HTTP flooding attacks. This
paper and the description of the FRC attack anticipates a natural evolution of these attacks
on the computing resources metered for utility pricing as found in the cloud computing model.
The recent emergence of cloud computing and its attractiveness has raised the prospect that
current utility model structures may prove to be a significant vulnerability to cloud consumers.
The attack is simply a matter of making properly formed and seemingly legitimate requests for
application services in suﬃcient quantity that expenses accumulate over time to a level that
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is unsustainable for the cloud consumer. One key objective of the attacker is to blend into
the noise of legitimate activity so that their malicious resource consumption is undetected by
current measures and their activities remain unimpeded. What makes the attack unsustainable
for the victim is that the victim’s business objectives for the cloud-based services are not
achieved regardless of the disproportionate amount of expenses paid.
In order to describe this attack more precisely, one could consider a continuum of Malicious
Resource Utilization (MRU) as seen in Figure 3.2. Reading from bottom to top, the y-axis on
the left-hand side of the figure depicts a gradual increase of resource utilization (%) for a busy
NASA web server over a two-week duration of time (x-axis). The y-axis on the right-hand side
of the figure denotes the number of requests per second experienced by the web server. Because
of the historical nature of the data set, a direct mapping of this relationship is not known, but
is depicted to represent a conservative estimate given the capacity of modern day web servers.
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Figure 3.2: Malicious Resource Utilization Continuum
Initial attack intensity above normal activity is a range labeled nuisance activity because
the resultant costs are insignificant to the cloud consumer. However, as the malicious activity
intensifies beyond the nuisance activity range, the malicious costs to the cloud consumer start
to become a matter of concern. This transition point is labeled J1. Malicious activity that
exceeds J1 enters into the FRC Attack Region. Within this region, a FRC attack is neither
nuisance activity nor does it significantly degrade the QoS of the web server. With a utility
model assigning costs for all resources consumed, this region is of interest to an attacker who
wishes to inflict economic pain. If the attack intensity increases above J2, the aggregate resource
consumption will reach a point when the QoS starts to significantly degrade as the increase
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resource utilization results in an increase in system response latency. It is at this point detection
like, as stated in [56, 58, 120], current application-layer DDoS detection and mitigation schemes
will be activated. The transition point between the inability and ability to detect malicious
resource consumption is denoted as J2 on Figure 3.2. The initial objective of the FRC attack
research is to improve detection sensitivity and push J2 closer to J1 by improving detection of
attacks that appear as legitimate traﬃc and transactions, but diﬀer in the requestor’s intent.
Availability in the context of this discussion is not a binary measure in which the system
is nearly incapacitated at the time of the attack. The technical infrastructure of a website
and its provider will have no trouble functioning while the FRC attack is underway. Instead,
availability is a long-term consideration defined as the cloud consumer’s ability to withstand the
financial consequences of such an attack over a prolonged period of time. Unlike a short-lived
DDoS attack, the duration of a FRC attack is intended to last weeks or months. As shown in
Figure 3.3, a FRC attack is similar to a slow-and-low approach in which the costs for resources
maliciously consumed are additive to that of normal traﬃc. The challenge the FRC attack
raises is that of the detection of malicious activity that blends in with normal behaviors with
the intention of subtly exploiting the resource sensitivity of current utility pricing models in
order to incrementally increase operating costs thus inflicting financial damage.
3.4.4 Direct Cost of a FRC Attack
DDoS attacks have always resulted in some from of financial loss for the victim. Whether
directly or indirectly, the victim experiences loss when legitimate clients are not able to access
revenue generating services, productivity is halted, or the service or corporation’s reputation
is damaged. Not until resource consumption was directly billable to the consumer, as is the
case in the cloud model, was it possible to associate a direct monetary cost to the compute and
networking resources consumed during a DDoS attack. The focus of this work can be seen as
a much more subtle variation of a DDoS attack. Because of this, both FRC and DDoS attacks
on services hosted in the cloud model can be modeled in terms of resources consumed and the
resulting monetary loss for the victim.
Regardless of the motive, an attacker and cloud consumer must consider the same set of
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Figure 3.3: FRC Attack Cost Curve
parameters in order to calculate the expected or actual cost of resources consumed in the cloud.
The one distinction between these calculations is that the attacker only considers resource usage
in excess of normal activity while the cloud consumer must account for the total cost of all
resources consumed despite the intention of the requestor.
From the parameters presented in Table 3.2, the total amount of data transferred into the
cloud consumer’s environment via HTTP GETs over a given time period (γ) can calculated
as Din = ρ · δ · γ · θ and the corresponding amount of data transferred out during the same
time period can be calculated as Dout = φ · δ · γ · θ. The subscripts “N” and “A” are used
to diﬀerentiate between normal activity and resources consumed as part of a FRC attack
respectively.
Base Cost = f(DinN , DoutN , γ, µ) (3.2)
Total Cost = f(DinN +DinA , DoutN +DoutA , γ, µ) (3.3)
FRC Attack Cost = Total Cost−Base Cost (3.4)
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Table 3.2: CSP Bandwidth Cost Parameters
Parameters Description
Number of clients (δ) Number of distinct clients requesting
resources
Average resource size (φ) Average size in bytes for each out-
bound resource request
Average request size (ρ) Average size in bytes for each inbound
request
Request frequency (θ) Requests per time period
Time duration (γ) Time elapsed between the beginning
and end of an observed period
Cost model (µ) CSP pricing model
Cost function f(Din,Dout,γ,µ) Cost of resource consumption
Tiered costing models such as the one used by Amazon’s EC2 (Table 3.1) require that the
FRC Attack Cost be calculated as the Total Cost of all activity minus the Base Cost. Data
consumed during a FRC attack is additive to that of normal activity and the FRC Attack Cost
cannot be accurately calculated without knowing the Base Cost.
The consequences of a FRC attack may be best illustrated by quantifying the cost of an
attack based on a realistic scenario. Presented next is a scenario of a FRC attack on a web
service hosted on Amazon’s EC2. Proposing hypothetical attacks in conjunction with the FRC
Attack Cost highlights the potential impact FRC attacks can have on a web-based resources
hosted in the cloud.
3.4.4.1 Scenario - EC2
Google calculates that the average web page currently found on the Internet is 320KB in
size [95]. Assuming this is the average page size of the cloud consumer’s website, which consists
of multiple distinct pages, an attacker is able to consume on average 320KB per each primary
HTTP GET request and its subsequent secondary in-line requests. In this scenario, normal
activity is assumed to be 1TB of data per month resulting in a Base Cost of $153.45. At the
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rate of requesting one page per minute every minute for a month, a single attacker is able
to consume approximately 13 GB of data. Applied to the FRC Attack Cost equation, this
attack alone results in a charge of $2.04 for data transferred in and out of the cloud consumer’s
environment.
Table 3.3: Single Attacker Scenario
Parameters Value
Number of clients (δ) 1
Average resource size (φ) 320KB
Average request size (ρ) 1KB
Duration (γ) 31 days
Request frequency (θ) 1 req/min
Cost model (µ) Amazon EC2
FRC Attack Cost $2.04
The cost accrued from a single attacker at the given rate in Table 3.3 would likely be
characterized as nuisance activity found below J2 as established on the MRU continuum (Figure
3.2). Although a non-zero cost, this malicious resource consumption is likely to blend in with
the noise of an average monthly service bill.
Table 3.4: Multiple Attacker Scenario
Parameters Value
Number of clients (δ) 1000
Average resource size (φ) 320KB
Average request size (ρ) 1KB
Duration (γ) 31 days
Request frequency (θ) 200 reqs/day
Cost model (µ) Amazon EC2
FRC Attack Cost $283.81
In the next attack variation, the number of active bots in the attack is increased and each
bot attacks with a request frequency of 200 transactions per day. These adjustments change the
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magnitude of the attack from nuisance activity to an attack intensity above J1 and thus into the
FRC attack region. The consequence of the utility model vulnerability as presented in Table 3.4
is a bit more apparent. If the attack were distributed throughout the course of a month, even
at 200 requests per day from a 1000 bots, the attack does not begin to significantly degrade the
QoS of the website (4 x 1.2 GHz 2007 Xeon CPUs, 7.5 GB RAM, 850GB storage) - assuming
the system was designed with suﬃcient performance headroom for the normal activity.
As seen by the attack scenarios in the case study of Amazon’s EC2, a FRC attack can inflict
a noticeable financial burden on the cloud consumer over time. As the number of attacking
resource consumption bots increases, damaging attacks can be mounted without being able to
associate a significant usage footprint to a single client, as compared to what was seen in the
single attacker scenario. Because current detection eﬀorts are focused on excessive amounts of
HTTP requests over a short period of time [56, 87, 120], as is the case in DDoS attack and
flash crowds, it is likely that FRC attacks will go undetected.
One important observation worth mentioning is the relative cost of conducting the FRC
attack. Although there may be costs associated with lease time and/or the corresponding attack
intensity, the amount of bandwidth and compute cycles for a bot to perform 200 requests per
day (i.e. on average, one request every 432s) over 31 days is a mere fraction of what a reasonably
modern computer is capable of producing. Based on this presented scenario, there should be
suﬃcient performance margin for many more requests per second for each bot being devoted
to the attack or other attacks concurrently. While the FRC attack described in this work is
presented as a subtle attack, this does not preclude the much more obtuse DDoS attack from
exploiting the same vulnerability of the cloud model. For a cloud DDoS victim, not only would
they be hindered by the loss of availability, they would also be financially responsible for the
bandwidth necessary for an attacker to mount such an attack.
3.5 Detection and Attribution Methodologies
In this section, initial methodologies for both FRC detection and attribution will be dis-
cussed. In the context of the described FRC attack, detection refers to being able to diﬀerenti-
ate increases in normal aggregate traﬃc from that of a FRC attack. Attribution, on the other
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hand, refers to the ability to accurately identify malicious clients from that of legitimate clients.
Because the realm of FRC attack detection and attribution have been largely unexplored, the
methodologies explored in this chapter are an initial attempt to push J2 down the Malicious
Resource Consumption Continuum (Figure 3.2) towards J1. By pushing J2 to a lesser intensity,
attackers will need to sustain their attack longer to achieve the same cost impact or increase
the number of bots needed to mount a successful attack. As performance of these initial de-
tection methods are evaluated, the common concerns of computational eﬃciency and overall
detection latency are less of a factor for detection and attribution solutions due to the long du-
ration of a FRC attack. Although ultimately desirable, such eﬃciencies are not an immediate
concern in the short-term, especially if attack clients initiate attack footprints on the order of
200 requests per day. Unlike click fraud or DDoS attacks, which require solutions that have
optimized computational eﬃciencies to deal with these events in a very timely manor, accuracy
is the overwhelming key factor for the mitigation of FRC attacks. Just as it is assumed that
a web server under a FRC attack will have no problem providing a high quality of service, it
is also assumed that such a server will be able to calculate the presented metrics in suﬃcient
time to make a timely detection/attribution decision.
3.5.1 Detection using Zipf’s Law
The first question to answer when attempting to mitigate a FRC attack is whether or not
a system is under attack. Although such knowledge does not directly lessen or prevent a FRC
attack, such knowledge is crucial when considering attribution trade-oﬀs and for performing
risk analysis. If it can be accurately determined that an increase in traﬃc volumes is the result
of legitimate client behavior, then it is counter productive for the cloud consumer (i.e. FRC
defender) to deploy a mitigation solution that will unnecessarily introduce false positives into
the system and hinder or reject legitimate clients.
The objectives of this section are to investigate an application of the properties of Zipf’s
law [132] for detecting anomalies in web request logs as well as to discuss experimental design
and empirical results of applying Zipf’s law to the detection of FRC attacks. This initial
detection methodology holistically explores a web server log in terms of web document frequency
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and the relative document popularity (i.e. document rank).
An eﬀective anomaly detection approach could be a useful indicator for fraud in metered
web services. In the past, Zipf’s law has been used for detection of anomalous patterns in
large data sets such as in detecting blog spam [81] and accounting fraud [52]. With respect to
applying Zipf’s law to the web, Zipf-like distributions of web logs have been used for modeling
and formalizing web caching models and algorithms [14]. A key property of Zipf’s law is that
it allows for the broad analysis of very large sets of data.
Consider a web server log that contains user-generated request records for a website con-
sisting of N distinct web pages. Let fi be the frequency of requests for the ith of N web pages
and let ri be the rank of that document. To construct a Zipf distribution and given a web log,
let all the web pages and their respective request frequencies be ranked in descending order of
the popularity where the most frequently referenced page is assigned the rank of one and the
ith page is the ith most popular page. If Zipf’s law holds, the frequency of a request for the ith
most popular web page is inversely proportional to the rank of the page and is represented as
follows:
fi ∝ 1
i
(i = 1, ..., N) (3.5)
If K is the number of occurrences for the most frequently requested web page (i.e. rank of
one), then given the rank of any web document, its frequency can be calculated as follows:
fi =
K
i
(3.6)
Shown in Table 3.5 is the rank and corresponding frequencies for a fictional website whose
user base conforms exactly to Zipf’s law and therefore abides by Equation 3.5. When the
corresponding rank (ri) and frequency (fi) are plotted on a log-log scale (Figure 3.4), the
observed slope (ψ) of the best-fit line is negative with a value of unity.
While the synthetic example conforms exactly to Zipf’s law, it has been shown through
research eﬀorts [14, 56] that web page requests for an actual website instead generally follow
a Zipf-like distribution where the frequency of a request for the ith most popular page is a
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Table 3.5: Theoretical Zipf Distribution Rank and Frequency
Rank(ri) Frequency (fi) Log10(ri) Log10(fi)
1 10000 0.00 4.00
2 5000 0.30 3.70
3 3333 0.48 3.52
4 2500 0.60 3.40
5 2000 0.70 3.30
6 1667 0.78 3.22
7 1429 0.85 3.15
8 1250 0.90 3.10
9 1111 0.95 3.05
10 1000 1.00 3.00
11 909 1.04 2.96
12 833 1.08 2.92
13 769 1.11 2.89
14 714 1.15 2.85
15 667 1.18 2.82
16 625 1.20 2.80
17 588 1.23 2.77
18 556 1.26 2.74
19 526 1.28 2.72
20 500 1.30 2.70
21 476 1.32 2.68
22 455 1.34 2.66
23 435 1.36 2.64
24 417 1.38 2.62
25 400 1.40 2.60
26 385 1.41 2.59
27 370 1.43 2.57
28 357 1.45 2.55
29 345 1.46 2.54
30 333 1.48 2.52
power-law function such that:
fi ∝ 1
iψ
(3.7)
To provide a more accurate illustration, Table 3.6 provides the rank and respective frequen-
cies from the NASA dataset (introduced in Chapter 4 and Figure 3.2). As it can be seen in
the corresponding plot in Figure 3.5, common distributions of web page requests are not truly
consistent with Zipf’s law as Zipf’s law states that ψ is unity. However, web page requests tend
to be consistent with a more general Zipf-like distribution that allows ψ to be close to but not
unity.
Using the resulting slope of the regression line from a Zipf-like distribution as a detection
metric, experiments seeking to exploit the consistencies in Zipf-like distributions for a particular
website were performed using datasets from web request logs produced by Iowa State Univer-
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Figure 3.4: Synthetic Zipf Distribution
sity’s public web server (www.iastate.edu) over the course of nine consecutive weeks from late
2010. The first week of data served as the training data set and was used as the model of the
site’s normal web page access patterns. The subsequent weeks served as test data sets as well
as the background traﬃc in which synthetically generated attack patterns were inserted.
The evaluation consisted of generating an attack through synthetic construction of malicious
requests and then interleaving these requests within the test data sets. The advantage of
synthetic generation is that it enables expedient testing of a number of scenarios and request
patterns of attackers in order to test the limitation of the Zipf-like distribution based detection
approach. In order to emulate a FRC attack, synthetic requests were generated to consume
a percentage of web-based resources above that of normal activity. The synthetic request
construction methodology assumed that the attacker had a priori knowledge of the magnitude
of normal web page requests for a given site. Although contrary to Section 3.4.2, such an
assumption was made to allow the attacker to generate more challenging attacks that start at
J1 and increase in intensity up the MRC (Figure 3.2) continuum. The web request pattern
generated was the union of normal and attack web requests. For each week of test data, five
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Table 3.6: Empirical Zipf Distribution Rank and Frequency
Rank(ri) Frequency (fi) Log10(ri) Log10(fi)
1 9577 0.00 3.98
2 1026 0.30 3.01
3 983 0.48 2.99
4 867 0.60 2.94
5 824 0.70 2.92
6 813 0.78 2.91
7 768 0.85 2.89
8 757 0.90 2.88
9 707 0.95 2.85
10 693 1.00 2.84
11 651 1.04 2.81
12 594 1.08 2.77
13 578 1.11 2.76
14 502 1.15 2.70
15 497 1.18 2.70
16 475 1.20 2.68
17 471 1.23 2.67
18 423 1.26 2.63
19 363 1.28 2.56
20 362 1.30 2.56
21 361 1.32 2.56
22 338 1.34 2.53
23 330 1.36 2.52
24 328 1.38 2.52
25 311 1.40 2.49
26 306 1.41 2.49
27 285 1.43 2.45
28 267 1.45 2.43
29 266 1.46 2.42
30 265 1.48 2.42
synthetic attack data sets were constructed in addition to the original data set. In the attack
data sets, the attack modeled uniformly random page requests totaling 5%, 10%, 20%, 30%
and 40% more requests than that of the original data set for a given week.
Based on the hypothesis that two weeks of web traﬃc would produce statistically similar
Zipf-like distributions, the detection methodology compared the training data set and each of
the test data sets using Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA). The first step was to compute the
Zipf-like distribution for the training data set and each test data set. The second step was to
determine if there was a statistically significant diﬀerence between the slopes of the two Zipf-
like distributions under examination. This required the computation of a linear regression line
for each distribution. The slopes of the respective linear regressions were compared with the
statistical hypothesis that the slopes are the same. If analysis indicated that the slopes were
significantly diﬀerent, then this result was interpreted to signify that a suﬃciently large web
page request pattern anomaly took place thus performing as the fraud detection threshold.
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Figure 3.5: Actual Zipf Distribution
Given the lack of specific attacker attribution, additional detection techniques, as presented
next, would also need to be deployed.
Table 3.7: Zipf Detection Confusion Matrix
Actual/Predicted Positive Negative
Positive 95% 5%
Negative 11% 89%
To measure the eﬀectiveness of this application of Zipf’s law for the 48 tests performed,
a confusion matrix of detection results is given in Table 3.7. Preliminary empirical results
show that the methodology produces a False Positive Rate (FPR) of 5% and a False Negative
Rate (FNR) of 11%. These initial results would lead one to believe that this broad analysis
methodology appears to be an eﬀective way to examine large sets of web logs for the purpose of
detecting possible fraud motivated access patterns in web request logs. However, this proposed
detection methodology has its limitations. Namely, as will be addressed in Chapter 5, the tail of
a Zipf-like distribution tends to deviate from Zipf’s law and thus provides inconsistencies that
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lead to errant classifications. Furthermore, this presented methodology only considers a single
aspect of a web log. Applying the lessons learned from this initial work on FRC detection,
Chapter 5 will explore a much more complete solution that also consider the completeness and
accuracy of compared web logs in addition to a revised application of Zipf’s law.
3.5.2 Entropy-Based Attribution
Once a web log has been successfully determined to contain FRC attack requests, the next
logical question to answer is which of the clients in the web log are malicious and which are
legitimate. Similar to the previously discussed work on FRC detection, this section provides
an preliminary methodology for FRC attribution.
Web server user interactions can be modeled as a series of successive requests grouped
together to form web sessions over a given time period. Requests are human-initiated events
utilizing HTTP protocol commands such as GET in order to retrieve web content. A series
of related requests generated by a specific user form a single web session. Web request logs
provide no indication of when sessions end or start. In order to establish user sessions within the
request logs it was assumed that a 900 second or greater pause between consecutive requests of
a single user indicated an end of a previous and start of a new web session [67]. Session length
was defined as the number of web documents requested during a web session. While previous
research has examined the use of statistics derived from web request logs such as source IP
address frequency [70] or request inter-arrival times [87] within a web session, the focus of this
detection methodology is to model individual user behavior by analyzing the entropy of session
lengths generated by an individual over a fixed duration of time in order to detect FRC attacks
on the utility model.
Publicly available web request logs, commonly used for flash crowd and DDoS detection
research [70, 87], were used as normal activity (i.e. training datasets) to conduct the entropy-
based detection experiments. One data set originated from activities observed by a busy ISP
web server over a two-week period [23]. The second collection is two months of web logs from
a busy NASA website [82].
The attacks within the experiments were modeled as a botnet that consisted of 500 distinct
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bots that generated for each bot, on average, a total of 200 malicious requests over a given
week. This fixed volume of traﬃc represented 46-113% more traﬃc than the original volume
for a particular week. Motivated by the threat model established by Oikonomou [87] in which
attack bots randomly requested web sessions lengths between 1 and 50, the malicious web
sessions used for the purposes of these experiments were composed to resemble much more
realistic usage patterns by generating uniformly random session lengths between 1 and 15 web
content requests.
The hypothesis of this initial FRC attribution solution is that randomly generated session
lengths, as previously described, deviate suﬃciently from a profile of normal user behavior in
such a way that detection and attribution of attacking bots is possible using an entropy-based
detection scheme.
The proposed detection methodology includes both a learning stage and a detection stage.
The learning stage involves computing a standard of entropy of normal session lengths for users
that invoke five or more sessions as observed in a web request log designated as the training
data set. The detection stage consists of computing entropy of session lengths for each unique
user and comparing the entropy result to the standard. If a user’s session length entropy is
outside the standard, the user is designated as malicious.
Entropy has been used in many detection contexts, including application-layer DDoS de-
tection [118, 124]. If the probability that a discrete random variable X takes on a value xi,
given by p(xi) = P(X=xi), then the entropy of session length for session j is Hj composed of
the n events is defined as follows:
Hj = −
n￿
i=1
pilog2(pi) (3.8)
The entropy of session lengths for a given data set is a random variable H that exhibits the
properties of a normal distribution. Each weekly web request log data set served as a training
data set while the remaining seven data sets represented potential FRC attacks. One advantage
of training on each week is that if flash crowds were present they would not be errantly detected
as malicious as is the case with some DDoS approaches. Only relative anomalous behavior is
flagged as malicious.
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To distinguish normal user behaviors from anomalous behaviors, a tolerance interval bound-
ing 90% of the assumed usual traﬃc (γ=0.90) was calculated with 95% confidence (α=0.05)
using a two-sided tolerance interval h¯ ± k2s where h¯ = ￿
i=1
hi/n is the mean of the entropy of
session lengths for the n respective clients, s is the sample variance and k2 is:
k2 =
￿￿￿￿(N − 1)(1 + 1N )z2(1−p)/2
χ2γ,N−1
(3.9)
For this two-sided tolerance interval, γ is the critical value of the chi-square distribution
with N-1 degrees of freedom. This test considers α percent of the sample population with
z(1−p)/2 as the critical value for the normal distribution with confidence (1-p)/2.
This metric was applied as the standard of entropy to the test data sets that potentially
contained attack traﬃc mimicking a FRC attack. Experimental results for FPR and FNR are
shown in Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 respectively. These tables summarize the findings of the 56
experiments utilizing the two months of NASA web request logs that were segregated into 8
weekly subsets. The ISP Web logs experiments produced the following results: week 1 as the
training set FPR: 4.0%; FNR: 1.2%, week 2 as the training set FPR: 9.1%; FNR: 0.6%.
Table 3.8: Attribution False Positive Rates (%)
Train/Test Wk1 Wk2 Wk3 Wk4 Wk5 Wk6 Wk7 Wk8
Wk1 - 4.4 5.1 8.2 6.1 7.7 7.1 11.6
Wk2 8.0 - 6.5 9.2 8.2 13.9 5.7 14.2
Wk3 4.0 4.4 - 7.1 6.1 7.7 7.1 12.2
Wk4 4.0 3.7 4.4 - 6.1 7.7 5.7 10.3
Wk5 4.0 3.7 4.4 4.1 - 7.7 5.7 10.3
Wk6 1.3 2.5 2.9 3.1 4.1 - 4.3 7.1
Wk7 2.7 3.1 3.6 3.1 4.1 4.6 - 7.7
Wk8 2.0 1.9 2.9 3.1 4.1 1.5 5.7 -
Initial experimental results show that entropy-based detection of session length variation is
potentially an eﬀective means to detect and reduce the eﬀectiveness of FRC attacks. Like most
attributions schemes, the methodology as it is currently devised can be defeated. By increasing
the number of attacking bots and decreasing the amount of sessions produced by each bot, the
attacker can achieve their objective and moderate the amount of entropy the attack produces
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Table 3.9: Attribution False Negative Rates (%)
Train/Test Wk1 Wk2 Wk3 Wk4 Wk5 Wk6 Wk7 Wk8
Wk1 - 3.4 5.8 4.8 4.4 3.4 3.2 4.0
Wk2 7.0 - 6.4 4.8 6.8 8.8 4.6 6.4
Wk3 5.4 3.2 - 4.6 6.0 3.8 2.6 5.2
Wk4 3.6 3.6 3.8 - 3.0 3.6 3.2 4.2
Wk5 6.8 4.6 6.4 6.8 - 4.2 7.2 5.4
Wk6 9.2 10.2 9.0 6.8 6.0 - 7.0 7.6
Wk7 7.2 5.0 7.4 4.8 6.8 5.6 - 7.0
Wk8 5.4 6.0 7.0 6.4 5.0 6.0 5.4 -
thus remaining within the tolerance limit. Furthermore, if an attacker consumes less than five
web sessions, they will also go unidentified. In a practical context with an attacker lacking the
insight on usage patterns, staying within the tolerance limit can be diﬃcult to judge by the
attacker.
While the proposed attribution scheme exhibited limited success, like the initial FRC de-
tection solution proposed, it is not a general solution and requires further refinement. Chapter
6 will improve upon this approach by considering a more apt and encompassing set of client
web usage characteristics.
3.6 Related Work
This section provides a survey of related work that has bearing and similarities with that
of a FRC attack. Because the mitigation and description of the FRC attack has been largly
unexplored and unaddressed, the related bodies of work are derived from many areas.
3.6.1 Economic Denial of Sustainability
The notion of an Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) attack has been previously
discussed in non-academic forums. The term was first presented on a blog posting by cloud
computing security professional Christopher Hoﬀ [51] and has since been discussed in similar
contexts [24, 91]. Hoﬀ describes the EDoS attack as a purposeful manipulation of a utility
pricing model that exceeds the economic means of a cloud consumer. This description of the
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vulnerability of the utility model in the cloud has served as a key motivation for this work.
This work on the FRC attack is a refinement that considers a more subtle threat model and
subsequent detection and attribution.
Taken at face value, an EDoS attack is an attack category that encompasses DoS/DDoS,
click fraud, and FRC attacks. Whether directly or indirectly, the majority of DoS/DDoS at-
tacks have had economic motivations. The victim suﬀers financially by degradation of service
capabilities, by payment of an extortion fee, loss of reputation, or elects to spend additional
resources to bolster defense capabilities. Likewise, click fraud has always been an economi-
cally motivated attack in which the attacker directly benefits from surreptitious requests. In
comparison to the previously stated attacks, the FRC attack, as discussed in Section 3.4, has
deep-rooted economic motivations in which the attacker uses a slow-and-low strategy to per-
form an attack that leads to an EDoS over a prolonged period of time. Although Hoﬀ first
proposed the concept of a FRC-like attack, this work formalizes a concrete understanding of
the utility model vulnerability, proposes both detection and mitigation solutions, and considers
this problem in the context of similar technologies, research, and mitigation strategies.
3.6.2 Application-Layer DDoS
There have been a number of key works that have explored application-layer DDoS attacks
that have resulted in potential detection and mitigation techniques that may be applicable to
FRC attacks. Although the attacker’s objectives and request intensities of DDoS attacks are
significantly diﬀerent from that of a FRC attack, this particular body of work is relevant because
both attacks employ similar attack methods to mimic the behaviors of legitimate clients.
Within this body of work, some have sought to distinguish flash crowds from DDoS at-
tacks [56, 120, 124]. It was found that the number of overall client requests in a flash crowd
was proportional to the number of users [124] and that flash crowds do not exhibit higher
per-client request rates [56]; both are behaviors that diﬀer from DDoS attacks. While signif-
icant, these findings are not applicable to the detection on a FRC attack. The FRC attack
is fundamentally diﬀerent from the behaviors of flash crowds as these events are composed of
dramatically increased amounts of normal traﬃc over a short period of time.
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Due to the nature of DDoS attacks - a large amount of requests during a short period
of time - detection and attribution of malicious clients has focused on statistical methods for
detecting such behavior. Ranjan et al. [97] implemented a DDoS defense that consists of a
suspicion assignment technique that is reliant on an abnormal increase in the inter-arrival
request frequency for individual users and an increased session inter-arrival frequency over all
clients to be successful. Oikonomou et al. [87] proposed a technique to model normal user
behavior by exploring increased metrics for session and request inter-arrival times as well as
the average inter-arrival rate per client session. Finally, Jung et al. [56] used similar methods
of flagging oﬀending attackers by monitoring per-client request rates. The eﬀectiveness of each
of these three solutions is contingent on the individual malicious clients performing requests
at a significantly higher rate during a DDoS than that of normal traﬃc. This is contrary to a
FRC attack in which a malicious attacker would only need to make on the order of 200 requests
over a given day that would not be detected by these DDoS detection methodologies.
Others have analyzed request semantics of users [87, 124], which appears prima facie to
be a promising area for future work that could be used in tandem with the presented FRC
detection methodologies.
To be fair, the approaches discussed in this section were not designed nor analyzed with
respect of a FRC attack by their respective authors. Until now, the FRC attack has not been a
research subject. Future examination and experimentation will answer the question of whether
or not these detection methodologies are limited to application-layer DDoS attacks or whether
they possess qualities that can be adapted for the purpose of detecting significantly reduced
but still malicious consumption of web content.
3.7 Future Work & Conclusion
Future research on this topic will focus on shifting the J2 point on the MRU continuum
ideally to where J2 = J1 - ￿ or in other words the FRC attack has been relegated to below
nuisance activity. While research in the area of application-layer DDoS attacks has been fo-
cused on mitigating attacks when the QoS of the target begins to degrade, methodologies and
approaches from this body of work serve as a promising catalog of techniques on which to base
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attribution and detection methodologies that are appropriate for more subtle attacks like the
FRC.
Utility models as they are structured today for cloud computing are vulnerable to remote
exploits. By allowing any user with access to consume resources that are in turn metered and
billed to the cloud consumer, exposes the cloud consumer to a risk that is only mitigated by
time, detection and accountability. Until now there have been no previously known mitigation
strategies. Awareness and understanding are a key means of defense, and this chapter strived
to achieve those goals. This chapter provided a thorough description of the FRC attack and
described initial detection and attribution methodologies that may contribute to or motivate
solutions to mitigate such attacks. Unless utility models are restructured to obviate the FRC
attack, research in mitigating the FRC attack is necessary in order to ensure long-term sustain-
ability of cloud consumers and remove one more impediment that has dissuaded organizations
from adopting utility model based computing services like cloud computing.
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CHAPTER 4. TRAFFIC GENERATION
Chapter contains modified content from the following published conference paper:
Idziorek, J., Tannian, M. and Jacobson, D. ”Modeling Web Usage Profiles of Cloud Services
for Utility Cost Analysis.” In Proceedings of the 2011 Winter Simulation Conference (WSC).
Phoenix, AZ. 11-14 Dec. 2011. pp. 3318-3329, c￿ IEEE 2011. (Invited Paper)
4.1 Abstract
Early proponents of public cloud computing have come to identify cost savings a key factor
for adoption. However, the adoption and hosting of a web application in the cloud does not
provide any such guarantees. This is in part due to the utility pricing model that dictates the
cost of public cloud resources. In this work we seek to model and simulate data usage for a web
application for the purpose of utility cost analysis. Although much research has been performed
in the area of web usage mining, previously proposed models are unable to accurately model web
usage profiles for a specific web application nor do they define the necessary analytical metrics
needed to measure such accuracy. The first objective of this chapter is to present a simulation
model and corresponding algorithm to model web usage based on empirical observations. The
validation of the proposed model is performed using four metrics that holistically summarize
web usage and results show that the simulated output conforms to that of what was observed
and is within acceptable tolerance limits. Building on this work and in the context of the FRC
attack, the second objective of this work is to determine the most formidable attack scenario
to employ when analyzing the proposed detection and attribution methodologies.
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4.2 Introduction
With the advent of the public cloud computing model, web services that were once hosted on
private servers and networks are being outsourced to third-party cloud service providers (CSPs)
- Amazon’s EC2 is a well-known example. Early proponents of this emerging compute model
have come to identify cost savings as a key motivation for the adoption of the cloud model.
In comparison to more traditional computing models, economic eﬃciencies in the public cloud
have been enabled by the fundamental paradigm shifts in the way computing infrastructure is
hosted (e.g., multi-tenant hosting through virtualization, economies of scale, thin provisioning)
and the pay-as-you-go business model that dictates costs for resource usages by the cloud
consumer (i.e. a person that rents computing infrastructure from a CSP) - namely, the utility
compute costing model. However, the adoption and hosting of a web service in the cloud does
not provide any guarantees of cost savings as there are many factors that must be taken into
consideration [39, 46].
Under the utility compute costing model, much like the utility model that governs the
cost of electricity consumption, cloud consumers only pay for the resources they use and only
for the time they use them. For instance, the data transfer costs in and out of Amazon’s EC2
environment by a cloud consumer’s clients (those that patron the cloud-hosted web application)
is governed by the Amazon’s Web Services costing model (Figure 4.1) and accrues a cost that
is a function of the total data transferred [4]. At the conclusion of the month - a typical cloud
billing cycle - the aggregated costs are billed to the cloud consumer. Because data usage in the
cloud environment is uncertain, the cost for data transfer is as well, which is not typically the
case for private web service hosting. The pay-as-you-go billing structure fundamentally changes
how those who adopt the cloud model view the monthly data usage of their web applications
and motivates the need for modeling and simulation of web usage profiles. Being able to
accurately forecast accumulated resource consumption in advance allows one to anticipate costs
and manage application designs in order to address costs proactively.
The first objective of this chapter is to model and simulate data usage for a web application
for the purpose of utility cost analysis. More specifically, the goal is to explore the minimum
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number of days of training data necessary to achieve acceptable accuracy of the simulation
output. Although much research has been performed in the area of web usage mining - tech-
niques to model and simulate web user transactions - previously proposed models that generate
web traﬃc are unable to accurately model web usage profiles for a specific web application.
Either these models generate generic web document requests or such requests are based on
theoretical distributions. The approach presented in this chapter diﬀers in that web document
requests are derived from trace-driven, and first- and second-order Markov models trained on
empirical observations of how the web application under consideration was used in actuality.
Additionally, this chapter proposes four analytical metrics with which to measure the holistic
accuracy of the simulated output - analysis which is also lacking from previous works. The
deliverable is a simulation model and corresponding algorithms to model web usage based on
empirical observations. The validation of the proposed model shows that the simulated output
conforms to that of what was observed and is within acceptable tolerance limits.
Building on the constructed simulation model for web traﬃc, this chapter further explores
how such a model could be used to generate attack traﬃc with which to analyze the proposed
detection and attribution methodologies. It follows that the second goal of this chapter is to
determine which simulation algorithm - trace-driven, first- or second-order Markov - presents
the most formidable attack scenario. In other words, which of the listed simulation algorithms
would be considered the worst-case scenario for the FRC defender. To make such a distinction,
the analytical metrics proposed for the analysis of the simulation model will be applied to a
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scenario when a FRC attacker attempts to consume 100% more traﬃc than is expected.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.3 discusses related works in the
context of this work. Section 4.4 describes the dataset used to train and validate the simulation
algorithm as well as considerations taken when cleansing the original dataset. To model web
usage profiles, in Section 4.5 describes a simulation modeling and corresponding algorithm.
Based on this model, Section 4.6 provides the experimental metrics, design, and results used
to validate the proposed model. In Section 4.7, this experimental design is used to discover the
worst-case FRC attack scenario. Lastly, future work and a conclusion are discussed in Sections
4.8 and 4.9 respectively.
4.3 Related Work
The related works that have bearing on this paper are derived from the research areas of web
usage mining and web traﬃc generation. Although web usage modeling and traﬃc generation
are not mutually exclusive, this chapter will explore a shortcoming in the synthesis of these
two research fields. At present, a complete model that takes into account all the necessary
sub-models needed to accurately simulate realistic web traﬃc for a specific website does not
appear to exist. Furthermore, there is no model suitable for predictive cost modeling of web
traﬃc. In this section, the described work is briefly describe in the context of these related
bodies of work.
Much research has been performed in area of web usage mining since the seminal work done
by Arlitt and Williamson [7]. Many of these works, similar to that of [75], [114], and [128] have
sought to characterize, model and validate the distributions that depict the way individual
users and user populations interact with websites. Extrapolating from this body of research,
a number papers have made use of and extended these models to simulate web traﬃc for a
number of purposes. Cao et al. [19] presented a model to simulate generic web traﬃc on
high-speed backbone links. Their objective diﬀers from the objective of this work in that this
chapter and the resultant simulation algorithm seeks to model aggregate user behavior for a
distinct website as observed by the web server as opposed to modeling link traﬃc. Luo and
Marin [74] devised a model to simulate realistic Internet background traﬃc, including the web,
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for constructing a network intrusion detection environment. Similarly, Kroc et al. [67] focused
on modeling the theoretical distributions that together compose a single web user session.
While such modeling may be suﬃcient for background noise and generating realistic user-side
web sessions respectively, neither of these two works model specific page requests as observed
for a given website. Instead they model web interactions as generic requests. Moreover, the
requested web document size is attributed a value based on a theoretical distribution, which is
not suﬃcient for the purposes of accurately modeling actual data usage for a specific website
with real document sizes. Instead, specific web requests need to be represented by their known
data sizes, which is discussed in Section 4.4.1.
Burklen et al. [17] present a general model and algorithm to synthetically generate a se-
quence of web requests for a single user. This work is based on known and previously studied
web usage behaviors and models in addition to the hyperlink structure of individual web pages
and their relationship to other web pages for a given website. While notionally similar to the
work in this chapter, the scope of such an algorithm is limited to that of a single user session,
not multiple users over a prolonged period of time, which is a key objective of this work. Fur-
thermore, the synthesizing of a single user session is predicated on a theoretical relationship
between web pages derived from the site’s hyperlink structure and not from leveraging historical
observations of how users have traversed the website. We instead generate individual requests
that compose a web session from a Markov model based on learned browsing patterns.
In contrast to modeling generic or request sequences based hyperlink structures, Markov
chains have been shown to provide accurate models for simulating web usage [71]. Under
this guise, Markov models have been used in a number of contexts including performance
analysis [21] and caching algorithms [20]. Most similar to the work presented in this chapter
are papers that have sought to predict user web sessions by means of Markov models. Nigam
and Jain [85] presented a model based on a dynamic nested Markov model for predicting the
next page accessed by a user given an observed series of requests. Borges and Levene have
produced a number of works - summarized in [10] - that investigate the next page request
of individual users and the accuracy of predicting n-grams of requests with various Markov
models. While eﬀective for their given purposes, neither of these works provide analysis of
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the accuracy and summarization ability of using Markov models for generating and predicting
aggregate web traﬃc based on actual server logs.
In their own respective way, each of these works presented in this section falls short of being
able to provide a complete model and simulation framework for data usage transferred by a
specific website. To fill this gap, this work creates a synthesis between many of the sub-models
presented in these works to provide a more relevant modeling of content usage for a specific
website based on training from session logs. This model can then be used for the purposes of
modeling usage profiles of cloud-based service for predictive cost analysis and dually for the
purposes of FRC attack traﬃc generation.
4.4 Dataset Description and Considerations
The datasets used for the purposes of this paper are two 56-day web server logs. The first
web server log (denoted as ECpE ) originates from our department’s web server and the second
log was produced by a busy NASA web server (denoted as NASA) [82]. To demonstrate the
generality of the proposed algorithm, each of the web logs are used to both train the proposed
model as well as for the experimental validation of the simulation proposed algorithms presented
in Section 4.5.
Web server usage is often represented as Zipf-like distributions [14] in which the frequency
of a requested document p(i) is proportional to its rank i such that p(i) ∝ 1/iα where α is
close to unity. Figure 4.2 depicts a Zipf-like distribution for the ECpE dataset as a log-log
plot of request frequency vs. rank. Figure 4.3 shows a similar log-log plot of document rank
vs. data usage. Drawing from Figure 4.2, the 356 most requested pages represent 90% of all
requests and of these pages their weight in data usage totals over 97% of data requested (Figure
4.3) over the observed 56-day span for the ECpE dataset. Given these empirical distributions
and observations, the modeling of data usage for the given dataset is heavily dependent upon
accurately modeling the most frequently requested documents.
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Figure 4.3: Zipf-like Distribution for Data Usage.
4.4.1 Web Usage Mining and Modeling Components
A web server log maintains an itemized journal of all users’ content requests and provides
the necessary observations for deriving empirical distributions and models used in the study of
web usage. Figure 4.4 provides an illustration of web usage metrics and will be used as a guide
to explain these metrics as well as the considerations taken to cleanse the observed web server
log from its original form to what was used for the purposes of this chapter.
Primary Web Document Request - An individual web request within a web log is
depicted as a vertical line in Figure 4.4. As seen annotated in the call-out, requests are composed
of an IP address for the requesting client, time stamp, document requested, and the data size
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        (entry)    [IP  address]  [time  stamp]  [page  request]  [size]
      (1)  192.168.3.2    1:30:30    /index.html    9392
      (2)  192.168.3.2    1:30:35      /students/index.html    9933
      (3)  192.168.3.2    1:30:35      /scripts/style.ccs    233
      (4)  192.168.3.2    1:30:36      /pictures/students.png    3399
      (5)  192.168.3.2    1:30:55      /academics/courses.html    6758
      (6)  192.168.3.2    1:30:59      /pictures/books.png    567
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Figure 4.4: Web Usage Modeling Components.
of the respective document.
The modeling and simulation objectives of this work are reliant on the accuracy of the
data size attributed to each client-invoked request (i.e. a primary request). The data size, as
shown in Figure 4.4, for each individual HTML request can be misleading as it is not a com-
plete account of the data usage needed to view the expected web page, but instead the entry
only reports the size of the HTML file itself. Typically, a single request for a HTML docu-
ment invokes other secondary in-line requests to retrieve embedded objects within the primary
HTML page such as pictures, scripts, and videos. In Figure 4.4, both (3)/scripts/style.css and
(4)/pictures/students.png are secondary in-line requests, shown as shorter lines, of the primary
request, shown as a taller line, for (2)/students/index.html. Together, the size of the primary
and associated secondary requests represent the total data usage for a single client-invoked
request, which is one of the objectives of this analysis. While both primary and secondary
requests are registered in a web log, archival analysis is inadequate to determine whether an
entry is a primary or a secondary request, and relate secondary requests with its parent primary
request. Client-side and distributed caching further complicate the task of reconstructing these
relationships from a web log.
Therefore, in lieu of these impediments and in order to accurately capture the data size
for each primary client-invoked request and its accompanying secondary requests, analysis was
performed on the active departmental website (i.e. the ECpE dataset). The URL for each
primary request in the web log - assumed to be an HTML document or URI - was requested
from the website with a script capable of capturing the data usage footprint for the primary
request as well as all secondary requests. After accumulating the footprint of each primary
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request and relevant secondary requests, the total replaced the original primary request size
and the secondary entries were discarded. Such analysis and post-processing can only be
performed with access to a live website and thus such analysis was not performed on that
NASA dataset. Therefore, the presented initial results for data usage modeling are limited to
that of a single website, since access to web logs of an active web site is severely limited.
Web Session - A web session is a set of consecutive requests generated by an individual user
during a single viewing period. As seen in Figure 4.4, web session A contains three primary
web requests and thus has a web session length of three. A web log is composed of many
interleaved web sessions initiated by multiple users. Within the observed web logs described
in this section, web session lengths ranged from well over 100 documents in length with some
sessions as long as 1400 primary requests. In order to provide a more accurate modeling of how
the majority of normal users actually traversed the website, web session lengths were truncated
to 35 primary requests, which falls within the 99th percentile.
Often web logs do not contain the complete information necessary to discern when a web
session for a user ends and when the user’s next web session begins. Research in this area has
sought to diﬀerentiate between sessions using time-oriented heuristics [130] and transitional
request probabilities using a first-order Markov model [92]. However, for simplicity, it is as-
sumed in this work that a 900 second or greater time lapse between primary requests denotes
the end of one web session and the beginning of a new session. This assumption is consistent
with previous works in the field [67].
Session Inter-arrival Time - Session inter-arrival time is the measure of time between
the beginning of two consecutive web sessions. In Figure 4.4, the session inter-arrival time is
depicted as the time between the beginning of web session A and that of web session B.
Request Inter-arrival Time - Within a given session greater in length than one, there
is an intermittent amount of time experienced between each respective primary web request
by the client. This is referred to as the request inter-arrival time and is shown between web
session A requests (4) and (5) in Figure 4.4.
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4.4.2 Dataset Limitations
As with many empirically based models, the simulation results are heavily dependent on the
quality of the training data. Moreover, the training of trace-driven and Markov models based
on the actions that have been observed in the web logs restricts the model to only the web
pages requested and conditional probabilities between pages that have been observed. Lastly,
due to the necessity of performing analysis on a live website and limited cooperation of website
operators, the results of this work is currently limited. Although there are no indications that
the presented model and algorithm would not provide a general solution, such claims can only
be made after further analysis of a broader set of websites.
4.5 Simulation Algorithms
The objective of the proposed simulation algorithms are to generate web traﬃc in accordance
with what has been observed. The uniqueness of the outlined approaches in comparison to the
papers discussed in Section 4.3 is that the described simulation algorithms generate web traﬃc
crafted from empirical distributions from a specific web application and utilizes trained models
to generate page requests that reflect actual primary request patterns. In this section, modeling
considerations and algorithms based on first-order and second-order Markov models in addition
to a trace-drive simulation model will be discussed. The primary objective of this section is to
describe a proposed Markov-based simulation algorithm by dissecting a second-order Markov
model and its underlying modeling components. Although not overtly described in the same
detail as the algorithm for the second-order Markov model, a similar algorithm using a first-
order Markov model was also constructed for modeling web usage.
4.5.1 Description of Markov-Based Simulation Algorithms
Given a web server log composed of N days of observed requests as an input, the objective
of Algorithm 1 is to simulate a web server log that conforms to the empirical distributions
derived from the input dataset while preserving web usage behaviors as they were deduced
from sessions within the input web log. The output of the simulation algorithm is a web server
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log L composed of many users’ web sessions that emulates actual clients as they utilize the
website over a period of time.
A web server log L is composed of many independent and, at times, overlapping sessions
s that represent the actions taken by a website’s user base. Each session s ∈ L is a tuple
s =< ipAddress, sessionLength, P > that is composed of the IP address of the individual
requester, the number of web pages requested during a given session, and the set of primary
web page requests P . Each p ∈ P is also a tuple p =< page, time, size > that denotes the
specific web page, time stamp, and size of each individual web page request within a session.
Algorithm 1 Modeling Web Usage from a Second-Order Markov Model
Require: Observed Web Server Log
Ensure: Generated Web Server Log
1: generateLog() : L {
2: absoluteT ime← 0, i← 0, currentRequests← 0;
3: while currentRequests < totalRequests do
4: si.sessionLength← generateSessionLength();
5: si.ipAddress← generateIpAddress();
6: absolute time + = generateSessionInterarrivalTime();
7: currentRequests+ = si.sessionLength;
8: for j ← 1 to si.sessionLength do
9: if j == 1 then
10: pj .page← returnFirstPage();
11: pj .time← absoluteT ime;
12: relative time← absoluteT ime;
13: else
14: if j == 2 then
15: pj .page← returnPageFirstOrderMarkov(pj−1.page);
16: else
17: pj .page← returnPageSecondOrderMarkov(pj−1.page, pj−2.page);
18: end if
19: relativeT ime + = generateRequestInterarrivalTime();
20: pj .time← relativeT ime;
21: end if
22: pj .size← pageSize();
23: end for
24: L = L ∪ si;
25: i++;
26: end while
27: return L;
28: }
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4.5.2 Algorithm Modeling Components
The presented algorithm illustrates a high-level overview of this approach to simulating
web usage profiles. The underpinnings of the algorithm are derived from published web usage
metrics in coordination with generating primary request sequences by using a Markov model.
The following descriptions provide a thorough analysis of the algorithm components used for
experimental evaluation, which is reviewed in the next section.
Line 3: totalRequests - Although not formally presented in in this paper, linear regression
analysis was performed on each training dataset to extrapolate the expectation of the
number requests for the given target of accumulated simulation days. This value was
used as the control parameter to dictate the length of each simulation run.
Line 4: generateSessionLength() - The session length defines the number of primary web
requests by an individual user during a single browsing period. Session lengths were
modeled as a Lognormal distribution with the following parameters: α = 0.44-0.48, β
= 0.76-0.78, µ = 2.47-2.49 pages, σ = 3.45-3.46 pages. The modeled session length
distribution is consistent with [114].
Line 5: generateIpAddress() - The IP addresses chosen for each individual session were
modeled and drawn from a continuous, piecewise-linear empirical distribution that was
populated based on the pre-processing analysis of the training data set.
Line 6: generateSessionInterarrivalT ime() - The session inter-arrival times were modeled
as an exponential distribution with a mean that varied between 113 and 126 seconds.
Although in [67], session length was modeled with a Weibull distribution, we found an
exponential distribution to be a more appropriate fit for the given data sets.
Line 10: returnFirstPage() - Each simulated session is initialized by determining the first
page to be synthetically generated for a given user and for each individual session. The
first page distribution is an initial state vector learned from the first page views of the
sessions extracted from the training dataset. Due to the self-similarity of web traﬃc,
the distribution of first page requests can also be depicted with a Zipf-like distribution
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similar to that of the aggregate request distributions presented in Section 4.4. Figure 4.5
represents the first-page distribution of the training data set and Figure 4.6 represents
the simulated first-page distribution.
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Figure 4.5: Actual First-Page Zipf Distribution.
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Figure 4.6: Generated First-Page Zipf Distribution.
Line 15: returnPageF irstOrderMarkov() - A Markov model is used to generate the actual
page requests and is trained by analyzing web server logs. Based on the presented algo-
rithm, if a session length is at least two, the second request generated in a web session
is drawn from a first-order Markov model such that pij = Pr(xn+1 = j|xn = i). For
a thorough explanation of training and building Markov models, which is accompanied
examples, please see [10].
73
Line 17: returnPageSecondOrderMarkov() - For web session lengths greater than two, all
subsequent requests are generated from a second-order Markov model such that pijk =
Pr(xn+2 = k|xn+1 = j, xn = i). The second-order model was constructed in a manner
similar to the first-order model.
Line 19: generateRequestInterarrivalT ime() - Each request inter-arrival time was gener-
ated from a Weibull distribution with the scale parameter ranging between 28.57 and 33.8
and the shape parameter between 0.57 and 0.62. The fitting of this distribution aligns
with that in [67].
4.5.3 Description of Trace-Driven Simulation Algorithm
Diﬀerent than a Markov-based model, a trace-driven simulation model is simply the replay-
ing of randomly chosen web sessions as they were experienced in the training dataset. Instead of
constructing conditional probabilities between successive requests, in this model, the selection of
primary web requests is a product of a randomly chosen web session that reflect exactly how real
users traversed the website under consideration. To construct such a model, web sessions were
extracted from the training dataset and assembled into datastore that allowed for both random
selection and quick retrieval. Unlike Algorithm 1, the generateSessionLength() function for
the trace-driven algorithm was not determined by a theoretical distribution but instead by the
empirical distribution of actual sessions and their respective lengths. Furthermore, because of
the prescribed nature of this model, the returnFirstPage(), returnPageF irstOrderMarkov(),
and returnPageSecondOrderMarkov() functions were replaced by a much simpler function
that injected the appropriate primary web request from the chosen web session selection. To
preserve the flexibility of the simulation and modeling ability of the Markov-based algorithm,
the simulation of IP addresses and inter-session and inter-arrival times is similarly performed
for the trace-driven algorithm. The hypothesis tested by introducing the trace-driven algorithm
is whether or not first-order or second-order Markov models are better equipped at modeling
web usage in comparison to replaying what was observed.
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4.6 Experimental Evaluation
This section presents the experimental metrics, experimental design and related experi-
mental results. Validation of the described algorithms relies on four key measures : 1) relative
proportionality and rank of aggregate requests (Zipf Metric - Section 4.6.1.1) 2) summariza-
tion accuracy (Spearman Footrule Distance - Section 4.6.1.2), 3) summarization completeness
(Overlap Metric - Section 4.6.1.3), and 4) modeling of data usage error (Section 4.6.1.4). To-
gether these four metrics are used to assess the output of the simulation models relative to
actual web usage recorded by the respective websites.
4.6.1 Experimental Metrics
4.6.1.1 Zipf Metric
As described in Section 4.4, a Zipf-like distribution for a web dataset can be depicted by
constructing a log-log plot of requested document frequency vs. rank. Through experimentation
of Zipf-like distributions of web datasets, it has been found that constructing a linear regression
line of the top 10% of primary requests yields a consistent metric with which to measure the
relative proportionality and rank of aggregate web documents. The capturing of only the top
10% of web documents is motivated by the inconsistencies in the tail of Zipf-like distributions
formed from web logs. Figures 4.7 and 4.8 represent Zipf values for both an actual and simulated
web datasets.
Because the Zipf metric is an empirical measure of a single dataset, the percent error (Equa-
tion 4.1) between between the actual Zipf value for the target web log and the corresponding
Zipf value (i.e. the slope of the regression line) for the simulated results were calculated to
produce a consistent metric with which to compare and analyze.
PercentError =
Experimental −Actual
Actual
∗ 100 (4.1)
Due to the fact that the Zipf metric only measures the relative volume of aggregate requests
between the expected and simulation web logs, it does little to express the actual accuracy and
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Figure 4.7: Actual Zipf-like Distribution
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Figure 4.8: Simulated Zipf-like Distribution
completeness of the web documents that were requested. For this analysis, the Spearman
Footrule distance and the overlap metrics are introduced next.
4.6.1.2 Spearman Footrule Distance
The Spearman’s Footrule distance [32] is a non-parametric measure of association between
two ranked lists. This measure was used in a similar context to measure the accuracy of pre-
dicting individual session n-grams generated from Markov models [10]. For this work, however,
the Spearman’s Footrule distance is instead utilized to measure the summarization accuracy of
the simulation algorithm by analyzing the ranked lists of the top-10% of the simulated primary
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requests output in comparison to that of the web logs.
The purpose of employing the Spearman’s Footrule is to find an aggregated ranking that
minimizes the distance between two ranked lists. However, for the purposes of this paper,
the proximity between two ranked lists will instead be considered as it is a more appropriate
measure that aligns with the described analysis objectives.
Drawing on the notation established in [10], the Spearman’s Footrule proximity is defined as
follows: Given two ranked top-k lists L1 and L2 as inputs, with each list containing k entries, let
L be the union of the two lists such that L = L1 ∪L2. Furthermore, let L1 be the reference list
that is assumed to be the ground truth and L2 be the comparison list, which in all actuality is a
partial list in comparison to that of the reference list. To obtain the ranking of a list item i ∈ L
in L1, we define the function f(i) and similarly g(i) for i ∈ L2. In either function f(i) or g(i)
if i /∈ L, then the subsequent ranking is assigned that of a location parameter l = k + 1 [105].
Given these preliminaries, the Spearman’s Footrule proximity is defined as follows:
F (L1, L2) = 1−
￿
i∈L
|f(i)− g(i)|
k(k + 1)
(4.2)
In order to provide a measure of similarity or proximity instead of a measure of diﬀerence
or distance, the normalized summation in Equation 5.3 is subtracted from one. In the case
that both ranked lists were identical, the Spearman proximity would be one. It follows that
two disjoint lists would yield a Spearman proximity value of zero.
To provide a tangible example for the calculation and purpose of the Spearman proximity
measure, Table 4.1 provides a modified listing of the top-15 requested web pages for both the
ECpE dataset (i.e. Actual) - reference list - and the simulated results using first-order Markov
model as described in Section 4.5 (i.e. Simulated). The respective Spear values, according to
Equation 5.3, can be found in the fourth column in Table 4.1. As can bee seen, the 10th most
popular web age for the Actual dataset is not present in the Simulated dataset, which incurs
the extraction penalty of 16 (i.e. k+1). Once summed and normalized, the provided example
results in an overall Spearman proximity value of 0.73.
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Table 4.1: Spearman and Overlap Comparison
Rank Reference List (L1) (L2) Spear
1 / / 0
2 /who-we-are/faculty-new.html /who-we-are.html 1
3 /who-we-are.html /who-we-are/faculty-new.html 1
4 /academics/courses.html /academics/courses.html 0
5 /research.html /students/graduate-students.html 3
6 /students/graduate-students.html /students.html 1
7 /students.html /academics.html 1
8 /academics.html /research.html 1
9 /admissions/grad-guidelines.html /admissions/grad-guidelines.html 0
10 /academics/calendar.html /who-we-are/staﬀ.html 16
11 /admissions.html /academics/ee-major.html 1
12 /learning.html /admissions.html 16
13 /academics/flowcharts.html /academics/flowcharts.html 0
14 /research/funding.html /research/research-groups.html 16
15 /who-we-are/people.html /academics/cpre-major.html 16
Spearman 0.70
4.6.1.3 Overlap Metric
In conjunction with the Spearman’s Footrule proximity, the overlap between the reference
list L1 and the comparator list L2 is measured to provide a broad indication of the summariza-
tion ability of the simulation model output. The overlap is defined as the percentage of items
in the comparator list L2 that appear in the reference list L1 such that:
O(L1, L2) =
|L1 ∩ L2|
|L1| (4.3)
In comparison to the Spearman distance, the overlap value measures the completeness
between the two analyzed datasets. As seen in Table 4.1, a similar example is provided to
demonstrate the calculation for the overlap measure. From this analysis, it is shown that the
Simulated dataset contains 11 of the 15 web documents contained in the Actual dataset (i.e.
the reference list). As a result, the overlap value for the two lists is 11/15 = 73%.
4.6.1.4 Percent Error
Lastly, the percent error (Equation 4.1) between the expected value of the aggregate data
usage (in bytes) as produced by the output from the simulation model and the actual data usage
from that of the observed logs is measured. This measure compliments the Zipf, Spearman and
overlap values to provide a comparative indication of the model’s ability to accurately forecast
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aggregate data usage, which is a key variable in public cloud utility costing models.
4.6.2 Experimental Design
The available datasets were utilized to there full extent by using a sliding window for both
the input training days and for the output comparison. A goal of this work was to explore
the minimum number of training days necessary to accurately simulate future aggregate use.
In the context of cloud computing and due to monthly billing cycles, future aggregate use is
most appropriately defined as the 30 days in advance of the first observed day of the given
training window. For example, as illustrated in Figure 4.9, the simulation run A is trained
on the days 1-10 of accumulated logs and is tasked with simulating the aggregate usage of the
web application from days 1-30. The results of such a simulation output are then compared to
that of the observed web log. To provide multiple simulation runs for a given training window
size, the simulation was repeated by shifting the simulation window into the future one day
and repeating. As shown in Figure 4.9, the simulation run B was trained on the logs from
days 2-11 and was tasked with simulating the aggregate usage for days 2-31 and thus a sliding
training window of 10 days.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 . . . 27 28 29 53 54 5530 31 32 . . .
Simulation  Output
Training  Window
Days
Simulation  Run  A
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 . . . 27 28 29 53 54 5530 31 32 . . .
Simulation  Output
Training  Window
Simulation  Run  B
Days
Figure 4.9: Experiment Simulation Design.
To explore the minimum number of training days necessary to simulate future aggregate
use, a sliding window of observed days ranging from 4 days to 29 days was used. The size of
the training window (in days) is denoted as the x-axis for the Figures in both Section 4.6.3
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and 4.7. For each training window size, 25 simulation runs were conducted and the metrics
described in Section 4.6.1 were calculated. Each datapoint on the following figures represents
an average for the given metric resulting from 25 simulations runs per training window size.
4.6.3 Experimental Results
To generate web sessions that together form a web log, experimental simulations were
performed using trace-driven and both first- and second-order Markov models. Having prior
access to the accumulated data logs allowed for the comparison of the simulation model output
with that of what actually transpired.
Figure 4.10 provides a comparison the of percent error in accumulated data usage between
generating web requests from a trace-drive and first- and second-order Markov models. From
the analysis of the ECpE dataset, it can be seen that the trace-drive simulation model provides
a more accurate modeling of data usage than both of the Markov-based models for training
window sizes larger than four days. While it takes approximately eight days of observed web
logs for the trace-driven model to produce a 30-day projection of data usage that is within
a 5% error tolerance of the actual value, it takes more than twice as many observed days to
for the Markov-based models to achieve the same results. As expected, the initial prediction
capability of the three models improves as the training window sizes increases. However, the
trace-drive model reaches a limitation of accuracy after approximately 21 days while the first-
and second-order Markov models exhibits a more linear improvement in accuracy after seven
days while maintaining a proportional relationship as the training window size increases. While
similar analysis of the NASA dataset would be beneficial, the historic nature of the website
did not lend itself to being able to accurately attribute secondary-line inline requests to their
respective primary requests and thus it was not possible to accurately model the total data
footprint for each primary request. Despite this drawback, the remaining metrics previously
discussed are applicable to both the ECpE and NASA dataset.
Figures 4.11 and 4.12 show the Spearman’s Footrule proximity between the simulated output
and the observed logs for the top-10% of requests for both the ECpE and the NASA datasets.
The results show that across all training window sizes, the trace-driven model provides a
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Figure 4.10: ECpE - Data Percent Error.
consistently better accuracy in summarization ability in comparison to that of the Markov-
based models. This is in part due to the nature of Markov models. In this context, first-order
models accurately represent the first two requests of a session but do not accurately represent
all second-order conditional probabilities for session lengths greater than two. Second-order
models on the other hand, accurately model second-order conditional probabilities and thus
have a higher accuracy in reflecting reality but do so at the loss of coverage. The completeness
of the summarization strengths of the trace-driven can further be seen in Figures 4.13 and 4.14,
which provides a higher-level comparison of the overlap, or the completeness in summarization
between the top-10% of requests.
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Figure 4.11: ECpE: Spearman’s Proximity.
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Figure 4.12: NASA: Spearman’s Proximity.
Similar to the Spearman proximity analysis, the overlap between the top-10% of requested
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documents yields results that show the trace-driven model is more adept at providing a more
accurate completeness of summarization between the three analyzed simulation models.
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Figure 4.13: ECpE: Overlap Percentage.
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Figure 4.14: NASA: Overlap Percentage.
To complement the data usage and summarization (i.e. Spearman and overlap) metrics, the
Zipf analysis provides a measure of the relative proportionality of request volume between the
top-10% of requested documents. Because the aforementioned summarization metrics are non-
parametric measures, they do not account of the volume of requests attributed to each respective
primary request. As can been seen in Figures 4.15 and 4.16, the Zipf value for the trace-
driven model provides a significantly better result in comparison Markov-based models, which
is consistent the previously analyzed results. These results are also a product of the decreased
coverage of Markov models and the bias they create towards the most popular documents.
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Figure 4.15: ECpE: Zipf Value.
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Figure 4.16: NASA: Zipf Value.
Through this study, a trace-driven simulation model has been shown to provide a consis-
tently more accurate modeling of web data usage than a either a first- or second-order Markov
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model. In addition to the less accurate ability to model web usage, the drawback of Markov
models, in general and as they increase in order, is that they consume a exponentially higher
state-space and longer model runtimes than that of lower-order or trace-driven models. For
the application of data usage forecasting a trace-driven model has been shown to be definitely
the best of the analyzed models in all four provided measures.
4.7 Attack Traﬃc Generation
As discussed in the Section 4.2, the provided algorithm and results serve a dual purpose for
this work. Although the primary focus of this chapter was centered on modeling and simulating
web traﬃc for a specific website or web application, the presented results can also be used to
generate realistic attack traﬃc that can be used for the purposes of testing proposed FRC
detection and attribution solutions. Formal modeling enables for the creation of worst-case
attack scenarios that can test methodologies under challenging scenarios.
Diﬀerent than the analysis in Section 4.6.3, the objective of this section is to simulate web
usages in volumes that would be indicative of a FRC attack. To test the three simulation models
adeptness at creating realistic attack data in excess of normal, the experiments provided in this
section were constructed to consume 100% more requests than the previously targeted 30-day
value. Comparing the actual 30-day value from the observed web logs with the simulated attack
data will provide the answer as to what simulation methodology would best be suited for the
purposes of simulating a stealthy FRC attack.
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Figure 4.17: ECpE: Spearman’s Proximity.
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Figure 4.18: NASA: Spearman’s Proximity.
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Figure 4.19: ECpE: Overlap Percentage.
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Figure 4.20: NASA: Overlap Percentage.
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Figure 4.21: ECpE: Zipf Value.
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Figure 4.22: NASA: Zipf Value.
Similar to the experimental results presented in Section 4.6.3 and despite the 100% increase
in simulated traﬃc volume, the trace-driven model outperformed both the first- and second-
order Markov models in respect to the Zipf, Spearman, and overlap metrics. As a result,
throughout the rest of this work, the trace-driven attack scenario will be considered the most
formidable attack.
4.8 Future Work
Further validation and future work on this topic will be heavily dependent on obtaining a
suﬃcient number of daily web logs from an active websites of suﬃcient length and that are
suited for data usage modeling. To test the generality of the result presented, it would also
be beneficial to obtain numerous web logs from diverse web sites or web applications and of
varying user volume. While desirable, privacy and security concerns are significant impediments
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to accessing web logs for research use. In order to make due with what is available, and thus to
render existing publicly available datasets useful for such analysis, heuristic-based approaches
will be necessary in order to identify primary requests and to reconstruct data usage footprints
from associated secondary in-line requests. Within the study of Markov models, there exist a
number of methodologies that could be implemented (or expanded upon) to further refine the
accuracy of session generation components of the model, which could potentially lead to more
precise data usage modeling and provide for a more accurate coverage of overall requests. In
addition to the modeling of web usage for utility cost analysis, many other aspects of a CSP
platform like server instant hours, data I/O, and storage could be modeled and simulated to
provide a more holistic account the total expenses a cloud consumer incurs.
4.9 Conclusion
Resource planning is not unique to where an application is hosted. However, having accurate
profiles of future web application usage allows for more eﬃcient management and expectations
of costs in the cloud. In order to address this challenge, modeling needs to be able to charac-
terize a given web application trained with actuals usage patterns. In summary, the presented
approach was to do the following: 1) obtain actual page sizes (i.e. size of primary and secondary
in-line requests); 2) determine empirical distributions from actual web logs; 3) build Markov
models that represent page request order based on actual usage; 4) apply an algorithm that
leverages the models in 2) and 3) to generate web log entries for the target number of days;
and 5) evaluate accuracy and summarization of the resultant logs compared with actual logs.
In a practical setting the last step would not be possible until after the target day has passed,
but step 5) would be helpful to establish ongoing confidence in and possibly tune parameters
within the approach.
This paper contributes to the field of modeling and simulation by oﬀering a modeling
approach that approximates actual web application usage behavior with greater fidelity by
tailoring modeling to the application instance. Moreover, the developed algorithm provides a
means to utilize these models to produce days of complete web server logs. Thus providing
one an ability to evaluate the qualities of this approach with a practical benchmark. Results
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have shown that a minimum of eight days of observed logs coupled with a trace-driven model
is necessary to provide a suﬃciently accurate projection of logs for a cloud billing cycle. Lastly,
it was shown that the trace-driven model was best suited to provide the most formidable FRC
attack scenario.
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CHAPTER 5. FRC DETECTION
Chapter contains modified content from the following published conference paper:
Idziorek, J., Tannian, M. and Jacobson, D. ”Detecting Fraudulent Use of Cloud Resources.”
In Proceedings of the 2011 ACM Workshop on Cloud Computing Security (CCSW ’11) at CCS.
Chicago, IL. 21 Oct. 2011. pp. 61-72, c￿ 2011, Association for Computing Machinery, Inc.
(Acceptance Rate 13/45 = 29%)
5.1 Abstract
Initial threat modeling and security research on the public cloud model has primarily focused
on the confidentiality and integrity of data transferred, processed, and stored in the cloud.
Little attention has been paid to the external threat sources that have the capability to aﬀect
the financial viability, hence the long-term availability, of services hosted in the public cloud.
Similar to an application-layer DDoS attack, a Fraudulent Resource Consumption (FRC) attack
is a much more subtle attack carried out over a longer duration of time. The objective of the
attacker is to exploit the utility pricing model which governs the resource usage in the cloud
model by fraudulently consuming web content with the purpose of depriving the victim of their
long-term economic availability of hosting publicly accessible web content in the cloud. This
chapter thoroughly describes the FRC attack and discusses why current application-layer DDoS
detection schemes are not applicable to a more subtle attack. The chapter goes on to propose
three detection metrics that together form the criteria for identifying a FRC attack from that
of normal web activity. Experimental results based on three plausible attack scenarios show
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that an attacker without knowledge of the training web log has a diﬃcult time mimicking the
self-similar and consistent request semantics of normal web activity.
5.2 Introduction
The inevitable trade-oﬀ for the potential cost savings and convenience aﬀorded by public
cloud computing is the exposure to both new and old security risks. While both the confiden-
tiality and integrity of data transferred, processed, and stored in the cloud has attracted much
of the focus from initial threat modeling and research, little attention has been paid to the
external threat sources that have the capability to aﬀect the financial viability and thus the
long-term availability of services hosted in the public cloud.
A defining characteristic of the public cloud model is the pay-as-you-go pricing model [77]
that governs resource consumption costs (e.g. server hours, bandwidth, storage, etc.) - more
broadly known as utility pricing. Under this pricing structure, public-facing web content is
vulnerable to remote exploitation in which attack clients purposefully request web content in
volumes that are economically unsustainable for the cloud consumer - one that rents services
from a Cloud Service Provider (CSP) (Figure 5.1).
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Figure 5.1: Cloud Network Attack Diagram
Notionally similar to an application-layer DDoS attack, a Fraudulent Resource Consumption
(FRC) attack is a much more subtle attack and is carried out over a longer duration of time. The
objective of the attacker is to exploit the utility pricing model by fraudulently consuming web
content with the purpose of depriving the victim of their long-term economic viability of hosting
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publicly accessible web content in the cloud. To avoid detection by current application-layer
DDoS solutions, fraudulent request rates of attack clients are of moderate intensity and requests
attempt to blend into the normal activity of the target website. For the cloud consumer,
diﬀerentiating data usage of legitimate clients from that of attack clients is diﬃcult because
requests only diﬀer in the intentions of the attacker not in the structure or semantics of the
requests.
Known as the free-rider problem in field of economics [59], the unobstructed access to web
resources (i.e. non-excludable goods) by the general nondescript public via the Internet creates
a scenario in which the cost of excessive resource consumption is shouldered not by the request-
ing users but instead by the cloud consumer. In this context, excessive consumption leads to
market failure for the victim and abandonment of the public cloud model. The exploitation
of utility models is not a new concept. Telephone networks have experienced their fair share
of similar fraudulent consumption in the past [36]. However, unlike the telephone networks,
which have since abandoned in-band signaling and thereby addressing a well-known vulnera-
bility, public access and the pay-as-you-go business model are an architectural dichotomy that
remain at the root of this problem. Until the systemic vulnerability is addressed, detection and
mitigation of fraudulent usage of the public cloud should commence in earnest. At this time,
there appear to be no viable detection mechanisms capable of diﬀerentiating a FRC attack
from that of a normal increase in the web traﬃc volume for a given website. This work seeks
to contribute to the eﬀort of addressing this detection gap.
In the context of this chapter, the term detection is defined to be a method of distinguishing
a FRC attack from that of normal user activity and attribution to be the process of properly
identifying individual attack clients. The focus of this chapter is to provide a thorough analysis
of FRC attack detection methodologies. Attribution of such attacks is reserved for Chapter 6.
The contributions of this paper are threefold. (1) The FRC attack is diﬀerentiated from that
of application-layer DDoS attacks and flash crowds and it is demonstrated why solutions for
such problems are not viable for detecting a FRC attack. (2) A methodology is described that
incorporates three detection metrics that together exploit the self-similarity [27] of site-level
web usage. (3) Three attack scenarios are provided that test the proposed detection metrics
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and provide extensive experimental results.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.3 provides the background for the
cloud and utility model. The FRC attack, threat model, cloud web server profiling, and related
works are thoroughly discussed in Section 5.4. In Section 5.5, the datasets that is used for
both training and detection are described. The detection metrics are described in Section 5.6
and the attack scenarios used to test the given detection mechanisms are described in Section
5.7. Experimental evaluation is provided in Section 5.8 and the FRC attack is discussed in
context of a flash crowd in Section 5.9. Finally, Future Work and the Conclusion are presented
in Sections 5.10 and 5.11 respectively.
5.3 Background
This section provides the background and context useful for the remainder of the chapter.
5.3.1 Cloud Computing and FRC Actors
As illustrated in Figure 5.1, the following roles are defined in the context of cloud computing
to provide a consistent reference to the actors that play a role in a FRC attack.
• Cloud Service Provider (CSP) - The CSP (e.g. Amazon EC2, Microsoft Azure, or
Rackspace) oﬀers consumer-provisioned and metered computing resources that can be
leased for flexible time durations.
• Cloud Consumer - The cloud consumer is a person or organization that employs the
services of a CSP and is financially responsible for resource consumption. The cloud
consumer also plays the dual role of the victim.
• Client - The client is a legitimate user that requests web content oﬀered by the cloud
consumer.
• Attacker - Although a FRC attack is ultimately carried out by one or more attack clients,
the attacker (e.g. bot master) is the mastermind that orchestrates the FRC attack among
the attack clients.
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• Attack Client - The attack client is a malicious user (e.g. bot) that fraudulently consumes
resources oﬀered by the cloud consumer.
5.3.2 Cloud Utility Pricing Model
The utility pricing model is the oﬀering of computing, bandwidth, and storage resources
as a metered service. In some respects, the utility model is similar to traditional tariﬀs public
utilities charge for resources like electricity, because both computing oriented and public utility
oriented revenue is based on the quantity of resources consumed by their customers. Unlike the
electricity networks however, the information services oﬀered by a CSP are accessible through
an open global network (i.e. the Internet).
Table 5.1: Amazon EC2 Data Transfer Pricing Metrics for US East(Virginia) as of January
2012
Data Transfered Out
First 1 GB/Month $0.00 per GB
Up to 10 TB/Month $0.12 per GB
Next 40 TB/Month $0.09 per GB
Next 100 GB/Month $0.07 per GB
Over 150 GB/Month $0.05 per GB
Cloud consumers only pay for the CSP resources they use and only for the time they use
them. Although there are many metered services provided by CSPs, the focus of this paper
is on the data transferred out of a CSP environment. To illustrate the actual costs of data
usage in the cloud, Table 5.1 provides a summary of the costing metrics for Amazon’s Elastic
Compute Cloud (EC2) platform [4]. Under this pricing model and bounded by a Terms of
Agreement, the cloud consumer is responsible for all data usage regardless of the intent of the
requesting client.
Given that an average web page - including both primary and secondary objects - is 320KB
in size [95], Figure 5.2 enumerates the accumulated daily cost of data usage when applied to
Table 5.1 for a website that experiences 1, 5 and 10 requests per second respectively over a
billing period (typically a month). Even on the order of 5 requests per second, data usage -
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Figure 5.2: Accumulated Data Usage Costs
consumed maliciously or not - amounts to a significant monthly cost for the cloud consumer.
5.4 FRC Attack
This section provides the description for the FRC attack including a threat model, the
profiling of cloud-based web servers, and related works in context of the described attack.
5.4.1 Threat Model
Similar to those that carry out DDoS attacks, a FRC attacker considered in this work
is financially motivated by a fee for services rendered, by an extortion payment, or has an
enjoyment-based intrinsic motivation [69]. Although in practicality an attacker could carry out
a FRC attack from any Internet-connected device, for the purposes of this work it is assumed
that the attacker has amassed a botnet of suﬃcient size and capability to easily perform a FRC
attack.
In order to achieve the greatest cost burden, the attacker is interested in maintaing a
sustained attack over a long duration of time. This is best accomplished by avoiding aggressive
behavior and instead subtly inflating resource consumption in order to avoid detection. Ideally
for the attacker, the size of the resource consumption push is large enough to achieve the cost
burden objectives in the least amount of time. Attack optimization is not in scope of this work.
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The target of the attacker is a public-facing web application or website hosted in a public
CSP environment that is governed by a utility compute pricing model. Content from the
victim’s website is public-facing and intended to be viewed by the general public. While
authentication such as passwords could be used to de-annoynimize the requesting clients and
limit the amount of publicly exposed web content, such access control is considered counter-
productive for distributing public-facing web content. Furthermore, the victim does not make
use of reverse Turing tests [116] to diﬀerentiate between humans and attack clients. Turing tests
have been found to be unreliable and have been circumvented by mechanical Turks [18] and
puzzle breaking schemes [126, 131]. Moreover, requiring a casual web user to solve a graphical
puzzle to simply view a webpage is counter to the goals of the target web application as some
users are unable or simply unwilling to deal with the hassle [87, 97].
It is also assumed that the web server on which the victim’s website resides is properly
patched, adheres to a well-managed security policy and is buﬀered from the Internet by a firewall
that employs security best-practice filtering rules. Furthermore, all requests generated by the
attacker adhere to all protocols specifications. The only exploitable vulnerability considered in
this threat model is the utility compute model.
5.4.2 Cloud Web Server Profiling
Measuring the capacity of web servers hosted in the cloud is a key component for better
understanding the vulnerability that the utility pricing model presents to the cloud consumer.
Enumerating cloud server capacity highlights the significant gap that exists between normal
web server request rates and cloud web server performance capacity. To enumerate this gap,
a number of experiments were performed on Amazon’s EC2 - actual cloud infrastructure. The
objective of these experiments was to determine the requests per second capacity of the various
EC2 server oﬀerings for a range of average web page sizes. The three standard server instant
sizes oﬀered by EC2 and thus considered in this work are presented below [5]. Included in
this description are the hardware and software specifications of these instances. Although EC2
does oﬀer other high-performance instances with increased memory or CPU capabilities, the
experiments performed were considered to be general use-case scenarios. It is assumed and
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expected that such high-performance instances would be able to handle an equal amount or
more requests than the standard server instances presented.
Small Instance
1.7 GB memory
1 EC2 Compute Unit (1 virtual core with 1 EC2 Compute Unit)
I/O Performance: Moderate
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 11 Service Pack 1 basic install, EBS boot, 32-bit architec-
ture with Amazon EC2 AMI Tools preinstalled; Apache 2.2, MySQL 5.0, PHP 5.3, Ruby
1.8.7, and Rails 2.3.
Large Instance
7.5 GB memory
4 EC2 Compute Units (2 virtual cores with 2 EC2 Compute Units each)
I/O Performance: High SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 11 Service Pack 1 basic install,
EBS boot, 64-bit architecture with Amazon EC2 AMI Tools preinstalled; Apache 2.2,
MySQL 5.0, PHP 5.3, Ruby 1.8.7, and Rails 2.3.
Extra Large Instance
15 GB memory
8 EC2 Compute Units (4 virtual cores with 2 EC2 Compute Units each)
I/O Performance: High SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 11 Service Pack 1 basic install,
EBS boot, 64-bit architecture with Amazon EC2 AMI Tools preinstalled; Apache 2.2,
MySQL 5.0, PHP 5.3, Ruby 1.8.7, and Rails 2.3.
The web servers examined in these experiments were used to gauge the capacity of a web
server (i.e. FRC target) hosted in the cloud. To provide consistency throughout the many
experiments, the requesting host (i.e. FRC attacker) was deployed on a small EC2 instance.
The purpose of the attack host was to simulate an aggregate user request base (legitimate or
malicious) by enacting requests for a web document on the target web server by utilizing the
Apache web server benchmarking tool [6]. To determine the capacity of requests per second for
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a given instance, requests were generated from the attack host located in the same geographical
region (i.e. East 1-d) as the target host in order to reduce the eﬀects of network latency, among
other factors, in this measure.
To accurately gauge the average size of the web documents being publicly hosted by the
target server, which is necessary to provide a realistic experiment, Table 5.2 provides a selection
of web metrics calculated by Google [95] describing websites and web documents as found on
the World Wide Web (WWW).
Table 5.2: Google Web Metrics
Metric Top Sites All Sites Description
Pages 380 million 4.2 billion Number of pages analyzed
GETs Average number of GETs per page
Mean 42.14 43.91
Median 33 37
Network Size (KB) Average size per page
Mean 312.04 320.24
Median 176.23 177.47
KB per GET Average size per GET
Mean 7.32 7.19
Median 2.36 1.93
Given that the average webpage, encompassing both primary and secondary requests (Sec-
tion 4.4.1) is 320KB in size and that the average web page consists of nearly 44 web elements,
then, as shown in Table 5.2, the average object size, for all websites on the WWW, is 7.19KB.
Based on this average measure, web pages of both 1KB and 2KB smaller and larger than
7.19KB were constructed and hosted on the target web server to provide a range of measures
for capacity testing. To enact requests from the attacking host, the Apache benchmark tool
was utilized by requesting 10,000 requests in total, allowing for 20 concurrent requests for the
attack host at any one time.
To give context to the experimental results and to provide a reference for the normal requests
per second observed by an actual web server, consider Iowa State’s public web domain. During
a 12-week period in the Fall of 2011, the iastate.edu domain experienced, on average, 5.63 total
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request per second (including both primary and secondary requests). Similarly, the NASA data
set [82], used throughout this work, experienced a rate of 0.72 total requests per second over a
two-month period. Although these websites are not indicative of all sites on the WWW, they
provide a baseline with which to compare to the capacity of EC2 web server instances. To
reiterate, the objective of these tests is to measure the capacity of a web server hosted in the
cloud to illustrate the gap between the actual request intensity experienced by a common web
server and the upper bound of what a cloud instance is capable of handling. The results are
expected to show that cloud-based web servers are suﬃciently over provisioned and thus create
a significant gap with which an attacker can wage a FRC attack without being detected by
current DDoS detection mechanisms.
Depicted in Figure 5.3 are the average results of five test iterations for the previously
described experiments. For each a small, large, and extra large EC2 instance, requests per
second measures were taken for web document sizes of 5.19, 6.19, 7.19, 8.19, and 9.19 KB. As
it can be seen, for the average web document size found on the WWW (i.e. 7.19KB), even a
small instance running as a web server is capable of servicing 2000 requests per second, three
orders of magnitude more than the rate generated by the described reference websites (i.e.,
iastate.edu and NASA). For large and extra large instance, this capacity, in terms of requests
per second, increases by over 200%.
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Figure 5.3: EC2 Capacity Profiling: All Requests
As the result of presenting many measures in this work in terms of primary requests, Figure
5.4 illustrates the translation from all requests in Figure 5.3 to the expect primary requests per
the statistics shown in Table 5.2. In essence, this figure provides the measure of actual user
generated requests, which is calculated be 1/44 of all requests.
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Figure 5.4: EC2 Capacity Profiling: Primary Requests
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As demonstrated by these experiments, modern day web server capacity in the cloud is
suﬃciently capable of handling the request loads for an average sized web site. Even a one
or two order of magnitude increase in each of the example request rates provided would still
leave suﬃcient headroom for a small server instance hosted in the cloud to operate without
diminishing the QoS for the end user. Given this gap between normal request rates and the
capacity of cloud infrastructure, the FRC attack will be described in detail and an explanation
will be provided as to why current DDoS detection and attribution methodologies do not apply
to a much more subtle FRC attack.
5.4.3 FRC Attack Description
Together flash crowds and application-layer DDoS attacks provide an apt comparison with
which to illustrate the request dynamics and subtleties of a FRC attack. Like flash crowds and
application-layer DDoS attacks, an attack client involved in a FRC attack also victimizes the
application layer by way of making protocol adherent requests. Diﬀerentiating a FRC attack
is that the aggregate requests do not degrade availability of a given site. A FRC attack is
intended to run-up the data usage cost for the victim by consuming bandwidth in excess of
normal usage. In order to provide a clear description of the FRC attack and to explain why
currently proposed application-layer DDoS solutions are largely ineﬀective for mitigating FRC
attacks, Figure 5.5 illustrates the key diﬀerences between flash crowds and application-layer
DDoS attacks.
5.4.3.1 Flash Crowds and DDoS Attacks
Depicted in Figure 5.5a is a graph of the all requests per second for a week-long web trace
from a busy NASA web server [82]. Based on observations of flash crowds and application-
layer DDoS attacks [56, 124], request dynamics for each of these two web phenomena were
synthesized and interwoven into the web log trace in order to provide an illustration for the
following example. For the purposes of continuity, each event was synthetically generated within
the same web trace over non-overlapping periods. Figure 5.5b depicts the corresponding ratio
of requests per client for these two events and interleaving request activity. Together Figures
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Figure 5.5: Flash Crowd and Application-layer DDoS Comparison
5.5a and 5.5b provide the necessary context to describe and diﬀerentiate the FRC attack from
flash crowds and application-layer DDoS.
Beginning at Day 1 and culminating at Day 2.5, a flash crowd was generated to depict the
request dynamics of this event. Flash crowds are defined as a significant number of legitimate
clients simultaneously requesting web content from a given site. Often triggered by a major
news [111] or sporting event [56], the individual clients that participate in this phenomenon
are not malicious in nature. However, the aggregation of their actions is detrimental to the
availability of the site under consideration. As shown in Figure 5.5b, the resulting per client
request rate throughout the duration of the flash crowd remains consistent with normal usage
despite the dramatic increase in requests per second. Clients that unintentionally participate in
a flash crowd continue to behave in a manner that is consistent with the normal user behavior
and thus during a flash crowd the request volume maintains the same proportion with the
number of clients accessing the site. As observed in [56], request per client rates have actually
been shown to decrease during a flash crowd as clients react to the diminished QoS of the
system.
Although consequences may be similar, application-layer DDoS attacks provide a stark
and malicious contrast to flash crowds. Attack clients participating in a application-layer
DDoS attack utilize legitimate HTTP GET requests in excessive volumes to overwhelm a
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target’s resources. Consequently, legitimate clients are subjected to a significantly diminished
or unavailable service due to the reduction in throughput and increased server response latency.
As shown in Figure 5.5a, beginning at approximately Day 4.7 and terminating on Day 5.5, a
DDoS attack is an abrupt increase in the amount of requests per second experienced by a site
- similar in the peak request rate to that of a flash crowd. However, as depicted in Figure 5.5b,
the dramatic increase in the request per second rate during a DDoS attack is attributed to
the increase in the per client request rate, which is significantly diﬀerent from that of a flash
crowd or normal usage. DDoS attacks are characterized by relatively few clients requesting
web content at a very high rate or many malicious clients requesting at a lower, but still at a
saturating rate. In either of these two cases or anywhere in between, the per client request rate
deviates greatly from that of normal activity. Thus in an application-layer DDoS attack, the per
client request rate increases in direct proportion to the increase in the per second request rate.
It is this very observation that has been used as a key diﬀerentiator in proposed application-
layer DDoS detection methods that seek to to distinguish flash crowds from application-layer
DDoS attacks [56, 70, 97, 120].
Given the two web phenomena in Figure 5.5a and within this context, as the aggregate
request intensity increases significantly (three order of magnitude more than is shown) above
normal activity - whether it be malicious or not - this intensity significantly degrades the QoS
of the web server. The scale chosen in Figure 5.5a was based on the experimental results from
Section 5.4.2 for a small server instance on the EC2 platform and for an average file size of
7.19KB. As shown, such a server is a conservative estimate given modern computing capacity
in the cloud. Aggregate request intensity depicted between 2000 and 2300 requests per second
- labeled as the Denial of Service Region - is where the QoS of the system degrades to the point
where the clients’ user-experience is intolerable. Just below the Denial of Service Region is
the threshold labeled as J2 on Figure 5.5a and is the point at which application-layer DDoS
attacks and/or flash crowd mitigation solutions begin to sense and activate in order to quell
the pending threat of unavailability [58, 120]. The threshold J2 is an approximate sensitivity
benchmark indicating the state-of-the-art of reliable detection.
Considering request intensities above J2 is outside the scope of this work as it is assumed
100
Denial  of  Service  Region
FRC  Attack  Region
FRC  Attack
Nuisance  
Activity  
Normal  
Activity  
DDoS  AttackFlash  Crowd
R
eq
ue
st
s  
pe
r  S
ec
on
d
Days
J2
J1
J1
2000
5
10
15
20
2100
1990
2200
2300
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0
(a) Requests per Second
2
1
3
4
5
6
0R
eq
ue
st
s  
pe
r  C
lie
nt
5 7Days 643210
(b) Requests per Client
Figure 5.6: FRC Attack Illustration
that current solutions would be able to mitigate such anomalous request activity. Instead the
focus of this paper is on fraudulent request intensities below J2. Below this point, currently
proposed mitigation solutions are not enabled because the QoS of the system is not significantly
aﬀected and would inevitably trigger on false positives which lead to the unnecessary rejection
of legitimate clients.
5.4.3.2 FRC Attack
In comparison to the previously described flash crowd and application-layer DDoS attack,
a FRC attack is a much more subtle event. For a FRC attacker to be successful, they need
not deny service to the system but instead consume enough bandwidth to incur a fraudulent
and unsustainable cost onto the cloud consumer. Building on Figure 5.5, Figure 5.6 depicts
the request per second (Figure 5.6a) and requests per client (Figure 5.6b) characteristics of a
FRC attack. As was the case in Figure 5.5, a FRC attack was synthesized and interwoven with
that of the same week-long NASA web trace. In Figure 5.6a the request per second behaviors
of both the flash crowd and DDoS attack were persevered to provide contrast and emphasis on
the subtleness of a FRC attack.
The lowest layer of web traﬃc illustrated in Figure 5.6a is that of normal activity as gen-
erated by legitimate clients - labeled in the callout. Normal activity represents the requests
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generated by the legitimate clients that frequent and interact with the site under considera-
tion. The requests generated by legitimate clients provide value to the cloud consumer that is
necessary to justify the costs of hosting the web application in a CSP environment.
In the presence of a FRC attack, data usage consumed by fraudulent requests is additive to
that of normal activity. At the lowest intensities of illegitimate use, the resulting costs do not
significantly impact the financial well-being of the cloud consumer. Such request intensities are
considered nuisance activity and can be expected given the ever present noise originating from
the Internet.
As malicious resource consumption intensifies, it will reach a point where the cost to the
cloud consumer is no longer trivial. This threshold is denoted as J1 on Figure 5.6a. As shown
in the callout, request volumes in excess of J1 are considered to be that of a FRC attack.
The requests performed by attack clients in a FRC attack have no intention of providing value
to the site and seek to only incur fraudulent charges. For a FRC attacker to be successful,
they need only to increase the amount of data usage consumed over a given period of time in
comparison to that of normal activity. Such an increase in request volume can be produced
by malicious clients utilizing published web usage distributions [7, 75]. Thus for attack clients
to increase the data usage for a given site by over 500% - shown as request activity above the
J1 threshold in Figure 5.6a - the malicious request dynamics need not exhibit a higher than
normal per-client request ratio as shown in Figure 5.6b nor exhibit highly aggressive request
patterns on which many application-layer attack detection and attribution mechanisms depend
to distinguish malicious clients from that of normal clients.
As a recap, the FRC attack region is defined as the aggregate request intensities between
thresholds J1 and J2 on Figure 5.6a. At the lower end of the continuum (J1), fraudulent
requests begin to financially impact the cloud consumer. As FRC attack intensities increase,
the resulting cost becomes more significant. At point J2, a FRC attack exhibits behavior
characteristics that are comparable to a DDoS attack and thus detectable. It is assumed that
for request intensities above J2 that current DDoS mitigation strategies would be able be
eﬀective. As FRC attack detection improves, the J2 threshold will drop and ideally reaching
J1 in the future. It is significant to note the substantial gap between J1 and J2 (i.e. the FRC
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attack range) on Figure 5.6a. As shown, an FRC attacker can achieve success by consuming
10 reqs/s to nearly 1980 req/s more than normal traﬃc while avoiding extreme usage patterns
that would lead to detection. While the significant over provisioning of web servers is helpful
in many contexts, when a utility pricing model is applied, the gap between normal activity and
J2 presents and unaddressed vulnerability of the current cloud computing infrastructure.
5.4.4 Related Work
The catalyst for this work is directly attributed to security professional Christopher Hoﬀ
who first described the Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) attack [51] on the cloud
model as a manipulation of the utility pricing model that results in unmanageable costs for the
cloud consumer. The premise of the EDoS attack, as described by Hoﬀ, is for an attacker to
exploit the horizontal scaling capability [77] of both compute and storage resources hosted in
the cloud. This present work instead explores a much more subtle threat model in which the
FRC attacker does not seek to exploit resource costs in an overwhelming manner, which would
require a significant amount of malicious resource consumption over a short period of time.
Instead FRC is a slow-and-low attack over a longer duration of time that exploits resources
much more gradually. Additionally, when taken a face value, an EDoS attack is a class of
attacks of which FRC, DDoS, and click fraud are members for they inevitably deprive a victim
of economic value through direct costs, loss of business, or damaged reputation. In the context
of cloud computing, the FRC attack as described in this chapter and in this work, aptly defines
the subtle exploitation of resources governed by a utility pricing model.
The related bodies of research that have bearing on the FRC attack can be broadly cat-
egorized as detection schemes that seek to diﬀerentiate flash crowds from application-layer
DDoS attacks and attribution methodologies that aim to distinguish legitimate clients from
application-layer DDoS attack clients. Each of these bodies of work and subsequent papers will
be examined in the context of the FRC attack.
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5.4.4.1 Detection
To better understand the nature of abrupt changes in HTTP GET request rates, Wen et
al. [120] proposed an entropy-based solution that compares the ratio of observed source IPs
and target webpages. The results reported in [120] are consistent with the analysis in Section
5.4.3.1. While their observations may lead to the classification of dramatic increases of web
traﬃc, as evidenced in Section 5.4.3.2, FRC attack clients need not exhibit the same aggressive
nature of attack clients that participate in a DDoS attack to accomplish their goal. As a result,
entropy of per document request diversity is unlikely to diﬀerentiate a FRC attack from any
non-aggressive increase in normal activity. Similarly, solutions that trigger on the slope of
request intensity [70] are also likely to be ineﬀective at detecting FRC attacks based on the
same principles.
In contrast to the request intensities of the user population, other solutions have sought to
diﬀerentiate flash crowds from application-layer DDoS attacks based on the source IP distribu-
tion of the requesting clients [56, 70]. The hypothesis is that malicious clients participating in a
DDoS attack will originate from IP clusters not previously experienced by the site. However, as
stated in [58, 97, 124], such a solution is not reliable as it is likely that geographically distributed
attack clients will originate from similar IP prefixes and clusters belonging to legitimate clients.
5.4.4.2 Attribution
To exploit the limitations of automated attack clients, Kandula et al. [58] proposed a scheme
that makes use of graphical puzzles to diﬀerentiate human initiated requests from those au-
tomatically generated. Although eﬀective, such an approach is not generally regarded as a
practical solution [87, 124] to prevent an application-layer DDoS attack. Graphical puzzles
are out scope in the FRC attack context, see the Section 5.4.1. Similarly, the use of honey-
tokens [40] - human-invisible objects imbedded in web content - has also been proposed to
identify automated clients [87]. The premise of this methodology is that only attack clients
that haphazardly traverse web content will request invisible objects and thus be flagged as
malicious. Despite positive results, such a solution is only applicable to a very limited threat
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model.
In addition to visual approaches, others have sought to diﬀerentiate attack clients by scru-
tinizing the transitional probabilities between successive client requests [87, 124]. Albeit a
promising solution for a subset of attack scenarios considered for the FRC attack, this ap-
proach can be defeated with little eﬀort by an attacker.
In the context of the FRC attack, the greatest downfall of many of the previously proposed
application-layer DDoS mitigation solutions is that they do not activate until the victim web
server is under extreme duress [58, 120]. Even if activated, many solutions are predicated upon
the fact that attack clients exhibit anomalous inter-session and inter-request arrivals times in
comparison to that of request dynamics from normal activity [56, 97, 120]. While eﬀective
for detection of an attack client participating in a DDoS attack, as was discussed in Section
5.4.3.2, such solutions are not viable for the detection of a FRC attack. This is due the lack of
necessity of the attack client to request higher than average request intensities.
In fairness to the mentioned authors, their research focus was not on detecting a FRC
attack. Although each of the works cited are successful at accomplishing their own respective
objectives, these solutions are not directly applicable to the detection or attribution of a FRC
attack.
5.5 Dataset Description
Two 56-day web log traces are used for both training and testing of the proposed detection
metrics presented in this chapter. The first dataset is a web trace from ISU’s Department
of Electrical and Computer Engineering’s public-facing web server (referred to as ECpE). The
second dataset is a historical web trace from a busy NASA web server (referred to as NASA) that
has been made available to researchers [82]. The request per day plots for each dataset in Figure
5.7 illustrates the fluctuation in the day-to-day request volumes experienced by each respective
site. The daily volume variation is potentially as much as 100% and that characteristic has
driven the search for detection metrics with limited sensitivity towards request volumes.
Although both datasets follow a similar cyclical pattern, the nature of the datasets - one
being a departmental website and the other being a public website for a U.S. Governmental
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Figure 5.7: Detection Dataset Description
agency - provide suﬃcient contrast in the request volumes (Table 5.3) and user demographics
to test the generality of the proposed detection scheme.
For the purposes of this paper, each of the datasets have been reduced from their origi-
nal form. As is typical in the retrieval of web content, primary client-issued requests invoke
secondary (or inline) requests to retrieve supporting web content such as embedded pictures,
scripts and style sheets. The focus of this chapter is on the primary requests invoked by the
user and, as a result, all secondary requests were removed from the datasets.
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Table 5.3: Description of Experimental Datasets
Metric ECpE NASA
Days 56 56
Total Requests 94 681 977 930
Max Reqs/Day 2 405 34 566
Min Reqs/Day 1 020 9 171
Clients 14 891 130 128
Sessions 39 929 304 207
Avg Daily Req Variation 56.87% 74.91%
5.5.1 Attack Scenario
To quantify a FRC attack, consider the NASA dataset. At an average request volume of
17 463 requests per day, for a FRC attacker to increase the request volume by 100% with a
1000-client botnet - modest by current standards - each attack client would only be required to
request 18 web documents per day. At such a small and low intensity quota, individual clients
will have no problem blending in with the request dynamics of normal clients. It follows that
to increase the web traﬃc by 1000% or 10 times the average cost, attack clients would need to
request 180 web documents per day. Even at a request volume 10 or 100 times greater than
that of normal activity and given the capacity of cloud computing infrastructure, the target site
would be far from experiencing request volumes that would result in a DDoS. The hypothesis
this chapter seeks to verify is that despite the malicious request volumes, the structure of the
accumulated malicious requests will deviate suﬃciently from normal activity to be detectable.
5.6 Detection Metrics
There are two objectives for detection mechanisms that have been identified in this section.
The first is to take advantage of the consistency and self-similar nature of aggregate web
activity. The second is to be able detect the presence of resource usage fraud within an inspected
dataset. In other words, the detection techniques characterize the level of consistency of request
semantics relative to normal activity as opposed to factoring in volatile request volumes. This
section describes three detection metrics that are used together to detect FRC attacks.
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5.6.1 Zipf’s Law
The properties of Zipf’s law [132] provide a useful metric for measuring relative frequency
and self-similarity of web document popularity. Although Zipf’s law has been used as an
anomaly detection metric to detect accounting fraud [52] and blog spam [81], the predominant
application of Zipf’s law in relation to web requests has been in the modeling and formulation
of web caching schemes [65]. Based on these related works, this section provides a description
of Zipf’s law and description of the means by which Zipf’s law is applied in order for it to be
a key metric for the detection of FRC attacks.
Given a web server log that is composed of client-initiated request records for a website
hosting multiple web pages, let N be the total number of distinct web pages requested for a
given period of time. Let fi define the frequency - the number of times the page was requested
- for each i ∈ N web pages. Based on the request frequency of each respective page, let the
pages be ranked as a list in descending order based on their popularly such that the most
frequently requested page assumes the rank of one and the ith page is the ith most requested
page. Based on this ranked list of aggregate client requests, for Zipf’s law to apply, the request
frequency for the ith most popular web page is inversely proportional to the rank of the page
and is represented as follows:
fi ∝ 1
i
(5.1)
As shown in past research eﬀorts [14, 17, 125], aggregate web requests do not strictly follow
Zipf’s law, but instead more generally conform to a Zipf-like distribution in which the frequency
for the ith most popular page is a power-law function such that [125]:
fi ∝ 1
iψ
(5.2)
For Zipf’s law to directly apply to a distribution of web requests, ψ would assume the
value of unity. Instead, when a web request distribution is plotted on a log-log scale as a
rank-frequency plot, the resulting slope (ψ) of the best-fit regression line for the Zipf-like
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distribution is typically negative and approximately unity. The Zipf-like distribution for the
ECpE and NASA datasets are shown in Figures 5.8 and 5.9 respectively.
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Figure 5.8: Zipf-like Distribution for ECpE Dataset
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Figure 5.9: Zipf-like Distribution for NASA Dataset
In the context of a FRC attack, the primary interest is the set of web documents that
represent the majority of overall data usage. As shown in Figure 5.10, a three-day trace from
the NASA dataset, 10% (154 web pages) account for 90% of all web requests. Furthermore,
it is observed that to the left of this point the plotted data conforms to that of a power-
law distribution, and to the right of this point the plot diverges and is considered to be an
exponential tail. As a result, the detection metric presented in this paper focuses only on the
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top k documents that summarize 90% of all web requests for the respective dataset.
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Figure 5.10: Calculation of Zipf-like Regression Slope
As shown through experimentation (Section 5.8.1), the regression slope of 90% of web
requests has provided a consistent measure of aggregate use patterns that conform to the
principles of self-similarity. The hypothesis of this detection measure is that it would be a tall
order for an attacker to initiate requests that conform with the Zipf-like distribution of the
overall normal activity of a particular website. This detection metric is utilized by computing
the 90% regression slope of a sample data set and determining if the slope falls within a tolerance
interval relative to normal activity. To succeed in foiling this detection technique, the attacker
would need to be privy to the website’s usage patterns. This measure will be referenced as the
Zipf value.
5.6.2 Spearman’s Footrule
The Spearman’s Footrule distance [32] is a non-parametric measure of similarity, or lack
thereof, between two ranked lists. Although this measure has been used in other web-related
contexts such as measuring the accuracy of predicting individual session n-grams generated
from Markov models [10], Spearman’s footrule appears not to have been used as a metric for
the detection of anomalous web usage. While the more general use of the Spearman’s Footrule
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is to find an aggregated ranking that minimizes or maximizes the distance between two ranked
lists, for the purposes of this paper, the proximity between two ranked lists will instead be
considered as it is a more appropriate measure for the objectives of anomaly detection. Thus
the greater the Spearman proximity between two top k ranked lists, the more similar the two
lists are in respect to each other.
Building on the notation established in [10], the Spearman’s Footrule proximity is defined
as follows: Given two ranked top-k lists L1 and L2 as inputs, with each list containing k entries,
let L1 be the reference list that is assumed to be the ground truth and L2 be the comparison
list that is highly likely to be a partial list in comparison to that of the reference list. The
term partial list refers to a comparator list being of equal cardinality as the reference list, but
its membership is missing one or more elements present in the reference list. To obtain the
ranking of a list item i ∈ L1, we define the function f(i) and similarly g(i) for i ∈ L2. In
function g(i) if i /∈ L2, then the subsequent ranking is assigned that of a location parameter
l = k + 1 [105], where k = |L1|. Given these preliminaries, the Spearman’s Footrule proximity
is defined as follows:
S(L1, L2) = 1−
￿
i∈L1
|f(i)− g(i)|
k(k + 1)
(5.3)
In the case that both ranked lists are identical, the Spearman proximity would result in
the value of one and in the case of two disjoint lists the Spearman proximity value would be
zero. In order to provide a measure of similarity or proximity instead of a measure of diﬀerence
or distance, the normalized summation in Equation 5.3 is subtracted from 1. This measure of
similarity between a training and test dataset is known as the Spearman value.
5.6.3 Overlap
To complement the Spearman value, the Overlap between the reference list L1 and the
comparator list L2 is measured to provide a broad indication of the similarity between the
training data and that of test data respectively and is referred to as the Overlap value. The
lists L1 and L2 are defined in the same manner as in Spearman’s Footrule. As experienced
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through experimentation, when used separately the Spearman and Overlap values are prone
to misclassifications but when used together the synergy between the two detection metrics
provide a consistent non-parametric measure of relative document popularity. The Overlap
value is defined as the percentage of items in the comparator list L2 that appear in the reference
list L1 such that:
O(L1, L2) =
|L1 ∩ L2|
|L1| (5.4)
Thus given two equal sized lists, the Overlap between them is the cardinality between the
intersection of L1 and list L2 divided by the number of elements in the reference list.
5.6.4 Detection Training and Testing
As a product of the detection metric calculations from the training data, a statistical toler-
ance interval [86] for each metric was constructed to serve as a detection criterion. The use of
a tolerance interval in this context bounds a confidence interval that covers a percentage of an
assumed normal sample population with which one would expect an individual sample value
to fall such that X¯ ± g(1−α,p,n)s where 1− α is the confidence, p is the percent coverage of the
sample, n is the sample size and s is the standard deviation.
g =
￿￿￿￿(N − 1)(1 + 1N )z2(1−p)/2
χ2γ,N−1
(5.5)
For each of the three previously described detection metrics, a 80% tolerance interval sum-
marizing 99% of the training data were calculated. When a detection measure is outside the
tolerance interval, the understanding is that a FRC attack has been detected. Likewise, if the
detection measure falls within the tolerance interval the understanding is the test sample is
likely clear of an attack. In order to measure quality of the detection metrics, the false positive
rates (FPRs) and false negative rates (FNRs) were computed. A false positive (FP) is when the
detection measure falls outside the tolerance interval but the data is free of a FRC attack. Fur-
thermore, a false negative (FN) is when the detection measure is within the tolerance interval,
but the data contains an attack.
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Given many diﬀerent attack strategies, the Spearman, Zipf and Overlap detection metrics
are individually prone to unacceptably high FPRs and FNRs. However, when used in combi-
nation, the complementary nature of the metrics yield a reliable approach for the detection of
FRC attacks.
5.7 Attack Description
The quality of a detection scheme is a product of the environment in which it is tested. This
section describes three probable attack strategies that are used for the experimental evaluation
of the described detection metrics and are likely to be carried out by a FRC attacker. While
attack patterns can be crafted in a way that will be detected with a high measure of success,
the attack strategies chosen for the purposes of this chapter were done so to highlight both
the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed detection metrics. In order to challenge the
methodology, the attacker is given a great deal of latitude with which to mount a FRC attack.
5.7.1 Attack Assumptions
Overall, it is assumed that the attacker has full knowledge of the web logs before the
onset of a FRC attack. The three proposed attack strategies depict diﬀerent ways with which
the attacker could use such information to fraudulently consume web content. A simplifying
assumption has been made in that the training data used to prime the detection metrics is free
of attack behaviors.
5.7.2 Attack Strategies
5.7.2.1 Random Attack
In the random attack strategy, the attacker creates an unsorted list of the distinct web
pages requested by the legitimate clients as seen in the web logs. To mount an attack, the
attacker randomly chooses web documents from this list. To introduce a degree of variability
into this attack pattern, the percent parameter - denoted Pct - is used to narrow the scope of
the content requested by the attacker. For example, for a Pct=0.5 the attacker would randomly
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generate fraudulent requests from a list of 50% of the known web content previously requested
from the target site. Although the random attack is the least sophisticated of the proposed
attack patterns, it perhaps is the easiest attack to employ and can be performed without prior
access to the web log.
5.7.2.2 Heavy-Hitter Attack
The heavy-hitter attack simulates a scenario in which the attacker seeks to consume the
most frequently requested documents experienced by the target site. To carry out the heavy-
hitter attack, the attacker creates a ranked list from requested documents from the web log.
From the ranked list of the most popular web pages, similar to that of the random attack
pattern, the attacker randomly requests content from the top Pct of available web documents.
For instance, for a ranked list of 100 web documents and Pct=0.1, the attacker would only
request the 10 most popular web pages from the victim’s site. For a Pct=1.0, the heavy-hitter
attack strategy would be no diﬀerent from that of the random attack strategy. More cunning
than the random attack, the heavy-hitter attack seeks to blend into the normal activity of a
site by requesting the most frequently requested documents.
5.7.2.3 Trace-Driven Attack
As shown in Chapter 4, the most cunning attack strategy is a trace-driven attack in which
the attacker replays request sequences extracted from that of the observed training data. Sim-
ilar to the two previous attack scenarios, the Pct parameter is used to limit the scope of the
attacker to a smaller percentage of known sequences of requests. Given a web log that has 500
distinct request sequences, with a Pct=0.40, the attacker would only have access to 200 of the
request sequences. The trace-driven attack scenario is very similar to that of a prescribed-path
attack strategy - an attack in which the attacker guesses popular web request sequences with
which to mount an attack - however, such an attack is more formidable as the attacker is not
required to guess, but only replay known request patterns.
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5.8 Experimental Evaluation
To explore the robustness of the proposed detection metrics, this section provides the ex-
perimental results performed to calculate both the FPRs and the FNRs for each of the datasets
and the attack strategies presented in Section 5.7.2.
5.8.1 False Positive Rate Results
To calculate the FPRs for the proposed detection scheme, each of the two 56-day datasets
were partitioned into separate training and testing datasets. Using a window of three days,
15 detection metric measurements were taken and tolerance intervals summarizing 99% of the
data with a 80% confidence - chosen to minimize the false-positives and false-negatives - were
calculated for each of the three detection metrics. With the remaining dataset partitioned
for testing, the respective detection metrics were calculated and applied to each of the three
tolerance intervals.
For a test iteration to be deemed a true negative, the test window under consideration,
known to be free of an attack, is required to satisfy each of the three proposed metrics (i.e.,
Zipf, Spearman, and Overlap) by producing a measure within the respective tolerance intervals.
A single breach of a tolerance interval for any of the three tests would be considered anomalous
and thus register as a false positive. As shown in Figures 5.11b, 5.11a, and 5.11c for the ECpE
dataset, the detection schemed failed to yield a single false positive for any of the test iterations
and thus had a FPR = 0.0% for the stated parameters.
Similarly for the NASA dataset, as seen in Figure 5.12, the detection scheme performed
equally well resulting in zero false detections and likewise had a FPR=0.0%.
As shown in both Figures 5.11 and 5.12, the proposed detection metrics exhibit a consistent
and reliable measure of normal activity for each of the respective datasets. These results
supports the hypothesis that the self-similarity of the aggregate web traﬃc for a given website
can be exploited despite the variance in the day-to-day request volume in the training and test
datasets (Table 5.3).
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Figure 5.11: ECpE False Positive Confidence Intervals
5.8.2 False Negative Rate Results
Given the three attack strategies, the objective of this section is to determine the percentage
of data usage above that of normal activity an attacker can consume without being flagged as
malicious. For each attack strategy and dataset (ECpE and NASA), a table presenting the
results for each of the test cases is provided. For each of these tables, the rows denote the
percentage of data usage consumed in excess of normal activity - labeled as Att. For example,
Att=0.4 would represent a test case in which the attacker consumed 40% more data than that of
normal traﬃc over the given training window size. The column headings represent the percent
parameter - labeled Pct - that was described in the context of each of the attack strategies
discussed in Section 5.7.2.
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Figure 5.12: NASA False Positive Confidence Intervals
Diﬀerent than the FPR results presented in Figures 5.11 and 5.12, in the context of detecting
a FRC attack, for an attacker to succeed and not be detected (i.e. produce a FN), the result
of an attack must produce measures that are within the trained tolerance intervals for all three
detection metrics. If one of the three metrics falls outside of a tolerance interval, just as was
the case in the calculation of the FPRs, the test iteration would be considered an attack and
thus a TP.
5.8.2.1 Random Attack Strategy
In the random attack strategy, the attacker randomly requests a percentage (Pct=0.1-1.0)
of the known requested web pages and uses this knowledge to mount a FRC attack. Presented
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in Table 5.4 are the FNRs for the ECpE dataset. Based on these results, little success is
achieved by the attacker. At the worst, the attacker is able to consume 30% of data usage in
addition to that of normal activity with a success rate of 17%. In the context of the ECpE
dataset 30% more than normal would amount to a subtle 0.006 requests per second in addition
to normal traﬃc - a non-aggressive rate as far as of DDoS detection schemes are concerned. For
the remaining tests cases, the attacker was only able to achieve minor success consuming 10%
more bandwidth than normal, which also translates to nuisance activity as found on Figure
5.6a.
Table 5.4: ECpE: Random Attack Strategy - False Negative Rates (%)
Att/Pct 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.1 0.07 0.002 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.09 0.09
0.2 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.3 0.171 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.4 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.5 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Examining the first highlighted cell in Table 5.4 (Pct=0.1, Att=0.3) - denoted by the
superscript 1 - shows a minor ineﬀectiveness of the detection scheme against the random attack
strategy. As shown in Figure 5.13, individually each of the three detection metrics produces a
high number of FNs. However, when used together as was previously described, one can see
the eﬀectiveness of the overall detection scheme presented in this chapter. For this particular
attack scenario, the random attack pattern was able to stay within all three of the calculated
tolerance intervals for 5 out of 29 test iterations producing a FNR of 17%.
To contrast the previous results, the second highlighted cell in Table 5.4 (Pct=0.2, Att=0.1)
- denoted by the superscript 2 - depicts a case in detection methodology that failed to record
a single FN, which overall was the predominant trend for the random attack strategy. In this
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Figure 5.13: ECpE: Random Attack Scenario - Pct=0.1, Att=0.3
case, as can be seen in Figure 5.14, the random attacker pattern consistently altered the Zipf
value to a point where each test iteration produced a TN measure and thus an overall FNR =
0.00%.
The general trend across all test iterations was that the Overlap and Spearman values pro-
duced more FNs measures as the diversity of requests used in the attack increased. Randomly
requesting webpages from an equally likely distribution caused the Overlap and Spearman
metrics to remain consistent in terms of accuracy and completeness with that of normal traﬃc
but inflated the volume of each of the requested documents. As a result, the predominant
metric that caused the random attack pattern to fail (i.e. produce TNs) can be attributed to
the Zipf metric. Especially as seen in Figure 5.14, the biasing of request volume caused by
the random request pattern eroded the expected proportionality between consecutively ranked
documents, which resulted in a decrease in the slope of the regression line for the resultant
Zipf-like distributions.
The NASA dataset (Table 5.5) also achieved similar results for the random attack strategy.
At best, the attacker was only be able to consume 10% more than normal data usage with a
success rate of 0.03%, which would easily fall into the classification of nuisance activity as well.
Similar to the ECpE dataset, a test iteration of Pct=0.1 and Att=1.0, highlighted in Figure
5.15, outputs very similar results for the NASA dataset. Due to randomness and low diversity
of requests enacted by the attacker, both the Overlap and Spearman values are skewed enough
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Figure 5.14: ECpE: Random Attack Scenario - Pct=0.2, Att=0.1
Table 5.5: NASA: Random Attack Strategy - False Negative Rates (%)
Att/Pct 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
0.2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.0 0.001 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
to point where they registered intermittent TP and FN marks. Consistent with the ECpE
dataset, the random request attack pattern is unable to preserve the relative volume of requests
between consecutively rank documents and thus the Zipf metric produces a large number of
TP measures. As depicted in Figure 5.15, the Zipf metric recorded a single FN given 29 test
iterations. To the strength of the detection scheme, both the Overlap and Spearman metrics
registered as TP for the single Zipf metric that registered as a FN and thus overall produced
a TP classification.
The results of the random attack strategy demonstrates that although this attack strategy
would be the simplest of the three strategies for an attacker to perform, the attacker would
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Figure 5.15: NASA: Random Attack Scenario - Pct=0.1, Att=1.0
not be able to consume enough data to mount a substantial FRC attack. For the attacker
to achieve success against the presented detection methodology, it is clear the attacker must
attempt to preserve the Zipf-like distribution produced by normal users.
5.8.2.2 Heavy-Hitter Attack Strategy
Similar to the random attack strategy, for the heavy-hitter strategy the attacker also ran-
domly draws page requests from a list, but in this case the list is sorted based on the pop-
ularity of the given web document. This attack strategy tests the detection scheme’s ability
to withstand an attack that attempts to mask its occurrence by drawing on the most popular
documents as requested by legitimate clients. In this context, Pct=0.1-1.0 in Tables 5.6 and
5.7 represents the pool of most popularly requested documents the attack clients draw from.
For instance Att=0.1 would be the top 10% of documents and 100% would be all documents
and thus no diﬀerent than that of a random attack strategy.
As seen in Table 5.6 (Pct=0.3) and Table 5.7 (Pct=0.1), the heavy-hitter strategy exploits a
weakness of the detection methodology. Based on the natural composition of the two datasets
and the resulting tolerance intervals, the stated Pct values represent a range of the top k
documents that can be fraudulently consumed, with varying success, while still satisfying each
of the three detection metrics.
In Table 5.6 for Pct=0.3, Att=0.1-1.0, it can be seen that the detection scheme breaks down
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Table 5.6: ECpE: Heavy-Hitter Attack Strategy - False Negative Rates (%)
Att/Pct 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.1 0.28 0.55 0.45 0.29 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.14 0.15
0.2 0.00 0.29 0.41 0.20 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.3 0.00 0.07 0.38 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.4 0.00 0.01 0.33 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.5 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.6 0.00 0.001 0.302 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.7 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.8 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.9 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.0 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
for a specific range of generated requests. Figure 5.16 displays the detection results for the first
highlighted cell in Table 5.6 (Pct=0.2, Att=0.6) - denoted by the superscript 1 and in the
column or attack percentage adjacent to the trouble area. From these results, it is quite clear,
just as it was for the random attack strategy, that the Zipf metric prohibits the attacker from
conducting a FRC attack unnoticed. Because the heavy-hitter attack strategy only initiates
requests from the most frequently sought documents, the eﬀect of the attack on the Spearman
and Overlap metrics is beneficial to the attacker. The heavy-hitter attack pattern does not
significantly change the rank of the most requested documents, thus the large number of FNs.
Requesting the most popular documents does, however, alter the Zipf value to the point where
it is considered anomalous.
Examining the individual detection metric values for the highlighted cell (Pct=0.3, Att=0.6)
adjacent previously discussed cell - denoted by the superscript 2 - presents a clearer picture
of why the detection scheme failed for the range of requested documents where Pct=0.3. As
shown in Figure 5.17, the attack pattern was able to produce a number of measures within
the predetermined Zipf tolerance interval. Coupled with the failure of both the Overlap and
Spearman metrics for this particular range of requested documents, the attacker was able to
achieve some success defeating the detection scheme. Comparing the trend in Zipf values
between Figures 5.16 and 5.17 shows that the for a Pct=0.3 in Figure 5.17 the Zipf value
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Figure 5.16: ECpE: Heavy-Hitter Attack Scenario - Pct=0.2, Att=0.6
produces measures that are in the range of the Zipf tolerance interval while in Figure 5.16
the Zipf values are clearly larger than the stated tolerance interval. Although not presented,
the Zipf metric values for the test case where Pct=0.4, Att=0.6 exhibits a consistent increase
in the Zipf value, moving swing of calculated measures suﬃcient below the tolerance interval
to produce very little FNs. Thus given the heavy-hitter attack scenario, there is a natural
deficiency that, if found, could be exploited by an FRC attacker. However, despite this short
coming, by only being able to achieve a success rate of 25% (i.e. a FNR of 25%), the amount
of requests generated by such an attack, from an accumulated cost perspective, would be
insignificant and is thus labeled as nuisance activity.
FN FN FN FN FN FN FN FN FN
Figure 5.17: ECpE: Heavy-Hitter Attack Scenario - Pct=0.3, Att=0.6
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For the NASA dataset, the overall results from the heavy-hitter attack scenario diﬀer slightly
in Table 5.7 due to the contrast in composition of the two datasets but present the same general
trend as previously discussed for the ECpE dataset. The range of documents that is able to
defeat the Zipf metric for the NASA dataset occurs when Pct=0.1.
Table 5.7: NASA: Heavy-Hitter Attack Strategy - False Negative Rates (%)
Att/Pct 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.1 0.901 0.002 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05
0.2 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.3 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.4 0.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.5 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.6 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.7 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.8 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.9 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.0 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Figure 5.18 presents the results for the first highlighted cell (Pct=0.1, Att=0.1) in Table
5.7 - denoted by the superscript 1. Similar to measures produced in Figure 5.16, the necessary
structure in the data logs has been preserved to keep the Zipf value within the calculated
tolerance interval. At an Att=0.1, the heavy-hitter attack scenarios appears to have bested the
detection methodology. However, at Att=0.1, even with a success rate of 90%, the attacker is
only consuming 10% more bandwidth than normal and thus the impact over the overall attack
does not enter into the FRC attack range. For Pct=0.1, the observed trend in Table 5.7 is that
as the attack intensity increases the eﬀectiveness of the attack result decreases.
Consistent with the results for the ECpE dataset, an increase in the percentage documents
requested causes the heavy-hitter attack strategy to fail. The test iterations for the adjacent
cell (Pct=0.2, Att=0.1) - denoted by the superscript 2 - in Table 5.7, shown in Figure 5.19,
presents a consistent result of the decrease in the Zipf value as Pct increases.
In comparison to the random attack strategy, an attacker employing the heavy-hitter strat-
egy is able to defeat the FRC detection scheme with a higher degree of success. Despite this
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Figure 5.18: NASA: Heavy-Hitter Attack Scenario - Pct=0.1, Att=0.1
Figure 5.19: NASA: Heavy-Hitter Attack Scenario - Pct=0.1, Att=0.1
limited success however, the detection metrics are able to detect a vast majority of the attack
test cases and not a single registered test case yielded a FNR that would result in a successful
FRC attack.
5.8.2.3 Trace-Driven Attack Strategy
The third and most formidable attack scenario is the Trace-Driven attack strategy in which
the attacker simply replays the request sequences of users that have already visited the site.
Even without the assumption of allowing the attacker to have knowledge of the training logs,
a trace-driven attack scenario can be easily carried out by an attacker by crafting potential
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request sequences that mimic the web traversal patterns of a legitimate user interacting with
the victim’s site. Choosing highly likely request sequences, not requesting random and un-
popular pages that defy the link structure of a given website, thwarts detection eﬀorts that
seek to identify malicious clients based on known transitional probabilities between successive
requests [87, 124].
The objective of this attack strategy is to explore the diversity of request sequences needed
and volume of web traﬃc that can be consumed without being detected as malicious. In this
scenario, both the attack volume and percentage parameter diﬀer from that of the two previous
attack strategies. A trace-driven attack that makes between 10% to 100% more requests than
that of normal traﬃc is too subtle to be detected and thus a range of 100% to 1000% is
instead considered. Furthermore, enabling an attacker to replicate 50% to 100% of known
sequences likewise produces unacceptably high FNRs. Therefore, the attacker’s knowledge
has been restricted to that of 5% to 50% of known sequences. For each of these two omitted
ranges, these results are to be expected because the resulting consumption patterns within these
ranges are no diﬀerent from that produced by the site’s normal clientele and daily fluctuations
in request volumes.
To highlight the point of the FRC ineﬀectiveness against the trace-driven attack for the
given ranges, consider the results in Figure 5.20 for an attack that consumes 1000% more
requests than normal by replaying all available sequences observed (Pct=1.0, Att=10.0). Thus
in many respects this test scenario generates a flash crowd, an event the detection scheme
should not regularly detect. Even at 10 times the request volume of normal traﬃc, the detection
methodology fails to detect this action consistently as a FRC attack, which, given the context,
is the desired result.
The experimental results shown in Tables 5.8 and 5.9 depict the FNRs for synthesized
attacks that ranged in excess between 100% and 1000% (Att=1.0-10.0) of normal activity and
replayed 5% to 50% (Pct=0.05-0.50) of the known web request sequences. As can be seen by
the trend of FNRs in Table 5.8 for the ECpE dataset, the more diversity and subtleness in
request volume the attacker exhibits, the more diﬃcult a FRC attack is to detect and thus the
danger of a FRC attack. For an attacker to accomplish their goal, substantial financial damage
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Figure 5.20: ECPE: Trace-Driven Attack Scenario - Pct=1.0, Att=10.0
can be inflicted by requesting less intense volumes over longer durations of time.
Table 5.8: ECpE: Trace-Driven Attack Strategy - False Negative Rates (%)
Att/Pct 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50
1.0 0.00 0.07 0.22 0.37 0.48 0.53 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.66
2.0 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.13 0.25 0.37 0.40 0.47 0.57 0.55
3.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.18 0.30 0.39 0.44 0.56 0.54
4.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.17 0.24 0.36 0.44 0.44 0.51
5.0 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.14 0.17 0.31 0.39 0.46 0.53
6.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.22 0.36 0.37 0.46 0.49
7.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.09 0.20 0.30 0.37 0.45 0.48
8.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.16 0.26 0.33 0.45 0.48
9.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.13 0.25 0.32 0.47 0.48
10.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.17 0.31 0.36 0.40 0.47
Of the 39 939 observed request sequences for the ECpE dataset, 20% (i.e. column 2 in
Table 5.8) represents 7 986 of those sequences. Likewise for the NASA dataset that consists of
304 207 distinct request sequences, 20% of these request patterns equate to 60 841 sequences.
To put the less than desirable FNR results in Tables 5.8 and 5.9 into perspective, these results
are predicated upon the fact that an attacker either has full access to the web logs or is able
to accurately guess 8 000 or 61 000 web request sequences for each of the respective websites.
Thus for less knowledgable attacker and given the proposed detection metrics and experimental
results shown, it would be diﬃcult for an attacker to mount a successful FRC attack and avoid
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detection.
Table 5.9: NASA: Trace-Driven Attack Strategy - False Negative Rates (%)
Att/Pct 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50
1.0 0.00 0.14 0.49 0.71 0.72 0.84 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.94
2.0 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.43 0.64 0.69 0.82 0.86 0.90 0.92
3.0 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.30 0.52 0.66 0.80 0.83 0.89 0.91
4.0 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.24 0.52 0.59 0.69 0.86 0.91 0.92
5.0 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.16 0.47 0.62 0.72 0.77 0.85 0.93
6.0 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.17 0.43 0.56 0.69 0.75 0.82 0.92
7.0 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.14 0.41 0.55 0.70 0.72 0.85 0.90
8.0 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.15 0.41 0.61 0.67 0.78 0.82 0.90
9.0 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.13 0.39 0.54 0.68 0.70 0.85 0.90
10.0 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.14 0.39 0.57 0.69 0.76 0.83 0.89
Based on these experimental results from the three presented attack scenarios, it can be
seen that an attacker with knowledge of the web logs can perform a FRC attack with varying
degrees of success given the detection metrics presented in this paper. Without the knowledge
of the training data, the experimental results indicate that it would be very diﬃcult for an
attacker to mimic the aggregate web usage patterns to consume an appreciable amount of web
data without being detected as malicious.
5.8.3 Self-Similarity and Consistency of Training Data
Like fractals, aggregate web traﬃc has been shown to possess self-similar characteristics [27,
29]. This scale-invariant quality of web data, more specifically the collective patterns of client
HTTP requests, is relevant in context of FRC detection as it enables the presented detection
methodology to be applied to various scales of time (i.e. training and test window sizes) based
on the needs or requirements of a particular cloud environment. Although the experimental
results shown in Sections 5.8.1 and 5.8.2 were performed for a training and test window size
of three days, this parameter of the detection methodology is not fixed. Figures 5.21, 5.22,
and 5.23 presents the experimental results for the NASA dataset for the testing portion of the
detection methodology. By varying the training window size from one to seven days it can be
seen that these results, the average Spearman, Overlap and Zipf values, exhibit statistical self-
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similar qualities that lend this methodology to be applicable for more than a single training
window size. While the average Spearman, Overlap, and Zipf values remain consistent, the
tightening of the upper and lower tolerance intervals, for each of the presented figures, is in
larger part due the decrease in variance of the metric measures as the training window increases.
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Figure 5.21: Spearman’s Proximity: Self-
similarity of NASA Dataset
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Figure 5.22: Overlap Value: Self-similarity of
NASA Dataset
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Figure 5.23: Zipf Value: Self-similarity of NASA Dataset
To supplement the previously described self-similar characteristics of the aggregate web
requests, Tables 5.10 and 5.11 provide the FPR results for training window sizes of one to
seven days to enumerate the consistency of the measures. The motivation for presenting the
results of the three-day training window size in Section 5.8.1 was due to the fact that each of
the training windows sizes for both datasets yielded a FPR of 0.00% for a tolerance interval
with 80% confidence. While a 0.00% FPR is ideal, it is certainly not always obtainable given
the inherent characteristics of the datasets and the inevitable give-and-take between FPRs
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and FNRs. Furthermore, given this variance, a tolerance interval of 80% is considered in this
context to be an aggressive measure for the purposes of anomaly detection, especially when the
emphasis of the methodology is to reduce false positives in lieu of false negatives. As a result,
lower confidence tolerance intervals are not expected to yield FPRs = 0.00% for all training
window sizes. To show the contrast in experimental results for a more conservative tolerance
interval, measures in Tables 5.10 and 5.11 were performed with a confidence of 95%.
Table 5.10: ECpE: Consistency of Detection Metrics Across Training Window Sizes
ECpE Dataset FPRs
Window Size (Days) Zipf Spear Overlap Total
1 1/37 = 2.70% 0/37 = 0.00% 0/37 = 0.00% 1/37 = 2.70%
2 1/33 = 3.03% 0/33 = 0.00% 0/33 = 0.00% 1/33 = 3.03%
3 0/29 = 0.00% 0/29 = 0.00% 0/29 = 0.00% 0/29 = 0.00%
4 1/25 = 4.00% 0/25 = 0.00% 0/25 = 0.00% 1/25 = 4.00%
5 0/21 = 0.00% 0/21 = 0.00% 0/21 = 0.00% 0/21 = 0.00%
6 1/17 = 5.88% 0/17 = 0.00% 0/17 = 0.00% 1/17 = 5.88%
7 0/13 = 0.00% 0/13 = 0.00% 0/13 = 0.00% 0/13 = 0.00%
To present a higher fidelity view of the data presented in Table 5.10 for the training window
size of four days, Figure 5.24 depicts each of the three detection metrics, their corresponding
tolerance intervals, and a visual indication of whether or not the test iteration registered as a
false positive. Despite registering a FPR = 4.00%, which may be acceptable in some circum-
stances, it can be seen that the four-day training window size yields consistent measures for
both the Spearman or Overlap values. The overall FPR can be attributed to the single FP
measure recorded for the Zipf metric as seen in Figure 5.24. Referring back to Table 5.10, there
is a general trend that the consistency of the Spearman and Overlap value and inconsistency
of the Zipf value for the ECpE dataset is generally not unique to the training window size.
Although the Zipf metric is more prone to erroneous measures, as there is more variance within
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its measures, it is an absolutely necessary measure for the detection of the FRC attacks. While
the Spearman and Overlap metrics can easily be defeated by an attacker requesting a handful
of popular web pages (i.e. heavy-hitter attack scenario), the Zipf metric provides the necessary
measure to ensure that ranked aggregate requests conform to the relative proportionality in
volume as found in Zipf-like distributions.
FP
Figure 5.24: ECpE: FPR Results for Four-Day Windows Size
In comparison to the ECpE dataset, the measure of FPRs experienced by the NASA dataset
for each of the detection metrics and across varying training window sizes, as seen in Table 5.11,
yields more consistent and favorable marks. While specifying the root cause of these diﬀerences
is diﬃcult as there are many dissimilarities between the datasets that could eﬀect this outcome,
future research and access to a diversity of web logs will better help investigate the qualities
of a dataset in respect to the consistencies (or inconsistencies) of its FRC detection measures.
What is worth noting, however, is the applicability and accuracy of the given measures and the
resultant FPRs for two very diﬀerent websites and user bases.
As show in Table 5.11, a training window size of seven days for the NASA dataset also
results in a FPR = 0.00%. As shown in Figure 5.25, although the window size has increased to
seven days, due to the self-similar nature of the detection metrics, which can be observed for
all graphed tolerance intervals, the resulting values provide a consistent measure with which to
base an anomaly-based detection methodology.
While the FPRs will vary from website to website, the results reported show a promising
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Table 5.11: NASA: Consistency of Detection Metrics Across Training Window Sizes
NASA Dataset FPRs
Window Size (Days) Zipf Spear Overlap Total
1 0/37 = 0.00% 0/37 = 0.00% 0/37 = 0.00% 0/37 = 0.00%
2 0/33 = 0.00% 0/33 = 0.00% 0/33 = 0.00% 0/33 = 0.00%
3 0/29 = 0.00% 0/29 = 0.00% 0/29 = 0.00% 0/29 = 0.00%
4 0/25 = 0.00% 0/25 = 0.00% 0/25 = 0.00% 0/25 = 0.00%
5 0/21 = 0.00% 0/21 = 0.00% 0/21 = 0.00% 0/21 = 0.00%
6 0/17 = 0.00% 0/17 = 0.00% 0/17 = 0.00% 0/17 = 0.00%
7 0/13 = 0.00% 0/13 = 0.00% 0/13 = 0.00% 0/13 = 0.00%
solution that is more general than the reported findings. The experimental results presented in
this section demonstrate the applicability of the formulated detection metrics given a range of
variability in the parameters that govern the experimental design of performing FRC detection.
Furthermore, the characterization of the given datasets shows that the self-similar nature of
web requests enables flexibility in the resolution of the training and testing window sizes.
5.8.4 Discussion
The detection of a FRC attack is fundamentally diﬀerent than that of application-layer
DDoS attack or systems compromise. With respect to a FRC attack, detection is not a binary
measure in which the system is available or not, nor is it a question of whether a system’s con-
fidentiality or integrity have been compromised. Although ultimately desirable, the complete
detection of a FRC attack is not necessary, just a suﬃcient amount that enables the entire FRC
mitigation solution to relegate fraudulent use to that of nuisance activity. Reliable FRC attack
detection thus answers whether a cloud consumer has been subjected to fraudulent resource
use within a billing period or smaller unit of time. Building on this knowledge and as will be
discussed in Chapter 6, once a FRC attack has been detected, it is then necessary to apply a
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Figure 5.25: NASA: FPR Results for Four-Day Windows Size
FRC attribution solution to identify the malicious actors.
The methodology presented in this chapter relies on reviewing data over relatively large
periods of time. The detection metrics were chosen for their ability to characterize aggregate
data not for their computational performance. Although ideally FRC attack detection would
be performed in real-time in a compute eﬃcient manner, these qualities have lower priority
relative to the need for low FPRs and FNRs. The FRC attack spans many days, weeks and
possibly months, therefore available time and compute power are relatively abundant.
5.9 Flash Crowds and FRC Attacks
Relevant to the topic of FRC detection is to determine whether or not the presented FRC
detection methodology detects flash crowds and, if so, whether or not this is a desirable quality.
In this context, a flash crowd is a noticeable increase in the aggregate client request volume
over a finite period of time. Flash crowds are typically short-lived anomalies triggered by an
event that prompts a large number of unique clients to request a few web pages from a specific
website. The abrupt and collective actions of a flash crowd can be troublesome to a web server
as this behavior can inflict significant strain on available resources. Similar in nature to flash
crowds are DDoS attacks that are composed of a relatively smaller number of malicious bot
computers that each invoke a large number of requests. As has been previously discussed in
Section 5.4.3.1, the telling characteristic that distinguishes flash crowds from DDoS attacks is
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that the average per-client request rate for a flash crowd does not increase during such an event
while the average per-client request rate increases significantly during a DDoS attack.
A FRC attack is comparable to that of a flash crowd in that the average per client request
rate does not increase during an attack and thus such a measure cannot be used to make a
distinction. However, there are other telling characteristics that can be used to diﬀerentiate
these two events. As is central to the objectives of a FRC attack, the average per client request
volume will increase over a given time period, which is diﬀerent than that of a flash crowd.
Similarly, the duration of a flash crowd is short-lived while a FRC attack as described in this
work is to last weeks or months. Even if a FRC attack masks itself as a flash crowd, the overall
impact of a short-lived event will not incur significant charges onto the cloud consumer.
The objective of the FRC detection methodology is to determine if increases in accumulated
client traﬃc are consistent with that of what has been observed in the past or whether the
request volume can be attributed to fraudulent consumption. To this aﬀect, the FRC detection
methodology should detect FRC attacks, DDoS attacks, and flash crowds as anomalies because
each of these respective events are not indicative of normal traﬃc patterns. However, just
because the presented FRC detection methodology deems each of these events as anomalous,
this characterization does not infer that each of these events are a FRC attack. Once an
increase in traﬃc have been determined to be anomalous, based on the duration of the event,
constructs of the volume increase, and prior research, determining if an event is indeed a flash
crowds, DDoS attacks, and FRC attacks is a matter of further analysis. The focus of this work
is not on the events of extreme usage (i.e., flash crowds or DDoS attack) but instead on the
task of diﬀerentiating very subtle increases in traﬃc from that of normal, which occurs on the
other end of the attack spectrum. It is assumed that any resource usage in which the malicious
clients behavior or request intensities deviate from normal will be trivial to detect and identify
given the presented methodologies in this work. The challenging problem is detecting subtle
attack clients attempting to mimic normal behaviors.
There is a historical precedence that when proposing a DDoS detection scheme that it should
be able to accurately diﬀerentiate between DDoS attack and flash crowds, and, rightfully so, as
the objectives of the website owner diﬀer greatly depending on the nature of the spike in traﬃc.
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In the case of a DDoS attack, the goal is to block or deny access to as many oﬀending clients
as possible to enable legitimate clients to access the given website. Handling flash crowds, on
the other hand, it is the website owners objective to handle as many client requests as possible.
The same motivation is true when diﬀerentiating between a FRC attack and an increase in
traﬃc volume. In respect to the former, if the increased cost of traﬃc volume is not countered
by added business value, then the long-term sustainability of operating in the cloud may not
be feasible. As a result, a FRC attribution scheme would be used to identity and ultimately
mitigation oﬀending bots.
The operational purpose of the FRC detection and attribution methodologies should also be
taken into account in this discussion. Like Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), the presented
FRC detection methodology is a passive system that monitors traﬃc patterns for possible
fraudulent or anomalous incidents and itself is not does not take action to stop a potential
attack [103]. Similar to an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), the FRC attribution method-
ology is tasked with identifying and blocking suspected clients based on the clients individual
behaviors. In a sequence of events, a report of anomalous behavior from the FRC detection
methodology would lead to the activation of the FRC attribution methodology. The reason the
attribution methodology is not persistently engaged is that it would unnecessarily introduce
false positive when the presence of an attack has not been shown.
Even if a FRC detection methodology errantly detects a flash crowd and engages the at-
tribution methodology, such an action will have a minimum impact on true flash crowd users
as they historically have been shown to abide by the normal usage characteristics of individual
clients (i.e. requesting a few web pages). This is not to say that their collective actions rep-
resent normal traﬃc, just their individual request semantics. On the other hand, if an FRC
attacker masquerades as a flash crowd, as seen in either the heavy-hitter or trace-driven attack
patterns, then if the characteristics of this attack persist over a longer period of time, even if
the individual clients rates are non-aggressive, the client usage patterns will be deemed to be
anomalous and thus quelled.
At present, there does not exist a methodology that is able to distinguish increases in
normal web activity from the actions of a FRC attack. In this regard, it is not suﬃcient to
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attribute either an increase in aggregate request volume or increases individual request volume
as malicious. The FRC detection methodology is volume independent in the sense that it
focuses on the collective behaviors of clients and not the amount of requests that were enacted.
This design principle is key in order to diﬀerentiate a surge in a web sites popularity versus
fraudulent activity.
5.10 Future Work
The focus of this chapter, as was described in Introduction, was to detect FRC attacks from
that of normal or increases in normal activity. Although positive results were achieved, there
is still much work to be done in this problem space to truly reduce all FRC attack scenarios
to that of nuisance activity. The detection mechanisms presented are for the broad analysis of
request usage, and are not applicable for the identification of individual attack clients. Building
on the results of this chapter, it would be ultimately desirable to perform the given detection
methodology on a range of datasets that encompass and number of client volumes, website
structure and purposes, and client demographics.
The detection scheme presented in this work was targeted at primary requests generated by
clients. By analyzing only the primary requests, secondary requests were discarded before the
training and testing phases of the methodology. Future research into exploring the same general
approach but applied to the entire breadth of the web data logs would be interesting from the
perspective of whether or not such analysis provides a more accurate profiling of normal client
behavior and application of the presented detection metrics.
One of the primary objectives of this detection methodology was to find a solution that was
independent of the aggregate request volume and that focused on the semantics of aggregate
user behaviors. To develop a detection solution based on request volume, researching the
feasibility of using the y-intercept of the regression line for the Zipf-like distribution would
potentially provide an indication of fraud. Coupled with knowledge of the expect or normal
request volumes, these metrics could provide a broad indication of the expect parameters for
request volumes given a specific training window size.
As is evident in Figure 5.7, web usage follows a cyclical pattern dependent on the days of
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the week. In the approach presented in this chapter, each day used in the training and test
windows was done so without regard for which day in the week was present. If more days of
data logs were available, it would be worth exploring if the usage characteristics for particular
week days can be modeled in order to provide a more accurate profiling of daily aggregate web
usage.
The attacks presented in this chapter enabled the attacker to have great latitude in his/her
attack by having access to the training web logs before the onset of the attack. An beneficial
research project would be to generate attack profiles, without knowledge of the training web
logs, and based on the structure of a target website. This formulation of attack requests
would require a live website and ability to collect the resultant logs. Such analysis and the
attack patterns formalized would provide additional test cases utilizing the presented detection
methodology against a diversity of new attacks.
5.11 Conclusion
As it is currently structured, the pay-as-you-go public cloud utility model is vulnerable
to remote exploitation from any Internet-enabled device. Given the lack of attention and
mitigation solutions for this open vulnerability, an attacker has the unrestricted ability to
consume significant volumes of data usage that can result in a severe financial impact for a cloud
consumer. The challenge this chapter sought to address was that of accurately diﬀerentiating
aggregate data usage of legitimate clients from that of attack clients. Such a problem is diﬃcult
because requests only diﬀer in the intentions of the attacker not in the structure or semantics
of the request.
Presented in this chapter are three detection metrics that together provide the criteria ca-
pable of detecting three plausible FRC attack scenarios. To test the robustness of the proposed
detection scheme against a worse-case scenario, the stated threat model enabled the attacker
to access the log data before the onset of the a FRC attack. Despite the advantages of the
attacker, the experimental results demonstrated that the proposed FRC detection scheme has
had qualified success under very challenging attack scenarios.
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CHAPTER 6. FRC ATTRIBUTION
Chapter contains modified content from the following submitted conference paper:
Idziorek, J., Tannian, M. and Jacobson, D. Attribution of Fraudulent Resource Consumption
in the Cloud. 2012 IEEE 5th International Conference on Cloud Computing (CLOUD ’12),
c￿ IEEE 2012.
6.1 Abstract
Obligated by a utility pricing model, Internet-facing web resources hosted in the public cloud
are vulnerable to Fraudulent Resource Consumption (FRC) attacks. Unlike an application-
layer DDoS attack that consumes resources with the goal of disrupting short-term availability,
a FRC attack is a considerably more subtle attack that instead seeks to disrupt the long-term
financial viability of operating in the cloud by exploiting the utility pricing model over an
extended time period. By fraudulently consuming web resources in suﬃcient volume (i.e. data
transferred out of the cloud), an attacker (e.g. botnet) is able to incur significant fraudulent
charges to the victim. This chapter proposes an attribution methodology to identify malicious
clients participating in a FRC attack. Experimental results demonstrate that the presented
methodology achieves qualified success against challenging attack scenarios.
6.2 Introduction
The oﬀering of resources as a metered service is an essential characteristic that defines
cloud computing [77]. Analogous to public utilities like electricity and gas, cloud consumers
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are charged for computing resources like storage, processing, and bandwidth on a pay-per-use
basis. As an example, consider a web-based service hosted in the cloud. Each GB of bandwidth
consumed in support of client requests is applied to a utility pricing model and a fee is assessed
to the cloud consumer. Pursuant to a Cloud Service Provider’s (CSP) Terms of Agreement,
cloud consumers are financially responsible for all bandwidth consumed in support of their web
services whether clients consume these resources in good faith or not.
Obligated by a utility pricing model, public-facing web resources hosted in the cloud are
vulnerable to Fraudulent Resource Consumption attacks. Unlike an application-layer DDoS
attack that consumes resources with the goal of disrupting short-term availability, a FRC
attack is a considerably more subtle attack that instead seeks to disrupt the long-term financial
viability of operating in the cloud by exploiting the utility pricing model over an extended time
period. By fraudulently consuming bandwidth in suﬃcient volume (i.e. data transferred out of
the cloud), an attacker (e.g. botnet) is able to incur significant fraudulent charges to the victim.
Such attacks are diﬃcult to detect because the malicious clients’ requests are non-aggressive,
protocol compliant, and only diﬀerent in the intent of the requester.
Building on the previously explored topic of FRC detection (Chapter 5), the main contri-
bution of this chapter is an attribution methodology capable of identifying FRC attack clients.
This work seeks to reduce the impact of fraudulent clients while minimizing the misclassi-
fication of legitimate clients. Diﬀerent than application-layer DDoS solutions that focus on
request rates of attack clients, the attribution methodology presented in this paper targets four
aspects of client web browsing behavior. These four qualities are formulated into an attribution
methodology that is tested through the use of three progressively challenging attack scenarios.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.3 provides a brief risk analysis of utility
computing. Related works are discussed in Section 6.4. Section 6.5 describes the datasets
used for experimental purposes. The attribution methodology is presented in Section 6.6 and
the experimental evaluation is provided in Section 6.7. Section 6.8 presents a more thorough
analysis of FRC risk. A discussion and future work will be in Section 6.9 and lastly the
conclusion is provided in Section 6.10.
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6.3 Risk of Utility Computing
The utility pricing model is advantageous to a cloud consumer for it enables a low barrier
of entry and avoidance of upfront capital expenses. In respect to bandwidth pricing, CSPs like
Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) [4], Microsoft Azure [122], and Rackspace [94] charge
$0.12/GB (up to 40 TB), $0.12/GB and $0.18/GB respectively for data transferred out of a
cloud environment (i.e. bandwidth). While the utility model is convenient, it is not without
its risks.
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Figure 6.1: FRC Attack Illustration
As illustrated in Figure 6.1, each cloud-hosted web document represents a cost that is a
function of the document’s size and the CSP’s pricing model. Thus each request serviced
by a web site or web application translates to a direct cost that is assessed to the cloud
consumer. Because malicious clients requests diﬀer only in intent, all requests are serviced by
the web application. The unlimited costs resulting from aggregate outbound replies triggered
by malicious requests is the risk this paper seeks to help mitigate. This section will explore
the likelihood that the utility pricing model vulnerability is exploited and the impact an FRC
attack would have on a cloud consumer (i.e. victim).
The likelihood of a FRC attack is contingent upon the exploitability of the utility pricing
vulnerability and the threat source’s skill level, capacity, and motivation. Discovering the
utility model vulnerability is a simple task for the attacker because data usage pricing is openly
published [4, 94, 122] and the utility pricing model vulnerability has been discussed in both
academic and non-academic forums [51]. Exploiting the utility model is simply a matter of
making legitimate requests for publicly-hosted web content in suﬃcient volume to inflict a
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malicious cost burden on the cloud consumer. As a result, a FRC attack could conceivably
be performed by any Internet-connected device. Whether fraudulent requests originate from
a simple Perl script or through the use of the more recently infamous Low Orbit Ion Cannon
- an open-source software tool that enables individuals to perform or participate in DDoS
attacks - there exists few technical barriers to conduct a FRC attack. The worst-case threat
source, however, is that of a large botnet. Based on the sophistication and recent increase in
number and volume of DDoS attacks [25], the worst-case threat source undeniably possesses the
technical knowledge and resources necessary to conduct and sustain an impactful FRC attack.
Given the discoverability and ease of exploiting the utility pricing model vulnerability,
the only significant factor preventing a FRC attack is the motivation of the attacker. Like
botmasters that perform DDoS attacks, the source of a FRC attacker’s motivation is wide-
ranging and likely includes ego, hacktivism, monetary gain, extortion, revenge, creating a
competitive advantage, and/or economic espionage [82].
The financial damage resulting from a FRC attack is largely a product of the attacker’s
average request intensity and the duration of the attack. While a FRC attack could easily
exploit the utility model vulnerability with a DDoS attack, the attacker would do so at the
increased risk of detection and ultimately mitigation. To enumerate the financial impact of an
overt FRC attack, consider that the average bandwidth for a DDoS attack recorded in the last
quarter of 2011 was 5.2Gbps [25]. Applied to the utility pricing model, at $0.12/GB, if such
an attack were sustained on the cloud model the resultant costs would be $4.68/min, $280.8/h,
$6739/day, and $47,174/week. On the other end of the spectrum, an attacker could employ
a slow-and-low attack strategy to avoid detection but would then be required to sustain the
attack over a longer duration of time to achieve the desired cost impact. Given a more subtle
attack approach, all that is necessary for a 100,000 node botnet to double the data usage costs
of a website that averages five requests per second would be for each bot client to request eight
web pages a day. Such a un-assuming attack is the focus of this work as it would go undetected
by current firewalls, DDoS mitigation, and intrusion/detection solutions.
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6.4 Related Work
The closest body of work to that of FRC attribution is research that seeks to identify bot
clients participating in application-layer DDoS attacks. Given that both attacks utilize HTTP
requests to accomplish their goals, these works have served as a natural starting point for
exploring FRC attribution options. The following analysis is presented to motivate the need
for attribution methodologies that are able to detect much less intense attacks.
To identify application-layer DDoS attack clients, Ranjan et al. [97] devised statistical
methods to build profiles of normal client behaviors by considering client inter-session arrival
times, inter-request arrivals times and session workload parameters. Similarly, Oikonomou et
al. [87] examined a number of web browsing features to distinguish bot clients that exhibit
aggressive behaviors. Central to both of these attribution methodologies is the reliance on
time-based parameters (i.e. request rates). While these researchers report success against
application-layer DDoS attacks, such methodologies would prove ineﬀective against a FRC
attack because individual clients need not resort to short-term aggressive request patterns in
order to accomplish the attacker’s long-term goals.
To diﬀerentiate legitimate clients from bot clients, Kandula et al. [58] proposed an attri-
bution scheme based on graphical puzzles. While eﬀective in some contexts, such an approach
is not generally considered a practical solution [87], especially as a proactive approach for web
content that is intended to be publicly hosted. More transparent approaches include the use of
honey-tokens [40] - invisible decoy hyperlinks errantly requested by automated bots. Although
clever, this attribution methodology only considers a limited threat model.
Other approaches to diﬀerentiating legitimate clients from DDoS bots includes analyzing the
transitional probabilities between successive client requests [87, 123, 124]. The premise of these
works is that bots are unable to deduce common request sequences for a particular web site.
While potentially applicable to FRC attribution, these solutions only consider a single aspect
of a client’s overall request characteristics and thus are restricted to a limited threat model
not considered suﬃciently general for this work. Additionally, Kruegel et al. [68] proposed a
web-based anomaly detection methodology for the identification of attacks that attempted to
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exploit web-based software or configuration vulnerabilities. This work is distinctly diﬀerent in
that the objectives of a FRC attack is not application or host compromise, but to use the utility
pricing model as a weapon. In this respect, the proposed attribution methodology focuses on
anomalous usage characteristics of individual clients, not on the semantics of a query string in
a HTTP GET request.
More practical and less academic solutions include the assistance of web server anti-DDoS
software modules. Developed for the Apache web server, mod evasive is a DDoS detection and
mitigation tool that prohibits individual IP addresses from requesting the same webpage more
than three times in a second and issuing more than 50 concurrent requests per second [129].
Through statistical tracking of IP addresses and URIs, mod evasive also perform blacklisting of
oﬀending clients. While eﬀective for DDoS attacks, this solution directly targets the aggressive
rate of requesting clients, which is not considered a quality of a FRC attack client considered
in this work.
From this survey of related works, it should become apparent that current application-
layer DDoS attribution methodologies are not tailored to identify FRC attack clients. Instead
of focusing on time-based parameters, which often go hand-in-hand with resource exhaustion
attacks, attribution solutions that explore the behavioral characteristics of malicious client
requests are instead needed to identify surreptitious FRC attack clients that attempt to mimic
legitimate client behaviors.
6.5 Dataset Description
6.5.1 Web Log Properties
A web server log is a time-based record of all clients’ content requests and provides the
necessary observations for extracting features for deriving profiles of normal web activity. Figure
6.2 provides an illustration of the web usage features used for the purposes of attribution in
this work and also provides the context for the data preprocessing steps.
Each vertical line in Figure 6.2 depicts individual web requests that compose a web server
log. Denoted as tall lines, each primary web document request is an explicit request from
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Figure 6.2: Web Log Components
a client. As is typical for web documents, a single request often initiates other secondary
in-line requests to retrieve other web content embedded within the primary web document
such as figures, scripts or videos. Secondary in-line requests, as seen in the callout in Fig-
ure 6.2, are depicted as shorter lines that follow a primary request. For example, the pri-
mary request of (1)/index.html is followed by two secondary requests (2)/scripts/style.css
and (3)/images/welcome.png. While both primary and secondary requests are reflected in a
web log, without the live website from which a web log was obtained, it is diﬃcult to diﬀer-
entiate primary and secondary requests with complete accuracy. Client-side and distributed
network caching further complicate the task of reconstructing these relationships from a web
log. Therefore, in lieu of this ambiguity, web documents reflected as URLs for HTML docu-
ments or URIs were assumed to be primary requests and other web document requests such as
pictures and styles sheets were discarded during the preprocessing of the log as they are not
necessary to profile normal client behaviors.
Several terms need to be defined before discussing the proposed attribution methodology.
They are:
Request Volume - The quantity of primary requests invoked by a client within an obser-
vation time period.
Web Session - A set of consecutive primary requests generated by an individual client
during a single viewing period is known as a web session. As seen in Figure 6.2, web session A
contains three primary web requests and thus has a web session length of three. Although it
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is logical to think of usage bursts as sessions, web protocols do not inherently support such a
distinction. In order to construct a session, a pause in a client’s recorded activity longer than
900 seconds is considered to be a separation between sessions [67].
Session Length - The number of primary requests in a web session.
Average Session Length - An individual client may invoke one or more web sessions of
varying lengths and thus this term denotes the mean of these lengths.
Session Volume - The quantity of web sessions attributed to a single client within an
observation period.
6.5.2 Experimental Datasets
Two datasets consisting of 56 consecutive days of web logs from two websites were par-
titioned into 28-day datasets for training and test. The first dataset (denoted NASA) is a
historically popular research dataset from a busy NASA web server [83]. The second dataset
(denoted ECpE) originates from our department’s public web server. It is assumed that these
weblogs are a reasonable representation of each of the respective sites beyond the 56 days
collected. Table 6.1 provides a description of these datasets in respect to the client charac-
teristics. These descriptions will prove to be useful when evaluating the experimental results.
Although the purpose, volume of requests, and nature of the websites are quite diﬀerent, there
are consistencies between the websites that enable the formulation and experimental testing of
a generalized solution that is tuned but not designed for a specific web site.
6.6 Attribution Methodology
Attribution in the context of this work is the ability to accurately identify malicious clients
- based on IP addresses - from that of legitimate clients. The objective of this section is
to describe the anomaly detection methodology evaluated in Section 6.7.4. This attribution
methodology exploits the choices that an attack client must make under the hypothesis that it
is diﬃcult to replicate normal client behavior without having access to web server logs or the
training dataset.
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Table 6.1: Description of Experimental Datasets (all measures cover a 28-day observation
period)
Metric ECpE NASA
Total Requests
Training 45 953 564 090
Test 45 268 413 839
Avg Reqs per Client
Training 5.54 7.18
Test 5.64 5.99
Avg Session Length
Training 2.26 2.12
Test 2.37 2.00
Avg Sessions per Client
Training 2.93 3.17
Test 2.98 2.97
This methodology seeks to find statistical outliers among clients based on four observed
usage characteristics: request volume (reqvol), average session length (sesavg), volume of ses-
sions (sesvol), and chi-square statistic (chistat) of requested documents. In the evaluation of
a client, each attribution variable returns a probability score between 0.0 and 1.0 indicating
the likelihood that the resource usage footprint for a client is anomalous. As the attribution
variable approaches 1.0, the likelihood of usage behavior being anomalous increases. The four
respective metrics are summed together to produce an overall attribution score (ATTSCORE)
for each client.
ATTSCORE = reqvol + sesvol + sesavg + chistat (6.1)
After the ATTSCORE is calculated for a client, it is then compared to a threshold that is
the cutoﬀ between designating a client as benign or malicious. This threshold is the sensitivity
parameter of the attribution methodology. The following subsections describe each of the
respective attribution metrics in detail.
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6.6.1 Request Volume
Based on the objective of a FRC attack, it is in the best interest of an attack client to
consume as much bandwidth as possible over a certain duration of time without being identified.
As a result, the per client request volume becomes a natural discriminator of a client’s website
usage, and is therefore useful in performing anomaly detection. Figure 6.3 shows the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) for the per client request volumes for both the ECpE and NASA
training datasets over a period of 28 days. Although the two datasets are an order of magnitude
apart in terms of total request volume, the per client request volumes seen in these datasets
exhibit very similar characteristics, an observation that is repeated for each of the remaining
attribution metrics. Due to the overwhelming majority of clients that invoke very few requests
(Table 6.1), the CDF describing per client request volumes was constructed with a minimum
threshold of five requests to provide a larger contrast in the distribution of clients that invoke
the most requests.
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Figure 6.3: Request Volume CDF (min. threshold of 5 requests)
Based on the CDF in Figure 6.3, each client in the test dataset is assessed an attribution
variable value, reqvol = FX(x), between 0.0 and 1.0 by determining the probability that a given
normal client’s request volume x would be less than or equal to that which was observed overall
such that:
FX(x) = P (X ≤ x) (6.2)
Thus the more requests that a particular client makes, the larger the reqvol value will be
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assigned to that particular client. As seen in Figure 6.3, a client requesting more than 20
requests over 28 days is in the 80th percentile resulting in a reqvol score greater than 0.8.
6.6.2 Session Volume
In an attempt to avoid discovery and to mimic that of normal client usage patterns, an
individual attack client participating in a FRC attack is likely to distribute their resource
consumption over the course of many days by launching multiple fraudulent web sessions.
Without access to the web server log, the attacker does not know the amount of web sessions a
normal client typically makes over a given time period. Figure 6.4 depicts the CDF of session
counts per individual clients for both the ECpE and NASA training datasets. Similar to the
rational for the request volume CDF, a minimum threshold of two web sessions is considered.
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Figure 6.4: Sessions per Client CDF (min. threshold of 2 sessions)
The sesvol attribution variable is assigned a probability value between 0.0 and 1.0 resulting
from applying Equation 6.2 within the context of the session count CDF as shown in Figure
6.4. The probability value returned is the likelihood a normal client would have launched a
less than or equal number of sessions than was invoked by the overall client population (i.e.
nth percentile). Given that the per client average web session is nearly three for both datasets
(Table 6.1), malicious clients requesting slightly more than three sessions over a 28-day period
will likely be flagged as anomalous.
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6.6.3 Average Session Length
In addition to distributing requests over multiple web sessions, an attacker attempting to
mimic normal behavior must also determine each web session length. As shown in the CDF
for the per client average session length, well over 80% of individual clients exhibit an average
session length less than that of five requests.
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Figure 6.5: Average Session Length CDF
The sesavg score is the probability that a normal client’s average session length is less than
or equal to that of what was observed overall. In order for an attacker to avoid a high sesavg
score, the attacker is forced to initiate more web sessions, which in turn contributes to a higher
sesvol score. Like the other attribution variables, sesvol will take on values from 0.0 to 1.0.
6.6.4 Chi-Square Statistic
Pearson’s chi-square test has been used as an anomaly detection methodology to compare
multinomial distributions in a number of related contexts including network-layer DDoS de-
tection [34] and intrusion detection [68]. In the context of the FRC attack, however, Pearson’s
chi-square statistic is instead used to evaluate the actual web pages a client requests in com-
parison to the web page request frequency distribution for an entire website. The Zipf-like
distribution [132] for the ECpE training dataset is shown in Figure 6.6 - a log-log plot of
document frequency (i.e. popularity) vs. document rank. Used in a similar context for FRC
detection(Chapter 5), the Zipf-like distribution broadly states that 10% of the requested docu-
ments are requested 90% of the time. Discrete bins representing continuous ranks of requested
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web documents can be formed based on what the Zipf-like distribution states. As shown in
Figure 6.6, two bins are formed. Bin 1 contains the m most popular documents and Bin 2
contains the remaining documents in the web log. When comparing a client’s collection of web
document requests to overall website usage, these bins form probabilities that indicate, given k
requests, X% of the requests are expected to fall into Bin 1 and likewise Y% of the requests fall
into Bin 2. This test leverages the notion that a significant fraction of normal client behavior
is reasonably self-similar to the overall client population.
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Figure 6.6: Application of Chi-Square Test to a Zipf Distribution
Given these preliminaries and given a client’s collection of ranked web requests, let the
ranked web pages be grouped into two or more discrete bins B1, B2, ...Bk and let each bin
represent a probability π1,π2, ...πk such that given n observed web requests, the expectation
for each bin is Ei = nπi. Partitioning a client’s requests into k bins, ni is defined as the
number of requests that fall in the ith bin and Ei is the expected number of requests based
on observations from the training dataset. Under the premise that the frequency distribution
established from the training dataset is consistent with a test client’s requests, the chi-square
statistic can be calculated as follows:
χ2 =
B￿
i=1
(ni − Ei)2
Ei
(6.3)
While often used for hypothesis testing, the chi-square statistic in this context is instead used
as a relative measure of similarity or dissimilarity between individual client request distributions
and the overall population distribution. For each client in the training dataset, a chi-square
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statistic is computed and an overall CDF, as shown in Figure 6.7, is constructed. Based on
this CDF, Equation 6.2 can be applied to assign a value (0.0-1.0) to chistat. While it would
be tempting to assign a p-value to chistat based on the chi-square statistic, the application of
a p-value in this context would be erroneous.
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Figure 6.7: Chi-Square Statistic CDF
The power of this attribution variable is that it is diﬃcult for an attacker to prescribe a
page request frequency distribution that resembles that of which was observed in the training
dataset. Although this particular attribution variable is subject to high false-positive rates,
the overall methodology operates under the assumption that legitimate clients that exhibit a
particularly high chistat will achieve typical statistics for the other variables and thus not be
classified as malicious.
The overall objective of this attribution methodology is to limit the amount of resources
that an attacker can consume without being detected. As presented, it is diﬃcult for a FRC
attacker to consume a large quantity of resources without drawing suspicion. Although the
range of typical usage characteristics appear to be tightly bounded, there are legitimate clients
that deviate from normal and the experimental evaluation of the proposed scheme will uncover
the inevitable accuracy trade-oﬀs of attacker attribution.
6.7 Experimental Evaluation
In order to conduct a FRC attack, the attacker must devise a methodology for individual
attack clients by specifying: how many web documents, which specific documents, how many
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sessions, and the length of the sessions an individual bot node will make. This section fo-
cuses on the tactical decisions an attacker must consider in order to conduct a FRC attack.
Some of the decision combinations have been instantiated for testing and the corresponding
experimental results are presented. For the sake of brevity, not every possible combination of
attack parameters can be evaluated and presented here. Instead, a few specific FRC attack
profiles have been crafted in order to enable the evaluation of the eﬀectiveness of the attribution
methodology. Although attribution criteria is applied to a 28-day test dataset, the method-
ology is not confined to this observation period. Instead, the methodology is sensitive to the
usage characteristics of clients’ requests.
6.7.1 Attacker Simulation
Three progressively challenging attack scenarios have been chosen to illustrate the eﬀective-
ness and limits of the presented methodology. Although in practice it would be safe to assume
that the attacker does not have access to a web server’s logs (i.e. the training dataset) prior to
attacking, for two of the three attack scenarios evaluated this assumption is relaxed to give the
attacker an advantage in order to challenge the proposed methodology. In each of the attack
scenarios the attacker is utilizing a 100,000 node botnet. Each attack is implemented by syn-
thesizing and interweaving attack entries into the test datasets. The attribution methodology
is then applied to the test datasets after having trained on the training datasets.
6.7.1.1 Random Attack
The most na¨ıve of the attack methodologies considered is where an attacker randomly
requests web pages from a website without considering the popularity or the contextual relation
between consecutive requests. Similar to spidering a website, an attacker requests a webpage
and then randomly requests one of the hyperlinks present in the retrieved webpage. This
process is repeated until a web session reaches the specified session length. In this scenario,
the attacker randomly makes between five and ten random content requests per web session.
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6.7.1.2 Prescribed-Sessions
Under the assumption that the attacker knows the top-100 most requested web sessions of
at least three documents in length, the prescribed-sessions methodology simulates a more so-
phisticated attack in which each attack client is tasked with simply replaying the most popular
web sessions experienced by the website under attack. In this case, the attacker does not de-
termine the session length directly, but instead by the observed length of the chosen prescribed
session.
6.7.1.3 Trace-Driven
The trace-driven attack methodology is the most challenging attack scenario for the defender
and is considered the worst-case scenario. By replaying web sessions as captured in the training
dataset, the attacker is able to craft an attack that is derived from how legitimate clients actually
use a particular website. Like the prescribed-session methodology, each web session length is
determined by the observed session chosen by the attack client.
6.7.2 Evaluation Criteria
Given the attribution metrics described in Section 6.6 and the evaluation of an individual
client, there are four possible classification outcomes. If a client is malicious and is classified
as positive, it is denoted as a true positive (TP); if a client is legitimate and is classified as
negative, it is denoted as a true negative (TN); if a client is malicious but is classified as a
negative, it is denoted as a false negative (FN); lastly, if a client is legitimate but is classified
as a positive, it is denoted as a false positive (FP). In order to evaluate the attribution scheme,
a False Positive Rate (FPR) and a False Negative Rate (FNR) is computed as a percentage for
each test iteration.
FalsePositiveRate(FPR) =
FP
FP + TN
(6.4)
FalseNegativeRate(FNR) =
FN
FN + TP
(6.5)
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6.7.3 Baseline FPR
When analyzing malicious bots, a natural starting point would be to examine the total
volume of requests invoked by each client and use this threshold as a identification criterion.
For instance, if any client invoked more than 40 documents, regardless of their other usage
characteristics, the client would be considered malicious and be challenged by some form of
authentication. As a baseline measure of comparison, if the request volume were indeed the
sole discriminant (i.e. Request Threshold), then Table 6.2 displays the FPRs for the ECpE and
NASA datasets. It follows that the FNRs for each these measures would subsequently be 0.00%
if the attacker requested greater than or equal to the volume of the set request threshold. A goal
of this attribution methodology is to significant improve upon these FPRs while maintaining
FNRs that relegate aggregate requests to that of nuisance activity. Depending on the size of an
attacking botnet and the set request threshold of the attribution methodology, a FNR of 0.00%
or nearly 0.00% is not necessary if the data usage from the malicious requests that register
as FNs do not eclipse J1 in Figure 5.6a. While a FNR of 0.00% is ultimately desirable, the
following experimental results will be analyzed in the context of minimizing the FPRs while
maintaining tolerable FNRs.
Ultimately the goal of a FRC attacker is to achieve a cost burden onto the cloud consumer
that equates to a certain number of terabytes of data. While it would be logical to model the
data usage footprint of each individual client to look for statistical outliers, as is also discussed
in the future work, there does not exist a current body of work to support this analysis. To
model and simulate individual clients’ data usage footprints, one must be able to accurately
model the dependencies between primary and secondary requests for a given website. Such
modeling can only be done with access to the live website from which the archived log entries
were originated. Additionally, the caching of both primary secondary requests must also be
taken into account and historical logs provide incomplete evidence to make accurate assertions.
Despite this need for future work and given the presented attribution methodology, the attacker
is still constrained to generating attack behaviors that are in accordance with normal client
behaviors. Based on these constraints, attack optimization in terms of data usage may prove
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Table 6.2: ECpE and NASA Request Threshold FPRs
Request ECpE NASA
Threshold FP TN FPR FP TN FPR
0 8007 0 100.00 67008 0 100.00
5 2134 5873 26.65 15818 51190 23.61
10 1128 6879 14.09 7277 59731 10.86
15 622 7385 7.77 4283 62725 6.39
20 383 7624 4.78 2905 64103 4.34
25 249 7758 3.11 2113 64895 3.15
30 179 7828 2.24 1626 65382 2.43
35 137 7870 1.71 1311 65697 1.96
40 108 7899 1.35 1044 65964 1.56
45 96 7911 1.20 853 66155 1.27
50 77 7930 0.96 701 66307 1.05
55 60 7947 0.75 609 66399 0.91
60 52 7955 0.65 538 66470 0.80
65 48 7959 0.60 473 66535 0.71
70 46 7961 0.57 414 66594 0.62
75 42 7965 0.52 375 66633 0.56
80 40 7967 0.52 338 66670 0.50
85 33 7974 0.41 309 66699 0.46
90 28 7979 0.35 276 66732 0.41
95 25 7982 0.31 249 66759 0.37
100 20 7987 0.25 232 66776 0.35
to be diﬃcult for the attacker.
6.7.4 Experimental Results
Tables consolidating the FPRs and FNRs for each attack scenario and dataset follow shortly.
Each of these tables has the same structure. The first column denotes the threshold applied to
each computed AttSCORE resulting in client attribution. The scale of 3.00 to 3.45 was chosen
to capture a gradient of FNRs in contrast to the FPRs, which are presented in the second
column. The remaining columns are each labeled by the number of requests the attacker made
and the cells populated underneath these column headings represent the resultant FNRs for
a given threshold specified in the first column. Each FNR cell value is an average of three
distinct attack simulation runs using the same attack parameters.
155
Due to the many ways a given website can be utilized, the AttSCORE for legitimate clients
yields a considerable amount of variance leading to undesirable FPs. Unlike an intrusion
detection system in which a FN could potentially result in an undetected compromise of a
system, a FN in the context of a FRC attack is comparatively less worrisome. The result of a
misclassified attack client is incremental charges to the cloud consumer for those resources the
attack client consumed. Because of this fundamental characteristic of a FRC attack, Section 6.8
will provide context for the FNRs through a risk analysis.
6.7.4.1 Random Attack Results
The results reported in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 are for that of attack clients requesting random
pages and issuing web sessions of random length between 3 and 13 documents. As can been,
when employing such an attack strategy, the individual attack clients have a diﬃcult time
requesting more than 30 requests without being flagged as malicious. The motivation for
choosing a random session lengths of the stated values was derived from attack scenario crafted
by Oikonomou et al. for a similar profiling of attack clients behaving in a DDoS attack [87].
In this work, attack clients’ behavior was modeled as an attacker requesting between 5 and 50
documents per session. Using a common dataset (i.e. NASA) and based on the results of the
CDF in Figure 6.5, such a model for session lengths is clearing going to register as anomalous.
Instead, this attack scenario considers attack strategy more aligned with that of a realistic, but
naive attacker. The objective is to show that attack clients cannot employ a primitive attack
strategy and achieve success against the presented attribution methodology.
Based on the anomalous nature of the attack scenario, if a FPR of approximately 1.43%
is acceptable to the cloud consumer, the threshold can be set to identify malicious clients
requesting 25 or more web documents without registering a single FN. As is often the case
in the evaluation of anomaly detection systems, one thing to observe is that as the threshold
increases (i.e. sensitivity decreases) so too does the FNRs while the FPRs decrease. This
observation holds true for the remaining attack scenarios and context for this inevitable trade-
oﬀ will be discussed in Section 6.8. Moreover, the FPRs are the same for a given website across
attack scenarios because the attribution methodology and original log entries remain constant.
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Table 6.3: Random - ECpE Attack Results (%)
FNR (Reqs per Attacker)
Threshold FPR 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
3.00 2.77 14.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.05 2.50 14.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.10 2.16 14.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.15 1.77 15.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.20 1.43 71.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.25 1.20 71.20 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.30 1.02 97.50 36.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.35 0.84 100.0 36.43 8.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.40 0.52 100.0 83.87 8.37 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.45 0.39 100.0 100.0 54.90 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
To put the result in Table 6.3 into perspective, consider the shaded cell denoted by the
superscript one. If using the per-client request volume were the sole attribution criterion, then
at an attack intensity of 30 requests per attacker, based on the results in Table 6.2, the cloud
consumer could achieve a FNR = 0.00% if a FPR = 2.24% were acceptable. Given that the
objective of the FRC attribution methodology is not to detect every malicious client but instead
a suﬃcient amount of malicious clients in order to reduce the impact of a FRC attack, then a
FNR = 8.37% would be preferable given the comparably less impactful FPR = 0.84% yielded
by the given attribution methodology.
It is highly tempting to compare attribution performance across websites in addition to
across attack scenarios. However any conclusions drawn would be erroneous. The websites are
suﬃciently dissimilar resulting in “apples to oranges” comparisons. With that in mind, the
explanation for lower FNRs in the NASA results is due to the sessions per client CDF for the
NASA dataset resulting from a higher volume at lower sessions counts. The NASA dataset
yields a slightly higher sesvol for the same attack parameters and thus produces a consistently
lower FNR.
Applying Equation 6.1 to the described attack scenario for the NASA dataset illustrates
why this particular attack scenario fails for the FRC attacker. As highlighted in Table 6.4,
consider the attack scenario in which attack clients request 20 web documents. First, because
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Table 6.4: Random - NASA Attack Results (%)
FNR (Reqs per Attacker)
Threshold FPR 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
3.00 2.22 15.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.05 1.99 15.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.10 1.78 15.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.15 1.59 15.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.20 1.42 15.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.25 1.25 16.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.30 1.12 72.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.35 0.99 72.90 35.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.40 0.84 100.0 35.73 7.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.45 0.73 100.0 35.77 7.97 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
the attacker is simply requesting random documents, this usage pattern is not indicative of the
overall client population. As a result, attackers consistently score a chistat with µ = 1.0 and
σ = 0.0. While enacting sessions lengths between 3 and 13 documents limits the sesavg score
to µ = 0.6, it does provide a some amount of variability leading to a σ = 0.05. Even at 20
requests, this attack scenario yields a reqvol score of µ = 0.80 and a sesvol score of µ = 0.51 with
σ = 0.23. It is this variability that is responsible for the changes in the FNR for 20 requests
(i.e., FNRs = 15.13, 16.77, 72.73, 72.90, and 100.0). While the chistat and sesavg scores remain
fairly consistent as the request intensity increases, both the reqvol and sesvol do increase as the
request intensity increases and thus the FNR decreases given the common thresholds. These
results make it diﬃcult for the attacker to request much more than 25 requests per bot when
simply requesting random web pages.
6.7.4.2 Prescribed-session Attack Results
In this attack strategy, the attacker is given knowledge of the 100 most requested web
sessions from the training dataset of length three or greater. It is conceivable that an attacker
would attempt to guess a number of common web sessions and distribute these session among
a botnet. Despite the advantage of being privy to such knowledge, as seen in Tables 6.5 and
6.6, individual attack clients yield limited success in this attack scenario. From the attacker’s
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perspective, the achieved results are slightly better than the random attack scenario, because
the prescribed-pattern attack benefits from a lower sesavg score produced by replaying actual
web sessions.
Table 6.5: Prescribed-Session - ECpE Attack Results (%)
FNR (Reqs per Attacker)
Threshold FPR 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
3.00 2.77 12.80 0.50 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.05 2.50 46.27 3.33 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.10 2.16 57.83 3.40 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.15 1.77 100.0 3.40 0.97 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.20 1.43 100.0 20.00 0.97 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.25 1.20 100.0 59.20 5.70 0.13 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.30 1.02 100.0 100.0 58.93 0.33 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.35 0.84 100.0 100.0 99.90 15.57 1.93 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.40 0.52 100.0 100.0 100.0 86.40 12.93 0.57 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.45 0.39 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 93.60 22.47 1.60 0.27 0.00 0.00
One of the primary reasons the prescribed-session attack is not able to overcome the attri-
bution methodology is that despite knowledge of popularly requested web sessions, individual
attack clients are not able to decrease their chistat score, which, for an attack intensity of 20
requests, has a µ = 0.98 and σ = 0.03. This example plays to the strength of the chistat
attribution metric. Because the individual documents that compose the 100 most popular web
sessions primarily fall into Bin 1 in Figure 6.6, the expectation that roughly 10% of the request
generated by the attacker should fall into Bin 2 is seldom fulfilled and thus the consistently
high chistat scores are recorded leading to a higher overall ATTSCORE .
Of the 100 web sessions chosen by the attacker for the ECpE dataset, the majority of the
sessions are of length three or four. Generating web session lengths closer to that experienced
by normal users reduces the attack clients sesavg score and significantly reduces the respective
standard deviation. While advantageous for the attacker, the eﬀect this reduction has the
sesavg increases the sesvol score to a µ = 0.75 with σ = 0.02 at a request intensity of 20
documents - a trend that continues increase and request intensity increases.
As can be observed for each of the attack scenarios, the significant increases in FNRs
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between thresholds and attack request volumes can be attributed to the homogeneity of the
attack profiles or, in other words, a lack of variance in the attribution metric scores a result
to the attacker scenarios. As a result, an increase in the threshold value of 0.05 can yield
noticeable diﬀerences or no diﬀerence at all in the FNRs. This point can be illustrated in
Table 6.5 between the two highlighted cells.
Table 6.6: Prescribed-Session - NASA Attack Results (%)
FNR (Reqs per Attacker)
Threshold FPR 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
3.00 2.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.05 1.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.10 1.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.15 1.59 91.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.20 1.42 100.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.25 1.25 100.0 51.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.30 1.12 100.0 99.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.35 0.99 100.0 100.0 100.0 77.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.40 0.84 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.97 35.70 0.00 63.23 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.45 0.73 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.97 63.23 22.80 0.00 49.43
The CDFs in Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show that given the same attack parameters, the attri-
bution scheme would yield similar results with the exception of the session count CDF (Figure
6.5). The attack parameters derived from the respective training datasets are dissimilar enough
to produce a noticeable contrast in final FNR results. On average, the replayed web sessions for
the NASA conformed less closely to that of normal traﬃc and thus exhibit higher ATTSCORE
on average than that of the 100 most popular web sessions observed in the ECpE dataset.
6.7.4.3 Trace-Driven Attack Results
A trace-driven attack is extremely challenging for anomaly detection because the attacker
has managed to emulate normal usage behavior. In order to identify significant variation in
FNR performance, the range of per client request volume for this attack scenario has been
extended. Increasing the per request volume translates to each client launching more trace
driven sessions thus providing a greater opportunity for detection. As shown in Tables 6.7
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and 6.8, even though an attacker is requesting a significant amount of web documents (i.e.
reqvol) and thus web sessions (i.e. sesvol), the overall FNRs remain quite high. As the number
of requests and web sessions increase, the attacker approaches the 99th percentile for each
dataset’s request volume CDF and session count CDF resulting in reqvol and sesvol scores
returning values of where µ = 0.98 is σ = 0.03. However, because the attacker is simply
replaying web sequences of normal request patterns for a website, both the chistat (µ = 0.62
and σ = 0.31) and sesavg (µ = 0.44 and σ = 0.24) scores remain within the bounds of normal
despite the increase in request volume and thus do not contribute suﬃciently to the overall
score ATTSCORE necessary to yield lower FNRs.
Table 6.7: Trace-Driven - ECpE Attack Results (%)
FNR (Reqs per Attacker)
Threshold FPR 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
3.00 2.77 90.47 69.57 64.90 61.73 63.07 59.67 59.30 59.03 57.53 58.80
3.05 2.50 93.97 73.43 67.53 63.93 67.10 63.57 62.87 63.73 60.40 62.43
3.10 2.16 96.50 77.37 70.77 67.03 70.33 66.37 65.17 66.60 62.30 64.70
3.15 1.77 98.50 81.90 75.87 72.17 72.97 69.40 68.87 68.40 64.87 66.90
3.20 1.43 99.37 85.37 78.50 76.50 77.17 73.83 73.70 74.03 70.67 70.87
3.25 1.20 99.83 87.97 81.47 79.30 80.03 76.90 77.50 78.73 74.67 75.30
3.30 1.02 100.0 91.33 84.80 82.60 83.10 80.20 80.03 81.57 77.40 77.90
3.35 0.84 100.0 93.90 87.57 86.23 87.20 84.33 83.50 84.10 81.23 82.17
3.40 0.52 100.0 96.20 91.53 90.53 90.83 89.17 88.60 88.87 86.80 87.50
3.45 0.39 100.0 97.67 94.77 93.57 94.53 93.70 93.87 93.37 92.60 92.37
Similar to the prescribed-path scenario, the diﬀerences in FNRs are mainly a product of
the random web session replayed by the attack clients. Although high, the observed FNRs
were anticipated. If an attacker is able to learn the web session patterns of normal clients
and use this knowledge to mount an attack, then the resulting attack client request footprints
should largely be within the scope of normal. Under more formidable attack patterns like the
trace-driven scenario, Equation 6.1 can be altered by assigning a weight to each variable placing
greater emphasis on client’s usage characteristics that are more likely to be anomalous (e.g.,
reqvol or sesvol) for a given FRC attack.
In many ways, enabling the attacker to have access to the training logs is a hefty assumption.
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Table 6.8: Trace-Driven - NASA Attack Results (%)
FNR (Reqs per Attacker)
Threshold FPR 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
3.00 2.22 70.10 50.60 44.77 42.90 39.50 39.63 37.73 39.00 35.73 37.07
3.05 1.99 79.90 54.90 47.77 44.73 42.30 41.57 40.87 41.40 39.43 40.33
3.10 1.78 80.63 57.87 50.40 48.77 44.00 45.03 42.40 44.37 41.37 42.57
3.15 1.59 89.50 62.70 53.40 50.87 45.47 46.10 44.07 45.77 43.17 44.60
3.20 1.42 94.60 67.07 57.47 54.30 48.07 48.40 46.07 48.23 44.37 46.07
3.25 1.25 97.00 73.97 61.70 58.37 51.90 51.13 48.97 50.67 47.00 49.47
3.30 1.12 98.90 79.50 67.17 64.43 57.07 55.03 52.67 53.50 49.37 52.63
3.35 0.99 99.70 83.67 74.87 69.67 62.33 60.67 58.37 59.43 55.97 56.67
3.40 0.84 100.0 86.90 78.80 77.70 70.63 68.63 66.87 66.23 64.47 64.20
3.45 0.73 100.0 90.70 84.23 82.33 76.87 75.60 74.10 73.30 71.03 71.60
Even though the attribution methodology yields undesirable FNRs for large volumes of requests,
this behavior was expected as the attribution methodology was designed for this very purpose.
An objective of the attribution methodology was to decrease the FPRs for legitimate clients
that request a larger than average amount of web documents. Instead of issuing an attribution
threshold based solely on request volume, as is shown in Table 6.2, the attribution methodology
operates on four criterion that together describe normal traﬃc. This way, a legitimate client
that requests more than 40 documents and subsequently registers higher than normal scores
for the reqvol or sesvol metrics can compensate by scoring closer to normal for the sesavg and
chistat scores.
6.8 FRC Risk Analysis
Exploring the proposed attribution methodology in terms of FPRs and FRNs provides a
recognized measure that is common in the evaluation of anomaly detection schemes. In the
context of a FRC attack, however, such an measure does not provide a suﬃcient amount of
information for the cloud consumer to analyze the risk (i.e. risk = likelihood * impact) of
a respective attack scenario, threshold value, and resulting FPR and FNRs [82, 113]. This
section explores the results presented in Section 6.7 with the purpose of better understanding
the likelihood of such attacks and enumerating the impact that they would have on a cloud
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consumer.
6.8.1 Likelihood
The likelihood of an impactful FRC attack is largely dependent on two factors: the threat
source and the vulnerability [82].
6.8.1.1 Vulnerability
The ease of discovering the utility model as an exploitable vulnerability should be easy for
the attacker as the vulnerability has been published in a number of academic and non-academic
forums and is literally hiding in plain sight. A potentially more diﬃcult challenge for the threat
source would be to determine whether or not a particular target is hosted in a CSP environment
without the aide of an endorsement to a specific cloud vendor or a public acknowledgement.
Once the threat source identifies the vulnerability, exploiting the utility model is simply a
matter of making protocol adherent requests to the target website. As this document contains
the seminal work in both FRC detection and attribution, current cloud consumers are unlikely
to detect such an attack through technical measures. Outside inference of an attack based
increases in request volume and/or the audit of the monthly bill.
6.8.1.2 Threat Source
As evidenced by the growing number, capacity, and sophistication of both botnets and
DDoS attacks respectively [11], the worst-case threat source (i.e. botmaster) undoubtedly
possesses the skill level to mount a FRC attack. As discussed in Section 3.4.2, the motive
for performing such an attack ranges from ego and hacktivism to monetary gain, revenge,
creating a competitive advantage and/or economic espionage [113]. Although a FRC attack
could conceivably be carried out from any Internet-connected device, the worst-case scenario is
the attack origination from a large bot. An objective this risk analysis seeks to address is the
minimum botnet size, given the results presented in Section 6.7, that an threat source must
be in control of in order to eclipse the threshold of nuisance activity and perform a successful
FRC attack.
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Determining the minimum size of a botnet needed to carry out a FRC attack is a function
of the target’s detection rate (i.e FNR) and cost threshold (i.e. J1). Tables 6.9, 6.10, and 6.11
display the resulting cost of a FRC attack for botnets consisting in size of 10,000, 100,000, and
500,000 respectively. The first column in these graphs represents the FNR from the attribution
methodology in Section 6.6 and the row heading denotes the average number of request each
individual bot client issues. For example, as reported in Table 6.9 for a 10,000 node botnet, if
each client is to issue 20 requests and the FNR is 10.0% then the resultant monthly cost to the
cloud consumer would be $0.92. As the number of requests and corresponding FNRs increase,
so do the fraudulent costs.
Table 6.9: Monthly Costs of a FRC Attack ($) - 10,000 Client Botnet
Average Requests per Attacker
FNR 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
10.0 0.92 1.83 2.75 3.66 4.58 5.49 6.41 7.32 8.24 9.16
20.0 1.83 3.66 5.49 7.32 9.16 10.99 12.82 14.65 16.48 18.31
30.0 2.75 5.49 8.24 10.99 13.73 16.48 19.23 21.97 24.72 27.47
40.0 3.66 7.32 10.99 14.65 18.31 21.97 25.63 29.30 32.96 36.62
50.0 4.58 9.16 13.73 18.31 22.89 27.47 32.04 36.62 41.20 45.78
60.0 5.49 10.99 16.48 21.97 27.47 32.96 38.45 43.95 49.44 54.93
70.0 6.41 12.82 19.23 25.63 32.04 38.45 44.86 51.27 57.68 64.09
80.0 7.32 14.65 21.97 29.30 36.62 43.95 51.27 58.59 65.92 73.24
90.0 8.24 16.48 24.72 32.96 41.20 49.44 57.68 65.92 74.16 82.40
100.0 9.16 18.31 27.47 36.62 45.78 54.93 64.09 73.24 82.40 91.55
From the analysis of the 10,000 node botnet, it can be seen that a cloud instance that does
not deploy any sort of defense against a FRC attack (i.e. FNR = 100%) that the resultant costs
are likely to be insignificant to the cloud consumer - if the individual bot request rate is under
200 documents a month - and thus would be classified as nuisance activity. Such analysis is,
however, relative to each cloud consumer and their budgeted monthly costs and expected data
usage. For a FNR=30%, even at 200 requests per bot client over a given month, the resultant
costs would be approximately $27.47. For a FRC attacker to be successful, even against a
Trace-Driven attack, a 10,000 node botnet would not be suﬃcient unless clients requested a
significant amount of web documents larger than what was analyzed (i.e. greater than 200
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requests per client in a given month).
Increasing the size of the attack botnet subsequently increases the risk of a FRC attack.
While a 100,000 node botnet is certainly more rare than a 10,000 node botnet, a FRC attacker
is not restrict to performing the attack from a single botnet. Recent analysis has suggested
botnet owners are aware that larger botnets draw attention from law enforcement agency and
security professions and in turn attackers have reacted by creating smaller botnets of less than
50,000 nodes to remain hidden [11]. As a result, a FRC attack could be conducted from many
smaller botnets and together the aggregate clients from these botnets could amass to much
larger numbers.
Comparing the presented attack costs in Table 6.9 with that in Table 6.10, it can be seen
that the financial impact of a FRC attack is linearly proportional to the resulting size of the
botnet. Given the costs in Table 6.10 for a 100,000 node botnet requesting 200 documents
per client, the FRC attack has the potential to transition from nuisance activity into the FRC
attack region. Given these stated attack parameters, the resultant attack rate needed to sustain
such an attack would be 7.71 requests per second, well within the performance capacity of a
CSP server instance.
Table 6.10: Monthly Costs of a FRC Attack ($) - 100,000 Client Botnet
Average Requests per Attacker
FNR 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
10.0 9.16 18.31 27.47 36.62 45.78 54.93 64.09 73.24 82.40 91.55
20.0 18.31 36.62 54.93 73.24 91.55 109.86 128.17 146.48 164.79 183.11
30.0 27.47 54.93 82.40 109.86 137.33 164.79 192.26 219.73 247.19 274.66
40.0 36.62 73.24 109.86 146.48 183.11 219.73 256.35 292.97 329.59 366.21
50.0 45.78 91.55 137.33 183.11 228.88 274.66 320.43 366.21 411.99 457.76
60.0 54.93 109.86 164.79 219.73 274.66 329.59 384.52 439.45 494.38 549.32
70.0 64.09 128.17 192.26 256.35 320.43 384.52 448.61 512.70 576.78 640.87
80.0 73.24 146.48 219.73 292.97 366.21 439.45 512.70 585.94 659.18 732.42
90.0 82.40 164.79 247.19 329.59 411.99 494.38 576.78 659.18 741.58 823.97
100.0 91.55 183.11 274.66 366.21 457.76 549.32 640.87 732.42 823.97 915.53
Increasing the size of the botnet by a factor of five does elevates the potential cost impact
for a cloud consumer but it does so at the loss of subtlety. While the FRC attack considered
in this work was done so under the guise that the attacker attempted to be as surreptitious as
possible in order to avoid detection, this certainly is not the only concern. The utility model
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is also vulnerable to blatant DDoS attacks in which the loss of availability to the victim is
magnified by the high data usage costs. To enumerate this potential, the peak DDoS rate
reported in 2011 was that of 45Gbps which was launched from a 250,000 node botnet over the
course of a week [25]. If such a DDoS attack were performed on a CSP instance, assuming the
target website was continued to operate in the cloud, among other considerations, the resultant
costs to the cloud consumer would be approximately $0.68/s, $40/min, $2430/h, $58,320/day,
and $408,240/week.
Table 6.11: Monthly Costs of a FRC Attack ($) - 500,000 Client Botnet
Average Requests per Attacker
FNR 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
10.0 45.78 91.55 137.33 183.11 228.88 274.66 320.43 366.21 411.99 457.76
20.0 91.55 183.11 274.66 366.21 457.76 549.32 640.87 732.42 823.97 915.53
30.0 137.33 274.66 411.99 549.32 686.65 823.97 961.30 1098.63 1235.96 1373.29
40.0 183.11 366.21 549.32 732.42 915.53 1098.63 1281.74 1464.84 1647.95 1831.05
50.0 228.88 457.76 686.65 915.53 1144.41 1373.29 1602.17 1831.05 2059.94 2288.82
60.0 274.66 549.32 823.97 1098.63 1373.29 1647.95 1922.61 2197.27 2471.92 2746.58
70.0 320.43 640.87 961.30 1281.74 1602.17 1922.61 2243.04 2563.48 2883.91 3204.35
80.0 366.21 732.42 1098.63 1464.84 1831.05 2197.27 2563.48 2929.69 3295.90 3662.11
90.0 411.99 823.97 1235.96 1647.95 2059.94 2471.92 2883.91 3295.90 3707.89 4119.87
100.0 411.99 823.97 1235.96 1647.95 2059.94 2471.92 2883.91 3295.90 3707.89 4119.87
From the analysis of the threat source, given the implementation of presented attribution
scheme and in the context of the two presented datasets, a FRC attacker is going to be required
to possess control of a botnet near the size of 500,000 bots or larger to carry out a successful
attack. While results will vary from site to site, perhaps the simplest measure to take to
decrease the risk of a FRC attack is to limit the amount of requests a single client can enact
in a time certain period of time regardless of the aﬀect that the client has on the QoS of the
web server or network.
As a result of the cloud utility vulnerability being openly published and conceivably easily
discoverable, the likelihood of a FRC attack is largely dependent on the motive of the threat
source and the size of the attacking botnet. As evidenced by the provided analysis, the potential
impact of a FRC attack can be significant, adding to the overall risk of a FRC attack.
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6.8.2 Impact
For the cloud consumer, the impact of a FRC attack can be broken down in to technical
impact factors and business impact factors.
6.8.2.1 Technical Impact Factors
Following the exploitation of the cloud utility model, the predominant concern for the
victim would not be the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data but instead the loss of the
availability or financial viability of hosting public web content in the cloud. When coupled with
the concern of vendor lock-in (Section 2.6.4), a FRC attack could potentially lead to not only
significant monetary costs but also extensive service interruptions while the cloud consumer
extracts and relocates their web-based business presence.
6.8.3 Business Impact Factors
While the predominant impact of a FRC attack has been described as a financial loss due
to the exploitation of the utility model, the data usage costs are not the only toll a FRC attack
inflicts on its victim. In addition to bandwidth costs, a cloud consumer must also consider
auxiliary technical costs of attempting to mitigate a FRC attack as well as the indirect costs
that such measures will have on legitimate users as a result of the inevitable FPs presented in
this chapter. Weighing these factors, the cloud consumer must ultimately determine whether
the business risk justifies investing in mitigation solutions.
The task of assessing the severity of the risk associated to a FRC attack must be done on
an individual cloud consumer basis. The conclusions that can be draw from this FRC risk
analysis is that there exist motivated threat sources highly capable of exploiting the utility
pricing model. Given the both the direct and indirect costs of a FRC attack, the impact has
the potential to be severe.
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6.9 Discussion and Future Work
Presented in this paper is a reactive solution to the FRC attack based on the principles
of anomaly detection. By assuming that each client is innocent until proven guilty, the major
limitation to this approach is if an attacker can learn normal request patterns. As with any
anomaly detection based scheme, when the attackers actions are no longer anomalous, the
methodology is rendered ineﬀective. Although not directly explored in this work, an upper
bound can be placed on the request volume as an additional detection safeguard. For example,
if an attack client consumes more than 50 web documents and the client’s usage footprint is not
flagged as malicious, the attack client is then subjected to some form of challenge or hindrance.
The inevitable downside to this approach is that normal clients requesting over 50 documents
will also be burdened by the same mitigation technique.
Beyond pursuing attack attribution, a cloud consumer could take a proactive stance by lim-
iting the available web content that is publicly accessible. This is commonly performed through
user authentication, access control and serving graphical puzzles to limit readily available web
content. However, these solutions are not without their faults as they are not immune to attack
and they themselves frustrate legitimate user who my be unable or unwilling to engage with the
control. These user frustration considerations are not new with the introduction of the FRC
attack, however the cost benefit equation has shifted knowing that freely available content in
the Cloud could cost the cloud consumer even more in terms of operational expenses.
Given this initial work on FRC attribution, there are several avenues of future work to
explore. While optimized attack strategies were not considered as part of the threat model
in this work, a future endeavor will be to consider the data usage footprint of each client.
In this case, the attacker seeks to minimize the volume of requests by choosing the largest
web documents hosted. Although such an attack would still likely be identifiable by presented
attribution methodology, examining individuals’ data usage provides an addition dimension for
limiting the risk of a FRC attack. Similarly, other aspects of observed client behavior such as
the use of client-side caching, or lack thereof, and the categorization and distributions of both
primary and secondary requests will also be explored. In addition, diurnal, daily, weekly and
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seasonal traﬃc patterns will also be considered to better characterize normal client behaviors.
In this work it is also assumed that the cloud consumer is able to prime the attribution
methodology with a given period of training days. Future work will also explore non-supervised
machine learning techniques when the cloud consumer is not aﬀorded such a luxury.
6.10 Conclusion
The pay-as-you-go pricing model introduces a vulnerability into current CSP oﬀerings.
Web content hosted under a CSP’s utility model enables an attacker to perform a FRC attack
by simply making protocol compliant requests. Due to the ease of exploitation, the only
factor preventing a FRC attack is the threat source’s motivation. With limited prevention
controls available, attribution methodologies are necessary for cloud consumers to defend their
commitments to cloud computing. Based on the results from three progressively challenging
attack scenarios, the proposed attribution methodology has achieved qualified success.
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CHAPTER 7. PREVENTION AND MITIGATION
Chapter contains modified content from the following submitted journal paper:
Idziorek, J., Tannian, M. and Jacobson, D. Insecurity of Cloud Utility Models. IEEE IT
Professional, c￿ IEEE 2012.
The predominant focus of this work is on the detection and attribution of FRC attacks
on public cloud utility models. Bookends between these to aspects of security are prevention
and mitigation respectively. This chapter briefly discusses methodologies that cloud be used to
quell a FRC attack before it comes to fruition and how a cloud consumer could respond once
a FRC attack has been detected and individual malicious clients have been identified.
7.1 Prevention
A common way to prevent the exploitation of a vulnerability is to download and apply a
patch for it. However, in the context of the utility pricing model, the bug is not a software
defect but a common business model deployed by CSPs. Until this vulnerability is exploited
on a frequent basis, the cloud business model is not likely to change. In lieu of a patch for this
vulnerability there are several, albeit limited, prevention options.
7.1.1 User Authentication
The first option for the cloud consumer would be to limit the amount of readily available
public-facing, and thus exploitable, content by implementing a user authentication control into
a given website. By first requiring a user to authenticate to gain access to the majority of a
site’s content lessens the consumable footprint available to a malicious client and potentially
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lends itself well to a more focused attribution solution. Furthermore, authentication assists
in the identification and mitigation of malicious clients as login credentials can be suspended
or revoked independent of an IP address. There are trade-oﬀs, however - by enabling a user
authentication mechanism for content that is intended to be publicly viewable and indexable on
the WWW, such an approach may lead to clients unwilling to go through the necessary steps to
establish login credentials or clients not being able to search for the desired content in the first
place as authentication prevents search engines from indexing content. Lastly, although the
user authentication would potentially limit the amount of exploitable content, the login page
itself and other publicly available content is not impervious to a FRC attack. Although user
authentication may be eﬀective in some contexts, this control is only viable if it is consistent
with the web applications objectives.
7.1.2 Graphical Puzzels
The second option is to challenge those that initiate requests at the onset of a connection
with a CAPTCHA like puzzle. Often used in the prevention of DDoS attacks, CAPTCHAs
challenge the requesting client with a visual puzzle under the assumption that humans can easily
solve the puzzle while bot computers can not. Again, while eﬀective in some circumstances,
such graphical puzzles often complicate the process for clients to obtain the information that
they are seeking, causing some clients to lose interest. Similar to the user authentication
prevention option, CAPTCHAs are not immune to attacks and a motivated attacker could easily
established multiple user accounts or manually defeat CAPATCHAs to bypass this technical
control. In essence, the two presented authentication controls are simply raising the bar of
eﬀort required by the attacker to perform a sustained and successful FRC attack.
7.1.3 Application Design
The third option for the cloud consumer is to work with application and content developers
on minimizing the resource footprint of the common or average web object. Limiting the
impact of client requests increases the costs for the FRC attacker and the risk of detection and
attribution. As was shown in Chapter 6, the more requests a individual client invokes, the
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more anomalous they become. While such a solution certainly does not completely obviate a
FRC attack, it does provide a more client-focused and transparent solution in comparison to
the discussed authentication controls.
7.1.4 Web Hosting Environment
Lastly, if the perceived risk of a FRC attack coupled with other security concerns, such
as vendor lock-in, is a serious concern to the cloud consumer, a potential prevention solution
would be to simply host the web application in an environment not governed by a utility
pricing model. Given the systems of analysis presented in Chapter 2, the cloud consumer must
ultimately decide whether the benefits and cost savings of moving to the cloud are worth the
risks as such an act is a voluntary business decision.
Unfortunately, without a utility model patch, the presented controls will not thwart a
motivated attacker. Facing limited prevention capability, the next line of defense is the detection
of FRC attacks as presented in Chapter 5.
7.2 Mitigation
Once a FRC attack has been detected and malicious clients have been identified, it is
advantageous that the cloud consumer has a mitigation strategy or policy in place to deal with
the suspected malicious actors. When formulating mitigation solutions, the cloud consumer
must consider the potential for legitimate clients being errantly classified as malicious, which
is an undesirable and largely unavoidable aspect of anomaly detection.
7.2.1 Attacker Identification
Malicious requests that compose a FRC attack are likely to originate from zombie or bot
computers that unwittingly and surreptitiously participate in an attack unbeknownst to their
owners. As a result of an anomaly-based attribution scheme, mitigation of a FRC attack could
be accomplished by serving a suspected client a graphical puzzle to prove that the client is
indeed a human. In this context, the graphical puzzle is being served to a potential attack
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client after the defender has reason to believe the client is malicious. This technique has also
been proposed as a mitigation solution for DDoS attacks [58].
Because it is in the best interest of attack clients to form fully-completed TCP connections
in order to attack application-layer resources, attack clients are prevented from spoofing their
IP address. While knowing the true IP address of an attack client aides in the process of
attribution and mitigation, the defender has limited options to actually act on this information
to resolve the problem at the source of the attack. Instead of seeking out individual bots, the
defender is better oﬀ filtering or rate-limiting the oﬀending IP address.
7.2.2 Filtering
While heavy-handed approaches like blacklisting first-time oﬀenders may prove to do more
harm than good given the ever-present FPR rates, filtering oﬀending attackers is a realistic
strategy to decrease the financial impact of attack clients. In other contexts, filtering options
have been employed using a “three strikes and you’re out” rule.
7.2.3 Rate Limiting
In contrast to filtering, less absolute mitigation strategies include assessing anomalous
clients a back-oﬀ timeout in which requests from an IP address are not all serviced. Clients,
whether malicious or not, could also be given a data usage quote. Like many popular news
websites, after a quota has been reached the requesting client is either required to authenticate,
given restricted access, or is denied service all together.
These reactive approaches discussed in this section are available today, but with limited
detection and attribution solutions available to cloud consumers, the deployment and mainte-
nance of such solutions will be challenging.
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION
8.1 Future Work
The impact this work will have on the larger research and cloud communities will be highly
dependent on the future work and understanding of this vulnerability by other researchers
and security practitioners. While the solutions presented in this work are novel and highly
eﬀective given the presented attack scenarios, one must be reminded that these are also the
seminal works on this specific topic. If history is any indicator, the critique and reformulating
of these ideas through several iterations or perhaps new approaches will be needed to address
the presented vulnerability of the cloud utility model.
The body of ideas discussed in this work fundamentally change the way researchers and
security practitioners address anomaly detection of web traﬃc. With the introduction of the
utility model, much more subtle attack behaviors can have an impactful eﬀect and thus the
analysis of such subtle attacks has opened the door for new research ideas, methodologies
and contributions. In addition to addressing the FRC attack, the detection and attribution
methodologies and metrics presented are relevant beyond the state context and could also be
applicable in other areas of study including DDoS detection and web usage mining.
Apart from the chapter specific areas of Future work addressed in Sections 4.8, 5.10, and
6.9, a key component that will enable future work in area of FRC detection and attribution will
be for security researchers to have access to a diversity of web logs from live websites. Although
historical analysis of web logs is beneficial, much more interesting and comprehensive analysis
can be performed given the structure of a live website.
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8.2 Contributions
The contributions of this dissertation are: (1) Conducted a broad security assessment of
the public cloud computing model by applying the Parkerian Hexad as a system of analysis;
(2) Provided detailed evidence that the utility pricing model is an unexplored and unaddressed
vulnerability of the public cloud computing model; (3) Formalized a threat model and clearly
defined the Fraudulent Resource Consumption (FRC) as an attack that exploits the utility
model vulnerability; (4) Examined, diﬀerentiated, and applied the relevant bodies of work in
related fields of study to the analysis of the FRC attack; (5) Developed a web traﬃc generation
algorithm and accompanying characterization metrics to simulate and model the worst-case
FRC attack scenario; (6) Formulated a FRC detection methodology by utilizing three qualities
of aggregate web traﬃc to distinguish normal web traﬃc from that of a FRC attack; (7) Devised
a FRC attribution solution by characterizing four aspects of individual client request behavior
to identify normal clients from that of FRC attack clients.
8.3 Summary
As they are structured today, cloud utility models are vulnerable to exploitation. By
allowing any client with access to the Internet to consume resources that are in turn metered and
billed exposes the cloud consumer to a risk that is only mitigated by time, detection, attribution
and accountability. Apart from the solutions presented in this dissertation, there have been
no previously known defensive strategies. In addition to technical measures, awareness and
understanding of this vulnerability are a key means of defense, and the works that composes this
document has strived to achieve those goals. Unless utility models are restructured to remove
the threat of a FRC attack, research in detection and attribution is necessary to ensure long-
term sustainability of cloud consumers and remove one more impediment that could dissuade
organizations from adopting public cloud computing.
To date, there have been no known public acknowledgements of a FRC attack occurring
on the public cloud. The absence of such knowledge, however, does not confirm that such
a vulnerability has not or will not be exploited. As an analog, back in the early 1990’s,
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Internet-facing firewalls were new and thought to be suﬃcient to secure a connected enterprise.
However, reality was that attacks were occurring and intrusion detection systems soon pointed
out these threats. Perhaps the utility model has been exploited and, as an security and research
community, we are presently ill equipped to detect its presence or identify its culprits.
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